East-Timor

How to Build a New Nation in Southeast Asia in the 21st Century?

Edited by
Christine Cabasset-Semedo & Frédéric Durand

2009
N°9
EAST-TIMOR
HOW TO BUILD A NEW NATION
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY?
A collection under the supervision of Benoît de Tréglodé

East-Timor

How to Build a New Nation in Southeast Asia in the 21st Century?

Edited by
Christine Cabasset-Semedo and Frédéric Durand


The Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia (USR 3142 – UMIFRE 22), based in Bangkok, Thailand, calls on specialists from all academic fields to study the important social, political, economic and environmental developments that affect, together or separately, the eleven countries of the region (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam).

LE CONSEIL SCIENTIFIQUE DE L’IRASEC

- Jean BAFFIE, CNRS, IRSEA
- Bénédicte BRAC de la PERRIERE, CNRS, EHESS
- Sophie BOISSEAU du ROCHER, Centre Asie
- Jean-Raphaël CHAPONNIERE, CNRS, AFD
- Christian CULAS, IRASEC CNRS
- Gilles DELOUCHE, INALCO
- Jean-Luc DOMENACH, CERI, Réseau Asie
- Evelyne DOURILLE-FEER, CEPII
- Stéphane DOVERT, MAE
- Frédéric DURAND, Université de Toulouse
- Alain FOREST, Paris VII
- Guy FAURE, IAO
- Michel FOURNIE, INALCO
- Charles GOLDBLUM, Ecole d’architecture de Paris
- Christopher GOSCHA, Université de Montréal
- Yves GOUDINEAU, EFE, AFRASE
- Andrew HARDY, EFE, Hanoi
- Jacques IVANOFF, IRASEC CNRS
- François LAGIRARDE, EFEO Bangkok
- Christian LECHERVY, MAE
- Arnaud LEVEAU, IRASEC
- LE Huu Khoa, Université de Lille
- Charles MAC DONALD, CNRS
- Rémi MADINIER, IRASEC CNRS
- Philippe PAPIN, EPHE
- François RAILLON, CNRS, EHESS
- Jean-François SABOURET, CNRS, Réseau Asie
- Christian TAILLARD, CNRS LASEMA
- Hugues TERTRAIS, Université de Paris VII
- Benoît de TRÉGLODÉ, IRASEC
- Marie-Sybille de VIENNE, INALCO
# Table of Contents

## Introduction

- Multidimensional Identity Construction: Challenges for State-building in East Timor
  - Nuno Canas Mendes

- Negotiating Statehood and Humanitarian Assistance in Timor-Leste: an incompatible pair?
  - Christine Schenk

## Part 1 – A difficult transition toward a new nation

- Reconciliation in Timor-Leste and the Role of the Media: The Casa de Produção Audiovisual
  - Henriette Sachse

## Part 2 – Socio-cultural identities and factors in question

- Translation in Crisis, Crisis as Translation
  - Paulo Castro Seixas

- "Ema Lorosa’e", "Ema Loromonu": Identity and Politics in Timor-Leste
  - David Hicks

- Nation building at the village level: First the house, then the Church and finally a modern state
  - Alexander Loch

- Denying peripheral status, claiming a role in the nation: sacred words and ritual practices as legitimating identity of a local community in the context of the new nation
  - Lúcio Sousa
Part 3 – Politics, legitimacy and electoral processes

Elections and the Social Dimensions of Democracy/Lessons from Timor-Leste ................................................................. 123
Rui Graça Feijó

Suffering, Dignity and Recognition. Sources of political legitimacy in independent East Timor ...................... 139
Kelly Silva

Crisis and Nation-building in Timor-Leste ................................................. 159
Sara Gonzalez Devant

Part 4 – Tracks for the construction of the future

Crises and Uncertainties as a Sign of a Lack of Timorese Project of Society ................................................................. 175
Frédéric Durand

Human Safety, Security, and Resilience: Making Narrative Spaces for Dissent in Timor-Leste ........................................ 193
Jacqueline Aquino Siapno

Thinking Tourism in the Sustainable Development Era in Timor-Leste: a tourism policy emerging from the grass-roots level .......... 213
Christine Cabasset-Semedo

Chronology: 1974-2009 ........................................................................ 233

Glossary and list of acronyms ............................................................... 268

Bibliography .......................................................................................... 274

Contributors ............................................................................................ 296
Main towns and transportation infrastructure of Timor-Leste
Introduction

This book is the direct outcome of a panel on Timor-Leste entitled « How to build a new nation? » and organized in September 2007 in the framework of the EUROSEAS Congress in Naples¹. Among the more than 40 panels held, Timor-Leste’s had been remarkably dense, with 20 presentations given by American, Australian, Brazilian, East-Timorese, French, German, Portuguese and Spanish researchers. At the time of this congress, the major event of 2006, which two years after continued to be called “the crisis”, was still foremost in people’s minds, conversations, and researches. While other events or forewarning episodes had taken place before that date, no doubt that the crisis of 2006/2007 had finally prove to be a turning point, for the country itself, and maybe even more so for international actors.

Though presented at first as a United Nations’ success story, especially when the territory was under UN management from October 1999 (withdrawal of the Indonesian army) until 20 May 2002 (independence of the country), the unity of Timor-Leste was then in peril, deceiving the expectations that had prevailed during the resistance years. Its climax was the conflict between “those from the West” and “those from the East” (“Loromonu-Lorosae” or Firaku-Kaladi), and a violence which caused a wave of internal refugees (around 150,000 IDP-Internally Displaced People). Beyond the causes and effects of this political and military crisis which had then spread to civil society, the “crisis” had also directly or indirectly revealed a certain number of dysfunctions, notably the deficiencies of the UN preparations of

¹ European Association for South-East Asian Studies, see http://www.euroseas.org/platform/en/content/5th-euroseas-conferences-naples-2007
independence and of the capacity of East Timorese governing bodies to manage and organize the country.

The year 2007, though quieter, remained however very tense because of the elections -presidential, then legislative- which changed the political landscape of the country. During the EUROSEAS congress of 2007, the Fretilin, the party historically representing the fight for the independence, had recently lost its majority to a coalition and a new Prime Minister who had been appointed on 8 August 2007: Xanana Gusmão, former leader of the resistance, who had just given up his position as President of the Republic in favor of José Ramos Horta, co-laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 for his role as defender of the people of East Timor. The fourth government formed by Xanana Gusmão was then confronted to the necessity to find an issue to the 2006/2007 crisis and, at the same time, to the necessity to set up new ways of exercising power. Most of the articles published in the present book integrate in their analyses these two main constraints by exploring different themes and angles, even if it could not be foreseen in September 2007 that the country would a few months later narrowly avoid a new political drama.²

The first part of this book presents some fundamental elements in historical perspective to understand the "difficult transition toward a new nation". Nuno Canas Mendes goes back to the “formation” of Timor-Leste, forever tied to Portuguese and Indonesian colonization, but also to “cultural roots” and to the means used during pre- and post-independence period to promote a collective effort around the idea of “nationalism”. It also shows to which extent the formation of a State’s identity is a multi-dimensional and a long-term process, and how the viability of a State is connected to its ability to answer basic expectations: safety, justice, and socio-economic welfare.

² On 11 February 2008, the rebel leaders Alfredo Reinado and Gastão Salsinha organized a joint attack in Dili against President José Ramos Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão. Alfredo Reinado was killed during the operation while José Ramos Horta, wounded in the stomach, had to be hospitalized in Australia where he stayed for several months of convalescence.
While exploring the causes of the dysfunctions of the State, Christine Schenck focuses her article on the needs assessment mission, carried out by the World Bank in 1999, as one of the major factors explaining the difficulties met today in the construction of the East Timor State. She shows that, by that time, this mission concentrated more on meeting basic needs than on the construction of the State and, moreover, that the different Timorese components – local populations, chiefs of suco, and even Timorese leaders or experts – contributed so little to this work that the latter “did not feel in the driver’s seat.” In conclusion, she points out how negotiating statehood was initially largely an international affair.

“Reconciliation” is one of the main challenges of nation building, between Timor-Leste and Indonesia, but also between Timor nationals themselves, notably between pro-integration and pro-independent individuals. Henriette Sachse bears witness to the role that the media played in Timor-Leste’s nation building. By focusing her article on the “Casa de Produção Audiovisual” (CPA), created and managed by the Jesuits, she underlines the involvement of this institution, in particular through the series entitled “História ba Futuru” “history for the future”, in the reconciliation process and the building of peace. Aimed at contributing to “the quest of a common perception of the history of the country”, the episodes broadcasted on television on a weekly basis, address periods and pages of the country’s history.

The second part of the book deals with socio-cultural identities and factors. Paulo Seixas analyzes the crisis of 2006 as a founding moment of the Nation, and as a “first ritual war”, post independence, during which the core cultural problem of Timor-Leste was revealed: Translation of Traditions. With this crisis, several pasts were brought to the front stage and put into discussion, which ultimately led to violence. This violence, as evidence of a crisis, has to be discussed in itself in order to translate it, the only way of creating a future.

The crisis of 2006 and more precisely the conflict "Lorosa'e / Loromonu" constitutes the main core of David Hicks’ article. The paper examines and assesses the distinction as an authentic verbal model of
Timorese socio-political identity, and to question the extent to which it is sociologically and politically viable. By doing so, this article overviews the geographic, historic, “ethnic”, and “sociological” contours of this distinction and questions the use of the conflict for political purposes.

Alex Loch analyses through three dimensions (“tradition”, “modernity” and “catholicism”) the parameters of state building on national and local scales, especially at the level of the village, a fundamental element in a country where more than 80% of the population lives from subsistence farming in rural settings. He emphasizes how these three dimensions cohabit on a daily basis, without excluding each other, and how one of the challenges to build “an imagined modern community” is to integrate traditional concepts and catholic values because, in case of a crisis, if a choice of priorities must be made, it would be as follows: “First the house, then the church and finally the modern state”.

From his side, Lúcio Sousa examines viewpoints from the so called “periphery”, i.e. from the countryside far from Dili. His paper intends to discuss the place and role of traditional political–ritual officialdom in the context of the new nation. The mountains and its inhabitants tend to be neglected, and depicted as inaccessible, peripheral and passive in opposition to the active role claimed to be played by the central State and the Church. His observations rely on ethnographic fieldwork made among the Bunak of East Timor in a small village in the mountains of Bobonaro, near the border with Indonesia. It presents the way local identity is constructed through a preserved tradition of oral history which depicts the region as the centre and origin of the world and the renewed practice of community rituals.

Politics, legitimacy and electoral processes constitute the third part of the book. Rui Graça Feijó studies the results of the elections of 2007, presidential and parliamentary, as the outcome of five years of the first political cycle of the country. In spite of a serious crisis that paralyzed much of the country in 2006, the attachment to constitutional procedures during this electoral period (3 votes in 3 months), were demonstrated by numerous elements such as: the number of voters, the calm which
surrounded these elections, the plurality of the parties represented etc. In this sense, if a number of challenges remain for the political actors, the electoral cycle of 2007 may be interpreted as a clear sign of progress in the consolidation of democracy in Timor-Leste.

In the context of the dynamics of the presidential pools in 2007, Kelly Silva’s text discusses the claims and dispute for political legitimacy in the East Timorese state-building process. The paper presents the sociological and moral principles under which political authority is sought by East-Timorese local elites from the main political parties. This work has been undertaken mainly through ethnographic observations of the electoral rituals – rallies, radio and television broadcasts, newspaper coverage. It shows the prevalence of value-ideas such as suffering, dignity and recognition in the repertoire of East Timorese contemporary political culture.

Coming back to the International community’s institutional top-down understanding of conflicts, which appears significantly different from the “Timorese experience” of violence, Sara Gonzalez-Devant offers an analysis of the role of the crisis in the nation-building process. Approaching the conflict not as Timorese state-failing but rather as Timorese society engaging in nation-building can help avoid both mystifying and over-rationalising the 2006/07 crisis.

After these analyses on the anthropological, historical and political backgrounds of the emerging of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, and on the factors of socio-cultural identity of the country, the fourth part of this book: “Tracks for the construction of future” offers the occasion to reassess the recent changes in perspective of present and future projects and prospects. Frédéric Durand’s text: “Crisis and uncertainties as a sign of a lack of Timorese society project” studies the main elements of the rhetoric used during the time of the accession to independence and the first years of the new state. It often recalls political declarations made by the international community about Timor in the 1970’s. In this context, the concepts of “viability” and of “poverty” that have regularly been associated to Timor-Leste’s need to be questioned. Similarly the importance and the impact of international aid has to be
reviewed not only “positively”, but also as a possible factor of destabilization. The four main crisis faced by the country between 2002 and 2008 can also be analyzed in terms of ideological contractions between the political leaders, naïves visions from international experts and a lack of real East-Timorese project of society for the future.

To further deepen those questions, Jacqueline Aquino Siapno’s paper “Human Safety, Security and resilience: making narrative spaces for dissent in Timor-Leste” focuses on who is reading, representing, interpreting, and producing knowledge in Timor-Leste, and about whom and what, notably through the analysis of political speeches and declarations. It shows the really wide gap that often exists between state ideals and everyday reality. Those “ideals” are disconnected from local knowledge, local methods of governance, cosmologies, paradigms, etc., and they might create more problems than improvements, as they may mainly benefit an exclusive elite and depend on an external “rule of experts”.

The last article of this book: “Thinking Tourism in the sustainable development era in Timor-Leste: a tourism policy emerging from the grass roots level”, by Christine Cabasset-Semedo, comes back to tourism policies and main factors and actors of tourism activity. This sector, though considered by all successive governments as a means to develop the country’s economy and to fight poverty, nevertheless received little attention for years, when the focus was mainly put on the country’s image and on attracting foreign investment. Her article shows that small entrepreneurs, and a number of private initiatives, especially those coming from the districts, can become essential players in the emerging tourist industry of Timor-Leste, particularly in a context where the gap between Dili and the rest of the country has severely increased during these last few years.

Christine Cabasset-Semedo & Frédéric Durand
PART 1
A Difficult Transition toward a New Nation
Multidimensional identity construction: Challenges for State-building in East Timor

Nuno Canas Mendes

The main goal of this article is to demonstrate that identity construction of one State is a structured and multi-dimensional process, with no hegemonic bases and single explanations, which – in the case of East Timor – took place in the post-Cold War new and uncertain configuration of forces and actors. In addition to this framework, it will also take into account East Timor’s historical scenario, in which cultural roots are juxtaposed by colonial influences (Portuguese and Indonesian) and by the UN international administration. These structures and forces led to the formation of nationalism and to the willing of building a State and a national identity. Let us start by conceptual precision, in order to establish a genealogy for East Timor. In fact, I tend to perceive the formation of identitary structures – especially if national identity is under scrutiny - in a dynamic perspective. National identity is a long term political process with unforeseen results. However, organized political power used to establish a program to feed the development of national feelings. The State capacity to fulfill its basic goals - security, justice and socio-economic welfare - usually compromises the success of

---

3 Coordinator of the Research Project “State-building, state-failure debate in International Relations: the case of East Timor” (PTDC/CPO/71659/2006), sponsored by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT).

this program. This is the point where this text deals with the state-failure concept, trying to point out some of the difficulties in fulfilling the basic goals named above. However, it is not my purpose to label East Timor as a failed-state, only to share my worries – “challenges” in a more positive sense.

Following a constructivist approach, let me try a reflection on identity matters, keeping in mind the inputs of colonial history and international relations changes will be analyzed and connected in order to explain the creation of East Timor.\(^5\) There is nothing new or even original in recognizing the importance of colonization: it gives a territorial basis for the creation of a nation-state and offers the nationalist ideology to the ‘native’ elite. The same assertion is valid taking into account international relations evolution and actors involved. There is probably no need to write a dissertation on this topic: the various actors involved, States, individuals, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, solidarity networks, public opinion, media’s impact, extension of UN’s mandate, only to mention a few of them, were influenced by the Cold War and post-Cold War architecture. In addition, the pre-eminence taken by new emergent nationalisms or the growing impact of globalization (in its economic and technological aspects) was highlighted in this particular case.

How then, was East Timor born? This is a very easy question to ask. The answer, on the contrary, is complex and underlines the multidimensional nature of East Timorese nationalism.\(^6\) This gestation motivated the proposal for describing the constituting project of this State’s identity, highlighting the following issues. These issues are going to be developed in the three parts summarized \textit{infra}:

- \textit{Boundaries and cultural roots}, especially the traditional concept of  
  \textit{sacred house} and its socio-political influence is a key to understanding 
  what is happening in East Timor today;

- \textit{Pre-Independence Ways and means of collective mobilization}, in which 
  we can include the following points: mythology, nationalist propaganda

---

Mattoso (J.) 2001, “Sobre a Identidade de Timor Lorosa’e”.

Colonization and the Problem of East Timorese Nationalism”; Guedes (N.C.) 2005, “A 
Complexidade Estrutural do Nacionalismo Timorense”.
and the Resistance, the role of Catholic Church, national language choice, youth movements, “heroes” and personality cults, formation of people’s stereotypes, like “Povo Maubere” or the distinction between “Kaladi” native Westerners and “Firaku” native Easterners (Loromonu /Lorosae). All this points have ambivalent effects, simultaneously uniting and fracturing:

- Post-Independence Diffusion and inculcation of the representations of a national project: The following aspects will be taken into account, in which were being tested, the efforts of inculcating a national project: the movement of national unity – CNRT, education system and armed forces, elections and system of government, foreign policy and regional relationships with Australia and Indonesia. Economic aspects, such as oil dossiers or unemployment are also important issues which help us to understand the present situation in East Timor. Special attention will be paid to the period after 2002 because of its importance as a test to the fragilities of a state-building process with the contingencies named above.

1 - Boundaries and cultural roots

The three steps mentioned above are an outline of what we intend to describe as the architecture of East Timorese nationalism, which is obviously a political process under construction. A very simple conceptual explanation is due to the reader of this first part of the essay. I understand nationalism as the usual programme for giving sense to a political unit made up of colonial (and post-colonial) spoils. In fact, I am trying to follow the gestation of East Timor by starting to map the territory and its common socio-cultural patterns. That is what I have called boundaries and cultural roots. For boundaries, I mean the existence of a political unit, defined by Portuguese colonization not without a tremendous effort to pacify all the kingdoms in the Eastern part of the island. The frontiers were convened with the Dutch only in 1916 and following a long process of diplomatic negotiations which lasted for
60 years. The question is still under controversy as the borders are still being defined, with acute difficulties with Australia.⁷

What I figure as a fundamental concept concerning the Timorese cultural roots is that of sacred house (uma lulik, in Tetum language), which is a fundamental reference of the traditional socio-political system (Hohe, 2002). In fact, the Sacred House is still a stable institution in the present political context as a common house of all the Timorese people (an intuitive translation for nation). The Sacred House is also a source of political legitimacy based on a hierarchical and aristocratic model of society, in which belonging to certain lineages is still important. The Sacred House is not only a cosmogony but also a metaphor for a dual organization of society, which distinguishes sacred from civil power. This diarchic and complementary model establishes the distinction and hierarchy between spiritual and political power and orders the ruling leaders for both powers as well as the system of alliances with other political units. I would like to underline, however, that the uma lulik is not a specific feature of East Timor; what is really a unique pattern is the one the Portuguese rule made in establishing a relationship with the indigenous socio-political structure⁸.

The polarization between religious and civil transposed to a “modern” democratic system is a source of tensions, as showed by the

---

⁷ Munton (A.J.) 2007, A Study of the Offshore Petroleum Negotiations between Australia, the U.N. and East Timor. East Timor-Indonesia Boundary Committee continues to meet, survey, and delimit the land boundary, but several sections of the boundary especially around the Oekussi enclave are still under discussion; Indonesia and East Timor contest the sovereignty of the uninhabited coral island of Palau Batek/Fatu Sinai, which prevents delimitation of the northern maritime boundaries. East Timor and Australia continue to meet but disagree over how to delimit a permanent maritime boundary and share unexploited potential petroleum resources that fall outside the Joint Petroleum Development Area covered by the 2002 Timor Sea Treaty; the dispute with Australia also hampers the creation of a southern maritime boundary with Indonesia (http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0902237.html).

⁸ The Portuguese produced to a certain extent a symbiosis in which they exerted civil power, not sacred, simultaneously internalizing the local alliance system. Portuguese flags, considered as lulik objects, symbolically expressed the existence of pacts. Another important measure, which is complementary to the above mentioned, was the cooperation of the Timorese elites in the Portuguese Army. This was an alliance and, at the same time, a sort of loyalty guarantee for the colonizers. This sort of consensus made the almost non-existent Portuguese presence in military and civil terms possible.
chronology of events since 2002. The clash between the Government and the Catholic Church or between Xanana Gusmão and Mari Alkatiri is more understandable in this picture, which relates the local paradigms to the imported ones.

2 - Pre-Independence Ways and means of collective mobilization

Let us start the second part of this essay, according to the summary above. This second step points out the birth of a kind of collective will supra kingdom or ethno-linguistic levels. I should start underlining what “collective will” is supposed to mean in this context. I am not talking about an organized nationalist movement yet, but of a collection of socio-political movements as a pre-consciousness configuration of sentiments belonging to East Timor as a whole.

Here two parameters can be established, one which recalls the myth of the crocodile as the island’s founding ancestor, which is common to several ethno-linguistic groups (with non-relevant variations) and the other, historical, we would like to develop further in this paper.

Let us focus on a flash of events that somehow prefigure a kind of collective sentiment beyond kingdom or ethno-linguistic levels. In the beginning of the 20th century, the Manufahi Wars, led by Liurai D. Boaventura, presumably showed evidence of a division between the natives, but was, in a way, an anti-colonialist and proto-nationalist sign inspired by some assimilated urban Timorese natives, some of them affiliated to the local Freemasonry.9 The Japanese invasion during the Second World War produced an organized resistance supporting both Portuguese colonial rule and Australian soldiers. In the late fifties, the upheaval against the colonial order in Viqueque (1959) took place and then, in the sixties, the Malay-Indonesian inspired nationalist movement, União da República de Timor.10

9 Gunn (G.C.) 1999, Timor Loro Sae, 500 anos.
10 Fernandes (M.S.) 2005, “A União da República de Timor: o atrófico movimento nacionalista islâmico-malaio timorense, 1960-1975”. Other aspects contributed to the development of nationalism ideals such as media impact (newspaper in 1938 and radio in 1950), the
The most significant key moments are undoubtedly the end of Portuguese colonization and the formation of the political parties followed by the Indonesian invasion in 1975. The main political parties, namely UDT, FRETILIN and APODETI; all of them were created in 1974, all of them grouping the different sensibilities within the East Timorese elite and giving birth to deep fractures that are still remaining and still have ‘modern’ and ‘pre-modern’ causes.

The twenty-five year Indonesian occupation was, however the most prominent mobilization factor for the deepening of an East Timorese sentiment and for the development of a nation-building project. Two forces with a remarkable strength and energy fought the intruders: the Resistance movement and the Catholic Church. Both of them were able to get support from outside and to be internationally recognized. With great effort and often with feelings of dispair, I should note. Indonesia’s political weakness, following the East Asian financial crisis, made the agreement for an auto-determination referendum possible, leading to end the last foreign power who have formally ruled in East Timor. A significant proportion of the people (79%) voted for independence.

It is not possible to forget the importance of the social forces that dynamically influenced this evolution and the genesis of a political collective will, some of them pointed out above. The Catholic Church was not only the lasting institution during the Indonesian rule, but also the vehicle for the survival of the Portuguese and the Tetum languages; its role in denouncing the human rights abuse was crucial. The clergymen from East Timor were strong defenders of East Timorese “cultural identity”, recognizing and diffusing the idea of its uniqueness. Their resilience had some echo in Vatican and, despite all the diplomatic difficulties, the Pope, John Paul II, visited East Timor in 1989. The influence of deportees and Portuguese officers, growing level of education for local elites and contact with African nationalisms, especially in Mozambique.

number of Catholics, below 30% in 1973, has risen, during the Indonesian rule, to almost 95% in 2002.\textsuperscript{12}

What is also significant were the young students who, during Indonesian rule, established a connection not only with those who were in the mountains, but also with those who were abroad, in Indonesia or in Australia (also counting on the support of the refugee’s communities), creating and reinforcing a solidarity network which strengthened the global support to the cause. These young people constitute the new nationalist generation that now is competing politically with the old Portuguese-styled generation.

The Resistance also used typical propaganda techniques such as the promotion of a personality cult around Xanana Gusmão or Nicolau Lobato. Xanana was the liurai of the liurais, the hero, the model for the \textit{homo timorensis}, the Southeast Asian Che, and was finally victimized when he was captured and imprisoned, also obtaining a kind of Mandela’s \textit{aura}. The need of using a stereotype for people, \textit{maubere} literally meaning \textit{very poor}, was a way of uniting people due to the pain and grievances they had suffered during colonial rule, especially the Indonesian rule. \textit{Maubere People} was a selected image in the nationalist discourse, used as a tool for forging an East Timorese identity. East Timorese, not the Mambai or the Fataluku (ethno-linguistic groups), were the ‘Maubere People’ who were victimized for centuries by Portuguese and then Indonesian colonization.\textsuperscript{13}

The historical picture cannot be dissociated of these mobilization forces that more or less worked concertedly to take advantage of the internal and international environment in order to attain their goals: the survival of an imagined community in the eastern part of the island of Timor.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{12}] Durand (F.) 2004, op.cit.
\item[\textsuperscript{13}] Seixas (P.C.) 2006, “De Maubere a Kafir e Mais Além: o Meio-da-Terra em Movimento”.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
3 - Post-Independence Diffusion and inculcation of the representations of a national project

The third part of this essay will be focused on the development of the nationalist project since the moment that the idea of independence was seen as viable.

From the emerged political parties with divergent programs and political methods in 1975 to the creation of Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense (CNRT) in 1998, the Resistance evolved significantly, not only in ideological terms but also strategically. The Resistance leaders finally perceived that the only way to succeed was to act as a united front. A fragile united front, we must recognize, which split into dozens of new and restored political parties after 1999. Some of the CNRT members participated in the UNTAET administration until the first elections to the Constituent Assembly in August 2001, won by FRETILIN.

After the announcement of the results, Vieira de Mello formed the first government with a majority of FRETILIN members, and after May 2002, without legislative elections, this party assumed full control of the government and parliament. The hegemonic FRETILIN had regular fighting with president Xanana as a result, not only from old and domestic political differences but also because of the Portuguese inspired semi-presidential system. This formally established a dual leadership that was one of the main institutional sources of disruption, even if the causes of divisions between the President and FRETILIN were older than the decision of a semi-presidential system.

---

14 Two and a half years of United Nations administration in a monstrous task of nation and state-building with unequal results and surely with a contested success, allowed East Timorese people to elect a Constituent Assembly and a Head of State. The political involvement and participation was considerably high. The people seemed to be motivated to try the democratic very strange reality.

15 The defined functions of the President are essentially symbolic, but the Constitution’s article 86 gives him the power of dissolving parliament and the government. In a way, this disposition institutionalized the tension between Gusmão e Alkatiri.

16 Feijó (R.G.) 2006, Timor, Paisagem Tropical com Gente Dentro.
The end of the UN’s transitional administration showed to the world how the newborn State had to face several challenges, not only in terms of socio-economic conditions, but also in terms of the political institutions would function. This issue, in particular, has been critical. Since May 2002, two moments of tension, the first one in December 2002 and the other starting in 2005 and climaxing between January-June 2006, showed how hard an independent status could be. The weak East Timorese economy guaranteed the country’s position in the countries ranking below the poverty line. Most worrying is perhaps the divisions within the ruling elite. Those divisions, with serious security implications, gave the opportunity for another foreign intervention in which Australia, in a *gendarme’s* role, has the most important position.

The elections of 2007 confirmed the changes in the political spectrum and two main consequences: Xanana left the presidency with his charismatic image eroded due to his leading of the constitutional crisis that led to Alkatiri’s resignation in 26 June 2006; FRETILIN is no longer hegemonic and needs to establish an agreement to rule with stability.

This series of events in which collective political will was tested seems to prove that an East Timorese consciousness is in fact a *longue durée* process and that various types of constraints remain for the existence of a State capable to assure security, justice or socio-economic welfare to its citizens. Of course, we do not intend to prophesize a State failure; it is very early to recognize East Timor as filling the variable prerequisites of a failed State even if many symptoms of State failure are clear. The concept is everything but unanimous and it is not the intention of this text to develop its particular background, for which a review of literature would be needed and perhaps to try the *spectre of comparisons*.17

In fact, it would be very useful to try the identification and mapping of social, economical and political indicators of state failure (refugees, the legacy of vengeance, gang violence, underdevelopment, poverty, low human development index, unemployment, weak law enforcement mechanisms, failing judicial system, low human security, among others). It would also be extremely important to evaluate the institutional

---

17 Cotton (J.) 2007, “Timor-Leste and the discourse of State-failure”
shortcomings and how the democratic regime functions, as well as the judicial system. Another exercise of great relevance would be to put the Timorese political evolution into perspective. The political crisis started in 2005, opposed by the Church and Government and reached its most critical level during January-June 2006, when the “Peticionários” episode showed serious institutional problems. This crisis has a number of symptoms, trends, evolutions and actors:

- the political/constitutional system;
- the divisions of the elites;
- the security and defense forces issue;
- political exploitation of ethnic identity (the tensions between Lorosae/Loromonu);
- the Catholic Church's involvement in the crisis;
- The role played by paramilitary groups (militias, martial arts groups, and others).

In this same framework, foreign policy is at front and centre as a key tool to reinforce the country multilaterally and bilaterally at international and regional levels, giving special emphasis to international aid and cooperation programs, the attraction of foreign capitals and the Timor Gap agreement.

This cartography requires a deep and long research fieldwork to be developed. In this text, I am taking the risk of presenting a dilettante perspective. Without going further into a detailed analysis based on precise data, four of the main tasks of the State - education, security, foreign policy or economy - are still, to a certain degree, a mirage.

As far as the educational system and the armed forces performance is considered, the situation reveals a sad picture. Progress in the educational system is slow: the Portuguese language, chosen as a national language, is far from a widespread reality and a severe limitation to an efficient education. Regarding the armed forces, the picture is even worse. The Reinado’s adventure is the clearest sign that there is only a simulacrum of Army and that there is a serious security problem in East Timor. The Army and the Police are unprepared and not cohesive. Command obedience is non-existent. The peticionários claim their rights, for which they fought with pro-government troops (May
2006). Weapons are circulating with no control. This is one of the main factors of instability that urged the Australian intervention and the continuity of the United Nations mission.

Foreign policy, on the other hand, is one of the main bases for sovereignty. East Timor needs to play in several scenarios, multilaterally and bilaterally. However, this still is not sustainable. The country is not able to do it accurately. The Timor Sea dossier, conducted by the former Prime Minister Alkatiri, was, according to several opinions, the only foreign policy exercised with some limited success. The Australia factor tends to be a geopolitical fate for East Timor and the continent-island is pursuing a policy of attracting East Timor to the category of the Pacific islands. The comparison with Solomon Islands or with Papua New Guinea is recurrent.

Of course, the economic aspect is crucial and overwhelmingly important in State-building. Not only because of the bad indicators, such as the human development rate, but also because of the huge unemployment in Dili which especially affects young people, or the oil and gas off shore exploration, and the great expectation for the country’s happy future. Australia intends to avoid disorder nearby its influence area18. Moreover, it seems that oil reserves in the Timor Sea are significant and the negotiations between the two countries were beneficial to East Timor.

Not all of these pessimistic remarks are sufficiently conclusive regarding the need to classify East Timor as a failed state. It is very difficult to diffuse and inculcate a national project, a rather abstract and strange reality even to the country-fragmented elite.19 I think I am not being politically correct saying that East Timor is a weak state. Five years after the independence, the nationalist project has been under constant pressure. A happy conjugation of events led to reality what many people felt as an unattainable dream. Nevertheless, the dream has not been accomplished.20

---

18 The Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea was signed in Sydney on 12 January 2006. The revenue derived from production will be shared equally between Australia and East Timor (Munto (A.J.) 2007, op.cit.).
Concluding remarks

Being East Timorese is certainly not an easy human condition in current times: giving a sense to it requires a full exercise of citizenship that is not automatic; it can take decades to make people know how to act and react in order to support a sustainable sovereignty in this poor country. The most recent events, since 2006, show us a serious constitutional crisis in which the powers of the president and the parliament were noticeably misinterpreted. The alliance between the Xanana’s newborn CNRT with other parties (PSD, PD and ASDT) to get parliament’s majority and the nomination of Xanana as Prime Minister (8 August 2007) of a coalition government is polemic bearing in mind that FRETILIN was the most voted party. This kind of arrangement, with clear approval of Australia and the United States, may cause a renewed instability, which is a real danger for the survival of democratic institutions.

Indeed multidimensional, with a complex genealogy and an even more intricate structure, this paper intended to fix some images of East Timor’s formation. Trying not to amalgamate these images, these three steps – territory mapping and cultural framework, emergence of nationalism and other ways of collective mobilization and finally the wide spreading and consolidation of the nationalist project – are an unfinished process. Too many questions remain in the air and the most worrying one is to know if the East Timorese people’s will is enough to sustain this project with peace and stability.
Negotiating statehood and humanitarian assistance in Timor-Leste: an incompatible pair?

Christine Schenk

The political turmoil and the excesses of violence that hit Timor-Leste in August and September 1999, before and after its population had voted with great majority for independence, had a grave impact on the political, social and economic development of the country. The subsequent pull-out of the official Indonesian authorities left the country without any legitimate representative of the Timorese people or a governmental bureaucracy. An elected Timorese government or even an interim bureaucratic rump body to facilitate the transition to an independent, sovereign country was virtually not available. Consequently, the regular government functions came to a standstill when the Indonesians left21.

In many circumstances after bloodshed, civil war or political turmoil have been ended, often thanks to an international military intervention, the international humanitarian community conducts needs assessment missions to assess the ground conditions and to provide the planning basis for the social, economic and political recovery of the country, to overcome consequences of conflict and to shape the short-term and potentially mid-term recovery priorities including financial implications. Such missions are generally led by multilateral

EAST-TIMOR

organizations with a strong focus on humanitarian aspects as well as subsequent reconstruction and rehabilitation. When the international community conducted the needs assessment in Timor-Leste in 1999, the situation was extremely challenging. I want to emphasize three points in this respect:

Firstly, the decision for independence triggered a calamity: Indonesian militias orchestrated widespread violence among the population, in addition private and public assets were destroyed on a large scale (70%). As a result of this violence, 75% of the Timorese population was displaced internally or across the border (with Indonesia)\(^\text{22}\). This entailed a very difficult access to the Timorese population, but also made travel arrangements to the country side quite complicated.

Secondly, the mandate and access of international actors was very limited.

At the time of the outbreak of violence the UN had deployed the United Nations Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) only focusing on the popular consultation of the future status of Timor-Leste, but not mandated to intervene in the upcoming conflict situation. Other international actors such as the World Bank, international NGOs and bilateral agencies did not have access to evaluate the situation via a national branch. This also implicated logistical obstacles e. g. entering Timor-Leste and staying in Timor-Leste in a situation of institutional vacuum, social anomie and standstill.

Thirdly, there was no legitimate representative of the government in Timor-Leste. With the sudden withdrawal of all Indonesian legitimate government members, there was no representative government available to lead or at least assist the needs assessment process. Consequently the needs assessment team did not have a governmental counterpart besides the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), which had been operating as underground organization from Australia as well as members from the Timorese Diaspora and civil society.

\(^{22}\) UN, 1999, *East Timor Crisis.*
My point in this article is that if we want to understand the difficulties in state formation in Timor-Leste, we need to look at the origins of this process. One element of this was the international needs assessment mission. I will argue that the international needs assessment mission conducted in Timor-Leste in 1999 followed an approach to ensure basic needs, but left the question of state formation under-explored. The post-conflict needs assessments and the derived implications for implementation intended to target the political dimension related to the conflict, including state-building. The actual support to state-building, however, had been insufficient and was seriously underestimated by all stakeholders comprising international and national actors. The needs assessment mission was not based on a broad consensus of all national stakeholders and did not consider the question in how far “the state” was actually negotiated in the very process of needs assessment, in particular as the state was literally dissolved in Timor-Leste in 1999.

I will illustrate these ambivalences in the needs assessment mission and how they impacted on negotiating statehood through an analysis of interviews that I conducted with former members of the needs assessment mission and other key informants. The paper thereby proceeds as follows: first, I will reflect more broadly on the role of needs assessment in the political dimension of peace-building and then introduce the framework of negotiating statehood as a theoretical setup for analysis. Subsequently, I will define focal repertoires relevant for state-building: institutional reform, capacity building and service delivery along the classical state sectors welfare/wellbeing, justice, security and analyze the processes of needs assessment therein.

1 - Needs assessment missions as part of a peace-building strategy

In the context of more complex wars and disasters, the demand for quick and comprehensive third party intervention has increased. Needs assessment missions in the context of conflict and crisis are one
assessment tool to get an overview of the situation and thus to develop a strategy to overcome these implications. Ideally the actual stakeholders of development, the national actors of the state and civil society should be the leading force for a needs assessment mission; nevertheless, the reality might often appear differently. Especially in the context of crisis and conflict the functioning of the state as one or the most important leading force for the development of the country as well as an active civil society claiming ownership for the development of the country is, most often, missing. Thus, international actors appear on the scene in order to relieve the state from its responsibility, but often also to encompass an own vision and mission on how to redress the crisis.

Needs assessment as a planning instrument can look back at some changes: while they were first introduced by humanitarian agencies focusing on the assessment of basic needs, the identification of deficits in the fulfilment of these needs (based on standards, and considering vulnerability, risks and capacities), and the assessment of required external assistance to close these deficits, recent approaches entangle a more holistic approach. Needs assessments for recovery and developmental purposes take a broader view of needs, including institutional, policy and infrastructure issues. Needs assessment becomes linked with peace building. According to the UNDP, “peace-building aims to build and enable durable peace and sustainable development in post-conflict situations”. Immediately after conflict, peace-building focuses on economic recovery, the removal of small arms from the community, the rebuilding of governance institutions, the launching of reconciliation processes, the releasing of land for agricultural purposes, and the rebuilding of social capital.

---

In the case of Timor-Leste, the needs assessment comprised two processes, firstly, the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) led by the UN and the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), led by the World Bank Group. It involved a division of labor by the organizations: while the CAP, led by the UN (including UN line agencies like UNCHR, UNDP, FAO) focused on immediate short-term relief and state-building, the JAM led by the World Bank and joined *inter alia* by the UN, the Asian Development Bank and bilateral donors, focused on short and mid-term planning for reconstruction and thereby providing a basis for financial requirements.

2 - Theoretical framework: Negotiating statehood

In a setup similar to what Timor-Leste encountered after September 1999 – formally still as a province of Indonesia, but an independent state-to-be after the referendum - there is much room for negotiating statehood. The national actors were not established nor did they have any legitimate designation. The structure of the state was undefined and the humanitarian crisis worsened, since displacement and food shortage ran rampant. Thus the needs assessment mission, which dealt with the social, economic, but also political dimension of the development, was the adequate place for negotiating the future of the newly-born country.

The analytical framework I will present assumes that statehood is not a firm setup, but in a condition of being constantly negotiated. Emphasis is laid upon the actors and their roles and how they deal with these roles in order to negotiate state-owned tasks. But what is the understanding of the state, who are the main actors and what is their division of labor in negotiating statehood?

Migdal and Schlichte (2005) essentially differentiate between perceptions of the state and actions by actors. All respective actors, be they state actors or non-state actors, see the state in their way, mainly related to their function in the setup of statehood and perceive a so-called *image of the state*. On the other hand, all actors also “do the state” and rely thereby on certain *practices*, formalised and non-formalized
patterns of actions related to their power. Every actor carries out a certain function (teachers educate in schools, tax officers track down revenues etc.). Practices provide thus a vital constituent in “doing the state”, which are derived from the interactions and tension between a certain image of the state and accompanying practices.

Hagmann/Peclard (2007) have refined Schlichte’s dynamic conception of the statehood in their paper “Negotiating statehood in Africa; propositions for an alternative approach to state and political authority” and have derived propositions towards “negotiating statehood”28.

In their vein the group of actors covers a wide array of different types. It ranges from national NGOs to civil society to donors. These interest groups have different resources. Resources can comprise of various elements, which are at the disposal of interest groups: it covers the material basis including bureaucratic capacities, organizational skills, finances, technical expertise, and control over physical violence, international networks, political alliances and access to state related resources. These resources are shared unequally among the actor groups. Arenas of negotiation refer to the locations in their spatial, social and temporal dimension. The guiding questions are: where is the arena of negotiation located? Who has access to these arenas of negotiations? And: over what time periods are negotiations taking place? Thus a group of actors situated in an arena of negotiation bargains about material resources while following their agendas or repertoires. These repertoires can be understood as conceptual approaches such as “good governance” or “democracy”. In this context I understand repertoires as elements relevant for the state-building process.

In the case of Timor-Leste I will elaborate on the main international actors deriving from multilateral, bilateral and international NGO backgrounds. These actors have met in the context of the needs assessment mission to negotiate the first steps for the state reconstruction and state formation. Thus the context of the needs assessment mission will be treated in this paper as the arena of negotiation. I will then focus on selected repertoires relevant for the state formation process. In this paper I will refer to the following repertoires: (1) institutional reform, (2)

HOW TO BUILD A NEW NATION?

capability building and (3) service delivery as part of the state-building process.

Figure 1 displays the setup of negotiating statehood in Timor-Leste represented by the example of the needs assessment mission in 1999 and related state-building efforts. In the arena of negotiations, the needs assessment mission actors on the national and international actors bargain about the state-building interventions. These comprise the steps institutional reform, capacity building and service delivery.

3 - Evaluation of needs assessment mission and subsequent aid implementation

In the following sections, I will analyze the process of the needs assessment mission in 1999 as discussed by some of its team members and by other key informants and relate this to the overall process of negotiating statehood. The results are based on a study conducted on behalf of German development cooperation (GTZ) in October and November 2003 during a long term field visit (10/2003 – 09/2004) and are part of an analytical country study in order to develop a practical guide to multilateral needs assessment by UNDP, UNDG and World Bank based on six country studies, including a policy paper directed to
all involved organizations\textsuperscript{29}. 15 semi-structured expert interviews were conducted. Interviewees included national and international mission members, senior management members from multilateral organizations involved in subsequent implementation and members from Timorese civil society. Some of the national and international respondents were still in decision-making positions either in the governmental setup or international organizations at the time of interview. In addition to this interview material, more recent evaluation reports of various organizations as well as side-observations gathered during subsequent consultancy visits in Timor-Leste in December 2004 and in October 2006 increment the analysis.

Main actors

The UN and the World Bank were the main actors in the Timor-Leste needs assessment. Several NGOs have been included in the subsequent implementation such as Oxfam, Care International as well as bilateral donors and their attached organizations, especially from Portugal, but also Germany, Ireland, Italy and Spain. In Timor-Leste itself, on the national level, there was only a fragmented and dispersed civil society, a rather loose network. The most visible actor was the CNRT, the former underground resistance group as well as Diaspora members. Classical representatives of the Timorese state were missing, since the state had to be created after the ballot. Thus the image of the Timorese state was in fact only a symbol comprising different aspirations, hopes and differently weighed values, but not actors, objects and material resources.

With the resolution 1272, October 25, 1999 the UN received the mandate to form a transitional government setup, the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) until independence in May 2002. Positions on the political and administrative level were handed over to international staff, making decisions and developing strategies for the future development of Timor-Leste, while preparing the transition to independence. The UN established a transitional administration and literally ran the state, but could not draw

\textsuperscript{29} See also op. Cit. UNDG/UNDP/World Bank, 2004.
back on a grown state setup. UN thereby created an image of the state, based on an artificial image of “Timor-Leste”.

The mission of UNTAET focused on several pillars: the first pillar, INTERFET (later called PKF) was supposed to look after security. The second pillar, the Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation (HAER), as a kind of a starting mission for UNTAET, assured the delivery of humanitarian relief. The humanitarian relief phase ceased in late 2000. The third, most challenging pillar, referred to Governance and Public Administration (GPA). While UNTAET focused its activities on all pillars, the World Bank concentrated on service delivery and to some extent local governance, e.g. the Community Empowerment Project\textsuperscript{30}. The coordination between the acting government represented by the UNTAET and other actors, especially the World Bank, was quite complicated since the UN had a dual role as the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste and as the Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste: while the former included a UN mission, the latter factually implied a full governmental setup as a government counterpart to UN agencies, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and bilateral organizations. This proved to be difficult in the beginning, but was resolved at a later stage\textsuperscript{31}.

**Needs assessment process**

The needs assessment process was already hampered in the beginning: The Timorese population did not take part in the process of collecting and prioritizing needs and developing plans for the future. This partly resulted from the difficult ground conditions since the militia was still active in several spots of the country, houses had been burnt down and the domiciles had temporally been abandoned. Thus, the needs assessment process also encountered difficult logistics: some parts of the country were only accessible by helicopter. Public gatherings were possible to a very limited extent only, mainly on ad-hoc advice. Most of the mission members and experts interviewed considered this to be one

---


of the main obstacles for the outcome of the assessment process. In their view, public participation was rather low and results subsequently lacked inclusiveness. Meetings with villages had rarely taken place; the village mayor (chefe de suco) had mostly not been consulted. As one respondent added, strategic national actors from civil society had not been included and the needs assessment mission concentrated on consultation with donors\textsuperscript{32}.

Neither had the conflict context received adequate attention during the assessment process. For example, the social cleavages in 1975 or the human rights violations during the Indonesian rule which still influence the Timorese society and have contributed to deepen conflict lines, which were not sufficiently taken into consideration\textsuperscript{33}. Another issue that all Timorese mission members agreed upon was their difficult role during the assessment process. In some teams, like the team on livelihoods and rehabilitation, the Timorese mission members were integrated to some extent and their perspective, view and expertise was included in the mission’s recommendation. This was not the case in most other mission teams, where the Timorese felt that the process was predominantly driven by international experts.

4 - Needs assessment as element of negotiating statehood

In order to analyze processes of negotiating statehood during and after the needs assessment process, I will differentiate among three types of repertoires: (1) institutional reform, (2) capacity building and (3) service delivery. Along repertoires I will focus on three sectors and then determine their objects of negotiations. These sectors represent three classical state functions: welfare, security and justice.

The repertoire of institutional reform had been the hardest part of the whole state-building process. General trends that have been listed in the table above: institutional reform has hardly happened, since it had not been prioritized (welfare/wellbeing) and it was, in addition, very difficult to tackle (sectors of justice and security). Likewise, capacity building had been neglected since international staff were quickly available, could act rapidly, and were more coordinated due to experience in the humanitarian relief sector, whereas few Timorese experts acquainted with the expectations of international aid agencies were available in Timor-Leste or abroad. Moreover, among themselves, international staff could easily converse and share information as they were all fluent in English and acquainted with the basic international concepts and language of humanitarianism, but through communicating in this humanitarianism discourse, they indirectly excluded and sidelined Timorese staff members who often were not that fluent in English and did not speak the international language of humanitarianism.

Timorese mission members also observed that international staff did not prove as a solid pool of human resources: many experts came and left after short time periods. A significant number of them were beginners in their job, “often graduates from high-ranking universities”, but without field experience or an understanding of practical issues of development or regional knowledge of Timor-Leste. Few of them spoke even one of the languages spoken in Timor-Leste (either Tetum, Bahasa Indonesia or Portuguese). These “adventurers”, as they have also been named, were largely in the driver’s seat and remained in their international communication island that effectively foreclosed a direct encounter with Timorese staff and the Timorese population.

In the repertoire of service delivery, international actors often took over main responsibilities and implementation tasks and thereby sidelined Timorese actors who were often weak in delivery. In the interviews conducted, both international and Timorese respondents agreed that capacity building was severely neglected and policies for institutional reform not implemented. This created a serious gap at the moment when humanitarian relief phased out and national structures
were not prepared to take over their functions of the state and for development. One can observe this process to differing degrees in the three sectors of welfare, justice and security.

In the sector of welfare/wellbeing, the focus of international actors had been on service delivery, mainly taken over by international NGOs, while capacity building most often played a minor role only. Institutional reform has hardly been tackled. The health sector showed a rather positive development in the arena of capacity building and service delivery due to the following factors: Timorese staff had taken over responsibility in an early stage and the process of “Timorisation” started early in the Ministry of Health. Moreover, coordination mechanisms with all involved organizational bodies assured smooth service delivery. However, with regard to service delivery NGOs often stepped in when the state sector was weak to tackle bottlenecks experienced by donors. In some cases, UNTAET asked NGOs to remain present as service deliverers and exit strategies were delayed. In the agricultural sector, the situation was quite different: Timorese felt pressured by international experts to introduce a market-orientated agriculture. The Timorese interviewees argued that the ministry was not structured at that time to deal with such an organizational development. Interviewees from various fields representing international actors complained about the perception that the government’s role was to provide handouts to farmers.

In the justice sector the institutional reform had a difficult start: the legal systems from Indonesia, Portugal and the transitional administration made jurisdiction very exigent. The “Brahimi Report” precisely names these challenges for transitional administration faced by the UN in particular, the question of the “applicable law” 34. Since jurisdiction did not follow a clearly-established judicial scheme, it opened a gap for all repertoires of state-building: Capacity building was hardly possible since three jurisdictions were too difficult to convey to new staff and moreover, to be applied by more experienced staff. Moreover, the formation period to become a qualified judge takes about

ten years as one respondent pointed out. Hence, the required time for capacity building was far too time-consuming in order to keep a system of jurisdiction and subsequent conviction running. This had also an impact on service delivery in the sector of justice: while national qualified staff were lacking, international staff did not encompass such a diverse knowledge in valid judiciary.

The security sector has achieved the smallest progress, emphasized by the recent crisis in 2006, when a struggle for competencies between the police and the army made the lack of institutional reform most obvious. Unfortunately critical voices from the national setup who expressed their strong concern about the security sector remained unheard as one respondent remarked. Respondents in the study criticized the lack of solid strategies in the needs assessment document to integrate FALINTIL, veterans, but also the police in the security sector on a sustainable base. Moreover, they criticized the limited involvement by international actors in the security sector reform, in particular the lack of capacity building as well as border security with Indonesia. Also, subsequent attempts to call for more attention on action in the security sector by the presidential commission in 2004 or concerns mentioned by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2004 had not been taken up. Nowadays these areas are discovered by donors and organization as an urgent field of involvement, but much trouble might have been avoided through an earlier engagement. After 1999 the provision of security had been taken over by the Australian-led intervention force (INTERFET) and later by UNTAET. The international actors (UN Civilian Police – CivPol) and the Australian-led forces remained in charge to handle internal and border security, the armed resistance movement FALINTIL remained with a less clear mandate. The Kings College Report commissioned by the CNRT and UNTAET proposed three scenarios and it was decided to create a 3000-strong army consisting of regulars and volunteer reservists (2000). The Security Council Resolution 1338 did

support this decision, but only encouraged UNTAET to play a coordinating role, without a clear mandate. This lack of clear support to the Timorese security sector had contributed to a deteriorating security situation in Timor-Leste, especially in Dili.

The recent report by the International Crises Group highlights the gaps in institutional reform targeting the police and the army. According to the report “the UN failed to lay adequate foundations for the security reform in the form of basic legislative and planning documents, administrative support and mechanisms for democratic control or to develop a national consensus on security policies and structures through consultations”38. Since institutional reform was pending, capacity building and service delivery in the sense of providing security remained mostly unfulfilled and remains until today a responsibility of the international actors. Internal organisation of the police is also a bottleneck. The organic law promulgated in 2004 provided more commotion than clarity: the organisational setup with ten main units plus 13 districts units and some more special offices rather provided room for confusion and is still not operating39.

Table 1 (next page) summarizes the main observations in the three sectors regarding negotiating Timor’s statehood from scratch after 1999. In the welfare sector, service delivery could be taken over relatively easily by international actors. Therefore, the weakness of statehood and the deficiencies in building up state capacities emerged only after international actors gradually withdrew from direct implementation. In the justice sector, the complicated situation of legal pluralism blocked significant progress from the beginning. Security remained in international hands for a long time and the embryonic Timorese security forces were unable to safeguard public security when international troops withdrew from Timor-Leste.

38 op. Cit. ICG, 2008, p.5.
### Conclusions

In this paper, I have argued that in order to understand the precarious state of the state in Timor-Leste, we need to go back to the origins of its construction: to the early negotiating processes that started with the needs assessment mission after the take-over of the Australian troops in 1999. One of the most devastating criticisms against the UN involvement in Timor-Leste has been leveled by Chopra (2002), who had worked for UNTAET for some time and provided a kind of insider’s account. Chopra describes a process of “establishing a UN statehood” in Timor-Leste: bureaucratic structures and process design of the UN dominated the scene of statehood instead of long-term orientated statehood

---

While Chopra’s account is quite harsh in its criticism, the question remains in how far the strong involvement of international actors in the process of rebuilding Timor resulted in a statehood constructed along the lines of international rather than Timorese priorities and worldviews. The example given above about disagreements on agricultural sector policies illustrates this tension. While with time, disagreement had been “negotiated”, the picture may change if we consider the question of financial resources: often, ministerial budgets consist of a majority of international aid money which makes the bargaining power of the donors very strong.

My interviews with both, international and Timorese staff involved in the 1999 international needs assessment mission showed the following patterns: On an operational level the process of the needs assessment mission in Timor-Leste can give a hint how the beginning of the statehood had actually been negotiated: Timorese respondents did not feel in the driver's seat. Hence, one conclusion is that the needs assessment mission itself should be planned with more time being prepared to provide more room for the exchange of ideas as well as to include closer consultation with the population and civil society. On the level of subsequent aid implementation, the main impediment to state formation was a lack of vision with regard to institutional reform and capacity building. This was most apparent in the justice sector and the security sector and to a lesser extent, in the welfare sector. Overall, many international experts deployed for the needs assessment mission and thereafter lacked long-term involvement and language skills. They remained in the communication islands of internationals with little interfaces to their Timorese colleagues or the Timorese population. In this sense, negotiating statehood was initially largely an international affair.

The case of Timor-Leste indicates that state formation after a crisis starts with an international needs assessment that is more than just a technocratic exercise to identify “needs”. In a situation like Timor-Leste, where a state is to be built without any direct precedent, it would be important to define distinct phases for government development with all available counterparts. This would have to include the setup and role of
administration, judiciary and security sector, timing and operationalisation of elections as well as timing and elements of nation building (esp. language). Negotiating statehood in this sense is only possible if all involved actors communicate in “the same language”.

Reconciliation in Timor-Leste and the Role of the Media: The Casa de Produção Audiovisual

Henriette Sachse

Post-independence Timor-Leste struggles to come to terms with its past, to improve the recent situation and to build up its future at the same time. These are enormous tasks which require a lot of attention from all actors involved: the national government, national institutions, individuals as well as national and international civil society. The overall goal is to build a foundation for lasting peace in the country by learning from the mistakes of the past and by investing time, money and good will in the best possible preparation for the future.

In order to come to terms with its past and to be in line with Transitional Justice mechanisms, Timor-Leste has seen several approaches on the national level: the establishment of the Special Panel in combination with the Serious Crimes Unit, the independent Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade, e Reconciliação – CAVR) as well as the bilateral Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) with Indonesia. The task of the CAVR was three-fold: first, to establish the truth about the political events and to set up a historical record of the period between 1974 and 1999, second, to facilitate reconciliation at the local level through Community Reconciliation Programmes, and third to produce a final report including recommendations related to the Commission’s tasks.

41 This paper is dedicated to Pater Ruedi Hofmann SJ who suddenly passed away May 28 2008. He set up and was the driving spirit behind the Casa de Producao Audiovisual.

42 CAVR. 2005. Chega!
Regarding the truth-finding task, it is clear that this was an enormous endeavor, especially considering the time constraints of the CAVR which operated from 2002 to 2005. Individual data was collected as well as seven public hearings organized, the one on the Internal Political Conflict labeled a “landmark in the history of East Timorese political life”\textsuperscript{43}. “The Commission was encouraged by the humility of political leaders who testified at the National Public Hearing on the Internal Political Conflict of 1974-76, and the positive community response to their openness. However more needs to be done to heal the deep hurt from this period and to consolidate the development of a pluralistic and peaceful political life in Timor-Leste.”\textsuperscript{44}

As a follow-up process on the work of the CAVR, an open national debate on the country’s history as part of a broader nation-building process is needed – this is especially true following the outbreak of violence in fall 2006 and the appearance of frictions within the Timorese society. It appears vital to find a common perception of the brutal events of the past (including taking responsibility for past mistakes) by means of dialogue and open discussions in order to tackle current problems. In this regard, the media can play a very important role in facilitating this dialogue, fostering active participation of the public and promoting a pluralistic society.

In this paper I argue that intended outcome programming media can contribute to reconciliation and social reconstruction as well as peace-building in Timor-Leste. Focusing on the example of the Casa de Produção Audiovisual (CPA), an audiovisual production facility in Dili, I argue that intended outcome media projects can be important actors in the process of rebuilding relationships. By focusing on essential aspects of reconciliation and peace-building such as the search for truth and education, the CPA provides information and educational training as well as a forum for open dialogue and public participation.

The paper proceeds in three sections: First, I will explain how I understand the concept of reconciliation and how the media fit into it. In the second section, I will analyze the work and ambitions of the Casa de Produção Audiovisual by describing the two main foci of work of the


50
CPA including their content, objectives and means. Finally, I will summarize my findings.

1 - Reconciliation and the media

When speaking about reconciliation I refer to the rather plain definition of “a process of relationship-building” as used by Bloomfield\textsuperscript{45}. He distinguishes between an individual or interpersonal process (bottom-up or “cultural” reconciliation) and processes of building working political and social relations (top-down or “structural” reconciliation). Bloomfield suggests that these two levels are complementary and that they should be linked in order to enhance their strength. He sees the potential for civil society to work as a transmitter between the two levels\textsuperscript{46}.

In order to make reconciliation more understandable, I would like to point to the model of Hugo van der Merwe who also sees reconciliation as a process of relationship-building. However, by also defining “spheres” – identity, values, attitudes, behavior – and “components” – healing, security, truth and justice – he adds two further dimensions to the levels (interpersonal, community, national) used by Bloomfield\textsuperscript{47}. Both these additional dimensions, spheres and components, are very helpful in order to analyse actors or initiatives in the field of reconciliation as well as in order to set up such initiatives.

When applying van der Merwe’s model to any reconciliation project, it becomes apparent that the “spheres” are to a large extent determined by the respective cultural context. Therefore, culture-related elements in reconciliation initiatives seem to be essential because these are the ones that are very likely unique and distinguishable from other post-conflict situations. In the case of the Casa de Produção Audiovisual, I argue that the CPA’s work primarily addresses both the issues of

\textsuperscript{47} Merwe Hugo van der. 1999. \textit{The truth and reconciliation commission and community reconciliation}. 
identity ("spheres") and truth ("components"). Therefore, I will take a closer look at both issues in the second part of this paper.

In its analysis of reconciliation in Timor-Leste, the CAVR points out in its final report: “From these experiences with communities, the Commission knows that reconciliation is not a simple or immediate matter. It cannot be achieved in just one step, or a single procedure and people cannot be obliged to reconcile according to the wishes of an institution or a state. But it is also clear that communities, victims and those who have harmed their communities are often open to assistance to help them come together to resolve past problems for the sake of a peaceful future. The Commission also believes that there is more work to do to secure the peace achieved by communities across the country since the end of the conflict.”

While the media can clearly have devastating effects on peace and stability as we have seen in the case of Ruanda, it can also contribute in a positive way to stability, peace and the creation of a democratic society: “By practising objective, fact-based reporting that avoids stereotypes or stirring up rumors, individual journalists and the media as a whole have a tremendous potential to contribute to understanding and bridge-building.”

Such positive intentions towards conflict resolutions are already reflected in the term “intended outcome media”. However, this concept as used by Howard goes further than only focusing on objective, fact-based reporting: “The definition of media is extended to include unconventional channels of communication such as street theatre, posters, radio dramas and comedy or other entertainment. The purpose is to produce information especially designed to influence attitudes towards conflict resolution. The media becomes a facilitator of positive change rather than a professional disinterested observer. This kind of initiative […] is not journalism as we know it, although it adheres to values such as accuracy, fairness and responsibility.”

The interest of international donors in assistance to the development of media in conflict societies (mainly training for journalists and providing technical equipment), relating to media and peace-building in general and specifically in intended outcome, media

---

49 See for example Howard Ross. 2004. The media’s role in war and peace-building.
seems to have increased during the last ten years\textsuperscript{52}. Practitioners as well as academics have developed guidelines, models and explanations for the role and impact of the media in general and of intended outcome media, particularly in post-conflict societies\textsuperscript{53}. Keeping in mind that the news media in Timor-Leste is still in an early stage of development, one could consider intended outcome media projects such as the CPA as an additional tool that complements the “\textit{traditional}” mass media and, to a certain extent, fills a gap left in the currently underdeveloped media sector.

Intended outcome programming media need to consider the local context, the specific post-conflict situation, the stage of peace-building and to use locally accepted means of communication in order to find acceptance and, finally, to meet their objectives. In the case of Timor-Leste, the Casa de Produção Audiovisual’s series takes into account a variety of local aspects ranging from language (Tetum), content (local legends and history; local music and bands) and way of communication (question-and-answer sessions; statements of witnesses; reading of the letters to the editor) to the early post-conflict period (high illiteracy rate).

2 - The Casa de Produção Audiovisual

The Casa de Produção Audiovisual is an audiovisual production facility based in Dili, Timor-Leste. It was founded in 2002 by the Catholic order of the Jesuits under the leadership of Father Ruedi Hofmann SJ, a Swiss national who came to Timor-Leste in 2000. Father Hofmann had been working in Yogyakarta/Indonesia for more than 30 years, where he was also involved in audiovisual projects.

The CPA is a Jesuit-founded and internationally funded project. First and foremost, it is a media project because its main objective is the production and distribution of its own audiovisual material. And based on the definition developed by Howard, the CPA is an example of


\textsuperscript{53} For further reference on development assistance and challenges for media in peace-building see Spurk 2002.
intended outcome programming media: While adhering to the standards of accuracy, fairness and responsibility in the production of its own programmes, it also has clear-cut objectives regarding its role in conflict resolution.

The CPA has become famous in Timor-Leste mainly due to its programs which are shown on the national TV channel (TVTL) – namely a series on the history, beliefs and traditional wisdom of Timor-Leste. The series “História ba Futuru” – from past to future – deals with the history of the country and is widely known by children and adults alike. The 24 staff of the CPA mainly consists of young people who were mostly trained in Timor-Leste and in Yogyakarta/Indonesia, especially for their technical skills. They include nine designers who produce the cartoons used in the series. To improve their knowledge of Portuguese, the CPA offers regular language courses to its entire staff.

The CPA has started to build a new production facility outside of Dili. It is located on top of a hill near the village Kasait and currently consists of two traditionally built huts which were constructed with the help of the local community. The CPA plans to extend this new production site to include a small training centre with a guest house – all with the financial assistance from international donors. The site was inaugurated in September 2006 with a traditional ceremony and a Catholic mass, attended by the whole village. Since then, the CPA has been already using this new site twice a week to produce parts of its other TV series on Beliefs in Timor-Leste as well as new episodes of “História ba Futuru”.

One of the key objectives of the CPA productions is to provide information on pressing issues such as national history and the search for identity by fostering a culture of peaceful dialogue, discussion and active participation among its audiences. In addition to these main objectives, the CPA also uses its own productions for educational purposes to sensitize teachers to more modern ways of teaching techniques. These are the two main aspects I will analyze in the following section.
3 - Truth seeking

In Timor-Leste’s nation-building process, the search for a common identity or for the binding element in society is essentially linked with the search for “truth” about the country’s history.\(^54\) During the fight against the Indonesian occupation, the goal was clear for a majority of the population – independence for Timor-Leste. This goal provided the binding element for them. However, after independence was achieved, Timor-Leste’s society is searching for new binding elements in order to develop a genuine national identity which goes beyond that of an independent state.\(^55\)

This search for historical truth was also part of the CAVR’s mandate. By taking statements of victims, witnesses and perpetrators, the CAVR focused on the violent conflict between 1974 and 1999. While the individual statements were taken in private and are kept in the CAVR archive for privacy reasons, the CAVR also held seven national hearings, which were publicly broadcast on TV and on radio.

The hearings started an important process of public debates and a public awareness of the possibility of open discussions – something that was inconceivable under the Indonesian rule. However, many people still feel reluctant to speak out on the past especially when it comes to the internal conflict of 1974-1975. In particular, in light of the outburst of violence in 2006, it is obvious that there still are strongly conflicting perceptions of local history and antagonistic memories regarding the 1974-1999 period of political conflict which need to be addressed within the Timorese society. The question is how to provide a safe forum for people to contribute to this discussion with their own experiences, but

---

\(^{54}\) Of course, the concept of historical truth cannot limit itself to a mere chronological listing of events, but rather includes a reconstruction of the past by interpreting it (see Giordano 2005). Likewise, such an interpretation cannot be achieved by establishing “[…] a single, univocal truth regarding past events and processes, particularly those with strong criminal connotations […]” (Giordano 2005). Rather, it can be considered as one of the functions of truth finding in post-conflict societies to reconcile formerly antagonistic perceptions of past events.

also to make sure that conflicting views can be heard—in tolerance and peace.

In the same vein, the CPA’s series on history, beliefs and traditional wisdom focuses on issues relating to the search for “truth” and for a Timorese identity. Its intention is to provide information, but also to stimulate discussion in society about Timor-Leste’s values and traditions as well as promoting its fruitful diversity at the same time. This is an ongoing process, and it not only focuses on events from the distant past, but also on the current situation which has been deteriorating since the outbreak of violence in April 2006. Ruedi Hofmann SJ puts it this way: “In our programs we put up questions in order to help our audience to understand the current situation on the basis of their own symbols and culture.”

“História ba Futuru”

The CPA series “História ba Futuru” aims to contribute to the search for a common perception of the country’s past. The 47 half-hour episodes cover the period from the early Portuguese Era to Timor-Leste’s independence in 2002. 16 episodes (8 double sessions) are dedicated to the work of the CAVR and its mandate. The series was broadcast on the only existing national television channel—TV Timor-Leste (TVTL)—between February 2004 and late 2006. It was shown on a weekly basis, every Wednesday with a rerun the following Sunday. Since 2007, the CPA has reproduced some of the older episodes and added new ones regarding the pre-colonial era and events after 2004, including the crisis of 2006 and its aftermath.

Ruedi Hofmann SJ and his team are constantly looking for historic events that have had an impact on today’s life or in some way are still relevant for the understanding of recent developments. The pre-colonial and colonial episodes are mostly based on Portuguese literature, whereas the episodes about the Indonesian invasion until the referendum in 1999 are based on the findings and the report of the CAVR. For episodes on highly sensitive issues such as the events in 1975, the team also invited experts (such as staff of the CAVR) on the

56 Translated from: Hofmann Rudi. 2007. Ein Friedenshügel im kriegerischen Osttimor, p.3.
57 e.g. FELGAS Hélio A. Esteves. 1956. Timor Português.
respective topic in order to ensure accuracy. As for all episodes, the audience is invited to send letters to the team with their personal opinion on these topics as a way to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the program.

**Content**

Each programme follows a common structure: It consists of a Timorese legend, local music, an event in Timorese history, and dialogues – all in Tetum, the other official language in Timor-Leste besides Portuguese.

The episodes start with a performance of several local musicians playing songs in a Timor-Leste landscape. Subtitles show the words of the songs. The band plays several songs throughout the program. A speaker introduces the main focus of the program while standing in front of a local building which has a connection with either the subsequent legend or the historic event. The legend is then presented as an animated cartoon and is discussed by a group of six young people. Several of them ask questions about the legend, its meaning and its local perception, and one (being the expert) answers them.

After another performance of the band, the animated cartoon of a historic event is shown. A commentator explains what happened at that event, who was responsible for it, the reasons for the event and its significance for Timor-Leste today. Sometimes a witness of that event is interviewed following the cartoon in order to tell his or her personal story about the event. And, again, a group discussion or rather a question and answer session follows with a group of young people.

At the end of each program, a question is addressed to the audience which relates to the historic event that was covered in the program. Some of the audience’s written answers are read in subsequent programs – three weeks after the series was shown. After a short repetition of the main facts of the program, the answers are read out without any additional comments for half an hour.

The overall set up of the series is very simple in terms of the storyboard or the overall outline, but carefully and thoughtfully done. With the balanced mix of music, dialogues, narratives, animated comics, question-and-answer sections and the reading of letters, it is very informative, to some extent emotional, but nevertheless entertaining.
Objective

What is the objective of the CPA programs, and especially of “História ba Futuru”? How do these objectives relate to the definition of intended outcome media programming?

First, the CPA can be seen as a provider of information on past and partly on recent events and traditional legends which are otherwise rare to find. Second, the CAP also aims for a discussion about these events and reaches for the active participation of its audience. As a third objective, the educational perspective becomes apparent as well.

However, all three objectives can be seen as elements of another, more mid-term goal: reconciliation of society and establishing a truly pluralistic, tolerant, democratic and peaceful Timor-Leste.

Means

The CPA series are shown in two different ways: Firstly, they are broadcast on TVTL twice a week (one is the rerun); but secondly, they are also distributed on DVD for public viewing. This is due to the fact that TV sets and coverage are not yet widespread in Timor-Leste because of poverty and infrastructural underdevelopment.

An important issue for CPA therefore is how many people are able to watch TV in Timor-Leste. A recent survey among 1200 Timorese presented the following data on radio and TV coverage: “The daily reach of radio is just under 30%. Weekly reach is just under 50%. Nearly half (47%) have a radio set at home. Two thirds of all radio sets are powered by batteries. Just less than one in five lives in a home with a television. About two in five ever watch television at all. The daily reach of TV is 19%, the weekly reach is 25%. TV use is highest in Dili where the weekly reach is 79% and lowest in Manufahi, Ainaro and Ermera. Three in four daily TV viewers are in Dili. There is a lot of out-of-home TV viewing. Only 45% usually watch TV at their own home. Others watch at friends’ or neighbor’s homes or through various means of communal viewing.”

Since the TV programs in Timor-Leste do not offer a wide variety of locally produced programmes – during most of the day, Portuguese soap operas or music shows are shown, with some news programs in the

---

evening – the series of the CPA are quite popular. The same survey mentioned above states that about 10 percent of the polled people with children under the age of 15 named "História ba Futuru" as a program that their kids would watch. But the series is not just popular with children (who may also like it because of the cartoons and the music), but also with adults, as the large weekly number of letters to the editor proves.

As the survey shows, the overall percentage of Timorese able to watch TV on a regular basis is quite low, but highest in the capital Dili. Therefore, the CPA started to distribute its series – the actual programs as well as the readings of the letters to the editors – on demand throughout the county. They can then be used for public viewing events, e.g. in villages, church communities or in schools. The DVDs are provided free of charge, but a second DVD is distributed to the same person/community when the first one has been returned. In this way, the cost of distribution does not get out of hand. So far, the programs’ reach had been rather limited. However, in 2007, 900 DVDs were distributed to 45 participants of two workshops on educational use of the CPAs programs. One of the CPA’s goals for the next two years is to establish networks through which the DVDs can be distributed systematically in Timor-Leste.

4. Education

"Educational and youth work is important in phases of conflict latency, in post-conflict situations and in times of peace. Its purpose is two-fold: to prevent conflict; and to encourage a critical reappraisal of the past as a step towards healing and reconciliation"59.

With a similar purpose and scope as distributing the series "História ba Futuru", the CPA also commenced a project to sensitize teachers, catechists and development aid workers to new teachings methods regarding the country’s history. This is especially important when teaching school children, but also vital when working with adults who

are illiterate. For them the pictures, cartoons and dialogues in Tetum are a perfect tool to get engaged and take part in debates and discussions.

The CPA training project ties in with one of the CAVR’s recommendations in its final report: “The Ministry of Education in the Government of Timor-Leste works with the post-CAVR institution to utilize the Final Report and other Commission materials in the development of curricula and other educational resources related to human rights, reconciliation, history, law, gender studies and other relevant disciplines”\(^{60}\). While it takes time to change curricula and to train teachers how to use them on a national level, initiatives such as the one of the CPA can fill the current need for new ways of addressing difficult issues related to the country’s history in schools.\(^{61}\)

**Content**

By using the series “História ba Futuru” for the teachers and catechists training programs, CPA makes use of the series’ popularity as was shown in the survey. However, because of the weak TV coverage outside Dili, most of the young people in the countryside have not had the opportunity to watch the series. However, due to the use of Tetum, the local music, the animated cartoons, the clear structure, and easy to understand dialogues as well as the comparatively short episodes of half an hour each, the series fits the needs as an educational tool for schools.

**Objectives and Means**

There are two main objectives in the CPA’s educational focus: To sensitize teachers and church workers to new methods of learning and teaching, and to encourage pupils, students and adults to think critically for themselves. In 2007, it already organized two six-day workshops for a total of 45 participants. More training is planned in the coming years.

In 2006, the CPA also organized a one-week training for neophytes in Fatumake. On one day, an episode of the “História ba Futuru” series was shown to the pupils and the class teachers. By applying a special teaching method called SOTARA, the teachers learned how to actively

---

\(^{60}\) Op. Cit. CAVR. 2005. p.188.

\(^{61}\) For more detailed information on the current state of the curriculum development see Leach Michael. 2007. History teaching: challenges and alternatives.
include the pupils in the analysis of the seen episode. The pupils were asked to react to the film by answering certain questions e.g. about the sound of the film, the content, the topic, to give a resume as well as come up with possible follow-up actions. The teacher was asked only to facilitate rather than dominate this process. Overwhelmingly, the teachers stated that they liked this way of teaching. However, more detailed training would be necessary in order to practice this technique more carefully.

As mentioned before, the new production site of the CPA will also include a training centre for interested teachers and others involved in education from the whole country as well as for its own staff. There could be training in teaching methods (both for school teachers and for teachers working in adult education) but also on the usage of audiovisual products for teaching.

### Conclusion

The CPA is the most well-known production facility for audiovisual media in Timor-Leste. Its series pick up issues of national interest such as the country´s history, its values and its identity. They are broadcast on national TV as well as distributed throughout the country on DVDs. As a second focus, the CPA engages in educational work such as providing training to teachers and pupils.

As an intended outcome programming media, the CPA aims at certain objectives: to provide the Timorese with quality information on pressing issues of the past and at the same time provide a forum to deal with those issues in the present in order to resolve them for a peaceful future. Therefore, both components of the CPA´s work towards reconciliation or the re-establishment of social relationships in Timor-Leste. By using locally adopted means of their series (Tetum, local songs and bands, local legends and historical events, dialogues, animated cartoons and the reading of letters to the editor) they are easily understandable for all Timorese and take account of the current social realities of the country. Thus, the CPA’s programs can play an essential part in the Timorese reconciliation and peace-building process.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine whether the CPA could function as a binding element between the top-down and bottom-up approaches of reconciliation as Bloomfield suggest\(^\text{62}\): The broadcasting of the series “História ba Futuru” on TV – as a top-down process – could raise awareness of critical issues related to the past and provide a forum for discussion. The public viewing events as well as the screening in schools could be seen as a facilitator for bottom-up processes of reconciliation.

Another interesting task would be an in-depth analysis of the letters to the editors – especially those that relate to the latest episodes like that on the crisis of 2006. Such an analysis would most likely provide a good indication of the state of reconciliation in Timor-Leste.

PART 2
Socio-cultural identities and factors in question
Translation in Crisis, Crisis as Translation

Paulo Castro Seixas

1 - Introduction

This article focusses on the 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste presenting it as a founding moment for the independent nation, the ‘first ritual war’ after independence in which the core cultural problem of Timor-Leste was revealed: Translation of Traditions.

I will argue that the Crisis of 2006 revealed a Crisis of translation and a Crisis as translation. To begin with, several pasts were brought to the front stage and put into discussion, which ultimately have become violent. This violence, as the evidence of crisis, was in itself discussed in order to translate it, the only way of creating a future.

The idea of Translation already has a non underestimated tradition in Anthropology, more evident in interpretative and post-modern trends, through which Anthropological science and its translating cultures regimes were, in fact, conceived as in the centre of western politics. Translation both as a problem and a tool concept is indeed at the core of anthropological thinking since the linguistic turn by which culture became a network of shared signs and meanings, Anthropology being a writing cultures process and the anthropologist himself mainly a

---

63 Anthropologist, Associate professor – Fernando Pessoa University, Porto, Portugal (pseixas@upf.edu.pt), Project PTDC/ANT/81065/2006 (Fundação Para a Ciência e a Tecnologia)
64 cf. for instance Said (E.) 1978, Orientalism; Clifford (J.) 1989, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century.
In fact, somehow the scattering of anthropological thinking in cultural studies, feminist and gender studies as well as race and post-colonial studies is evidence both of the relevance of the political problem of translation and of different perspectives and perspectives toward perspectives as methodology, in a word, multiple translation, in cultural analysis throughout the last decades.

Translation is at the core when culture is defined as an open process understandable as ‘diasporas and counter diasporas’, as ‘Multi-sited narratives’, as ‘Travel’, as ‘contact zones’, as ‘disjuncture and conjunctures’, etc. As a result, identity is also being understood more and more as ‘frontier’ and ‘in betweeness’, as ‘mediation’ and ‘hybridism’, as cultural brokerage in which individuals and groups seem themselves as being in between at least two both conflicting and ambiguous set of values. This leads to a model of, as well as a model for, culture defined through ‘third space’ or ‘other space’ or heterotopy: as a ‘bridge space’, as ‘third cultures’, as ‘syncretism’, as ‘cosmopolitism’, etc.

---

65 Geertz (C.) 1989, *A Interpretação das Culturas*; Clifford (J.) and Marcus (G. E.) (Eds) 1986, *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*

66 Hall (S.) 2003, *Da Diáspora. Identidades e Mediações Culturais*.


71 Hall (S.) 2003, op.cit.

72 Bhabha (H.) 1994, *The Location of Culture*.


75 Foucault (M.) 1986, “Of Other Spaces”.


77 Featherstone (M.) 1999, *Cultura Global: Introdução*.


79 Hannerz (U.) 1996, op.cit.
Translation is thus, for many reasons, a ‘metaphor of contemporary times’ and Anthropology is part of the problem in the translated wor(l)ds, we constructed over time, as being necessary to focus on the meanings of Cultural Translation. In what Timor-Leste is concerned, ‘translation’, ‘liminarity’ and ‘hybridism’ were notions imposed to me by the fieldwork since the very start and notions of ‘translating traditions’ and ‘culture of translation’ were already approached and discussed in more recent papers. Ultimately, my main statement is that nation building as a social identity in the process should be approached as a broad brokerage process in which translation mechanisms (what is tradition, what they stand for and which of them) are themselves at stake. This is more relevant and complex if one considers that Timor-Leste was a platform of an earliest ‘clash of civilizations’ and that the several cultures in Timor-Leste were not isolated but in an historical permanent ‘translation in a continuous world’ to use the words of T. Ingold in 1994 connecting, as a consequence, language, territory, social relations and cultural ideologies in a kind of a “prismatic cultural configuration”. Meaning that the construction of cultural relativities (translations among cultures through the construction of ‘otherings’), either in an ethno-linguistic, or in a social and in a strict cultural sense, was a constant, although its processes and consequences are yet to be tackled.

---

81 Ingold (T.) 1994, “The Art of Translation in a Continuous World”
84 Gunn (G.) 1999, Timor Loro Sae 500 Anos.
85 To understand some of the translation mechanisms which were put into practice over time in Timor-Leste cultures is, in fact, the main aim of the research project this paper refers to: ‘Translating Cultures, Culture of Translation: Negotiation as Core Heritage in Timor-Leste’. Despite the efforts of the research team, I believe that only a deep research into the oral history of the clans will bring some light into the problematic nature of intercultural communication in Timor-Leste over time.
Supported by this framework, this short paper builds on the assumption (not discussed here) that nation building may, and perhaps must, be defined as a translation in crisis process and, as a consequence, the more manifest crisis (eventually violent) on that process may, and perhaps must, be understood as a translation experience. Bearing in mind my other writings on the 2005-2007 crisis in Timor-Leste, I will argue that this crisis was a translation in which the several pasts became present turning the discussion of the ‘Anthropological Structures’ or ‘Structures of Difference’ necessary by which Timor-Leste cultures constructed the various ‘others’ which they have to come to terms with in an ‘Independence time’ turning them into a generalized ‘We’. Identity building through hierarchical and usually conflicting images of the others (‘othering’) will be the guiding process for sketching out the lexic thesaurus, and thus the universe of meanings, upon which each ‘othering’ draws on.

2 - The Crisis of 2006: The ‘first ritual war’ after independence

Throughout 2006, there was a discussion about the causes of the crisis and, as I put it in June 2006, it seemed that we could summarize those causes into five areas, by this time:

1. A political-military issue: the 591 petitioners.
2. A socio-cultural issue: the discrimination claimed by the soldiers because of being from the West and with the emergence of gangs on April 28, also a generational issue (in which unemployment was an important issue).
3. A political-institutional issue: the problem between Alkatiri and Xanana as the centre of the disintegration of the State and, as a consequence, of the social situation.
4. The theory of the State taking over in a double register: a soft one as a constitutional coup of the State by Xanana Gusmão and the hard

86 Seixas (P.) 2006d, A Difícil Construção da Nação e do Estado Timorenses.
one, followed by the World Socialist Web Site, which links oil, Kristy Gusmão, Ramos Horta, John Howard, Paul Wolfowitz and the World Bank

5. The result of a political policy in which the State was used as the extension of a political party (or, at least, parts of it), which has tried to implement a Tutelar Democracy or a Constitutional Dictatorship, and the use of the State for personal agendas of power.

By the end of 2006, three dimensions seemed to be the most important: the political-institutional, the social-cultural and the geo-strategic situation. Indeed, everything and everyone could be understood as promoting crisis as it is evident in the list compiled by Josh Trindade in 2006.

When everything and everyone could be to blame for whatever, ‘Mimetic Violence’, as considered by Rene Girard is installed. This is a state of Cultural Crisis, of a social undifferentiating in which main cultural references just disappear: outsiders vs insiders; city and mountain; youngsters vs elders, State vs Church. The dual model in a segmented way, as a whole, is in crisis. This situation of dissolution of the system could be understandable, in a traditional way, as a part of a ritual, if the elders who represent the parts in conflict ritualize themselves the way out of the conflict. This means that even if the beginning of the turmoil had not been ritualized, the turmoil could be recognized as a ritual war – and not as the terrified alternative of the end of nation and culture – if the way out of it had been ritualized. The ‘first ritual war’ after independence has created its own way towards an understanding and resolution, as I had previously considered through a ‘Culture of Politics’ in which the ‘Politics of Culture’ was its centre.87 The ritualizing moments that particularly Ramos Horta and Xanana Gusmão have implemented, with the delivering of weapons by Railos and the big meeting of the Katuas of several districts in Dili, were, indeed, the beginning of the end of the war.

Perceptions on Major Contributors to the Civil Crisis

1. Lack of national identity as a unifying force
2. Unclear goals and objectives as a nation
3. Lack of understanding about East Timor’s background in social, cultural, and political affairs from the development sector
4. Lack of statistical data and research
5. Discordant priorities between the Government and development sector and needs of the people
6. Elite minority of Diaspora and the "Mozambican Mafia"
7. Personal interests of Timorese Leaders
8. UNTAET administrations and unsuitability for East Timorese needs
9. Political parties cat and mouse games
10. Flaws in the May 2002 independence achievement
11. Improper use of human resources in the Government (including unsuitability of staff for roles)
12. Government operation as a whole
13. Flaws in Government policy
14. Lack of employment
15. Lack of access to quality education
16. Conflict between the Church and the Government
17. Conflict between the NGO sector and the Government
18. Lack of national moral and values
19. Portuguese language: a huge obstacle in developing the nation
20. Flaws in the creation of the first National Parliament
21. Ineffective and disorganized Law sector
22. Rivalry between PNTL and FFDTL
23. UN as a whole and donor countries (including the UN’s lack of cultural awareness and sensitivity)
24. International community in East Timor (lack of cultural awareness and sensitivity)
25. Poor collaboration between Government and its institutions, the NGO sector and the UN
26. Local and International media publishing incorrect information


Thus, the 2006 Crisis was, a founding moment in which the identity issue was, indeed, at the center of the game. The main question was ‘what is it to be ‘Timorese’ without the Portuguese, the Indonesian or the UN ‘other’?’ Questioning ethnicities, questioning land property on the one hand; questioning sides taken in resistance to Portuguese and Indonesians, questioning languages on another or, finally, questioning the performance and balance of State institutions were no more than symptoms of the big problem of the Timorese identity and, as a consequence, the legitimacy of new ‘big men’, of new Liurais as Nation Translators. That is what the 2006 crisis was all about. In this sense, the
2006 crisis was an incredible evidence of a Nation trying to come to terms with itself by putting onto a lively stage a serious play about the several ‘othering’\textsuperscript{88} (the construction about themselves as others). In fact, the core of this drama was the new anthropological structure (\textit{Us} versus \textit{Them}) of Timor-Leste as a Nation and, if I am not wrong, this Drama, as it was foundational of Timorese Modernity, will be put onto stage again in future times, unless the present government is able to perform the agenda’s Jump to Modernity in 5-10 years, which is doubtful.

\section*{3 - The anthropological structures}

The Timorese ‘otherings’, the anthropological structures which present the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, were built as a consequence of Timor-Leste being the centre of a confluence of different cultural regions as well as a consequence of centuries of colonization. I will argue here that the cultural memory of all these anthropological structures are functioning on present times and that translation plays a central role in these processes by enhancing a plurality of meanings.

Timor-Leste was (and still is) in between two cultural regions taken at large as Asia and the Pacific, in a more regional sense, as Indonesia and Melanesia and in a Timorese sense as Austronesian ethno-linguistic groups and Papuas ethno-linguistic groups. This “in betweeness” of Timor as a whole has already been referred to throughout history, since the classical analysis of Alfred Wallace on the Malay Archipelago in 1869, up to the present, considering it as an earlier ‘Clash of Civilizations’ in Geoffrey Gunn in 1999. Besides this “in betweeness”, China was extremely important in that particular region and, at a certain moment of history, perhaps even the Mongol empire.\textsuperscript{89} With the arrival of Europeans to the region as a long trend situation, Europe has become, in a way, the third cultural region to be taken into consideration in a

\textsuperscript{88} ‘Othering’ is a term coined by Gayatri Spivak for the process by which imperial discourse creates its ‘others’ and creates its own Imperial identity though this process (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 1998, \textit{Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies})

\textsuperscript{89} Durand (F.) 2006, \textit{Timor: 1250-2005. 750 ans de cartographie et de voyages}. 
generative narrative of present day in Timor-Leste. The capital town of a region or of a country often reveals the anthropological structure or the structure of difference of the hinterland, either a region or even the country as a whole. Arguments on this thesis have already been presented by me in articles focused on Porto (Portugal), on Manaus (Brazil), on Cluj-Napoca (Romania) and on Dili, being indeed that particular interest which first led me to Timor-Leste in 2000 because of my specialty as an Urban Anthropologist. The 2006 crisis, in a distant and large anthropological gaze, put Dili as a brokerage platform in which the three cultural regions, in a symbolic, yet quite real way (Lorosae/Firaku groups; Loromono/Kaladi groups and UN/Portugal/Australia) play their part trying to be translated into the future within the new narrative of the nation, which was felt by all as being in an important turning point.

Although an anthropological history of ‘othering’ in Timor-Leste is needed in order to shed some light on the underground generative important meanings, which support the socio-ideological framework that is presently used, we may consider that Timor-Leste was influence by - or even colonized - at least five times with generative consequences in socio-cultural and political-institutional present framework, meaning that each colonization has created some particular ‘othering/s’ which are important.

1st othering (malay)

‘Malae’ or ‘Malai’ (referring possibly to the Malay but meaning, at least presently, ‘foreigner’) is the name by which any foreigner is referred to in Timor-Leste. Ambiguously, once it could be synonym of Lord (even king), Mister or Bapa or could be just ‘foreigner’. The clan which considers itself to be the first in Timor-Leste, ‘Tutuala ratu’ also calls itself ‘Malai ratu’, meaning ‘Lord/king of the foreigners’ or ‘Lord/king of the lords/kings’. In fact, ‘malae’ is also the name given to

---

90 The hypothesis briefly referred to here was elaborated on firstly in a quite extended article in which all these several distinctions were presented and published in 2005, long before the 2006 crisis. See Seixas (P.) 2005, “Firaku e Kaladi: Etnicidades prevalentes nas Imaginações Unitárias em Timor-Leste” & 2006, Timor-Leste: Viagens, Transições, Mediações.
Timorese people who have come ‘from the outside’, ‘from the sea’ in relation to the ‘ones who stayed’, the ‘ones from the land’ and also to ‘mestizos’ (in ‘malae-china’, ‘malae-zapão’, etc.). For instance, some ethno-linguistic groups have the name ‘malae’ as a surname and the Tétum group have considered themselves, at least in a certain period, as ‘malae’ or ‘malae metan’ (black foreigners)\(^91\) in relation to the Portuguese, who were ‘malae mutin’ (white foreigner). A possible hypothesis is that cultural memory concerning the earlier clash of cultures between the Asia and Pacific regions, Indonesia and Melanesia, Malays and Papuas still generates Resentful distinctions locally and nationally. We may only assert that this was the ‘first’ foreign influence or even colonization because it seems that it was the first to produce a ‘generalized other’, the ‘malae’ and by doing it, to produce a sense of identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'From the sea'</th>
<th>Malae as Malay vs. autochthonous</th>
<th>Malae as Malay vs. Papuan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tetum people were malae</td>
<td>Malae</td>
<td>Mestizo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lords, even kings</td>
<td>Malae as 'Mister' or 'Bapa' vs. Timorese</td>
<td>Any Foreigner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2\(^{nd}\) othering (Tétum-Belo)**

Before ‘Portuguese time’ as the Timorese refers to it, there was a Belo-Tétum influence or even colonization with its centre in Wehali-wehiku. The Tetum people from Viqueque and Luca refer to themselves as ‘people from the plain’ (tetuk means plain) in opposition to the ones from the mountain and it is possible that Tetum people used local classifiers (positive or at least neutral ones) for the mountain people in order to classify them but changed them into having a negative connotation. 'Firaku' (Macassai) and 'Kaladi' (Mambai) are the negative classifications for the ‘mountain people’, basically referring them as culturally retarded, uncivilized people. There is no negative classification

---

\(^91\) This reference is made by Vaquinhas (José dos Santos) 1885 in “Timor” (p.63): “the Beale and Okusse people think of themselves as superior to all the others in the island and only inferiors in relation to the Portuguese and, for this reason, they call themselves malai-meta, calling the Portuguese or foreigners, malai-mute”
for the Tétum people and both negative classifications relate to ‘mountain people’ and those classifications refer to the biggest ethno-linguistic groups, the hypothesis that it was Tétum people who created the classifications seem quite strong.

If, firstly, the Timorese have built their own identity in relation to Malae, as the constructed other, secondly, the Tetum-belo, the Timorese identity was dichotomized and, in a way, inverted, once Firaku and Kaladi, indistinctively autochtonous or not, were turned into the ‘other’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From the hun</th>
<th>Mountain people</th>
<th>Firaku and kaladi as Papuan vs. Austronesians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous nouns</td>
<td>Firaku and Kaladi</td>
<td>Firaku and Kaladi vs. Tetum as civilized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People, not Liurais</td>
<td>Tetum were Lords, even kings</td>
<td>Tetum people were ‘malae’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3rd othering (Portuguese)

Differences between kingships were either used by the Portuguese and used the Portuguese rulers or Portuguese order to gain power. Firaku and Kaladi classifiers in the cultural memory became Portuguese classifiers, derived from Portuguese expressions (‘Vira-Cu’ – ‘turning the back’ and ‘Calado’ – ‘quite’) which translated to Tetum became Firaku and Kaladi. This story is completely unconvincing as both words almost certainly existed before Portuguese time. Firaku is a Makassai word (Makassai is a Papua language) meaning ‘we comrades’, ‘we, the friends’ and Kaladi is probably a corruption of keladi, a Malay word (meaning ‘taro’ or ‘yam’, a tropical plant known by its corm), a better hypothesis is that translation happened the other way around. Indeed, local classifiers were translated to Portuguese, identifying Portuguese expressions with negative connotations which have already been asserted to those particular people. It seems that the Portuguese and Tetum people have

---

92 I argued extensively in another article (Seixas, 2005, op.cit.) on the existence of the Firaku and Kaladi words, and probably at least some of its universe of meanings, before Portuguese time.
created a colonial ‘othering’ working consensus and if it is true that there is no evidence of a war pattern between the East and the West, it is also true that the Portuguese rulers in the ‘Pacification War’ used Eastern people against the Western revolution led by D. Boaventura.

The Portuguese ‘othering’ was in the origin of another important dichotomy which superposed the one that differentiates between Firaku and Kaladi: the one that discriminates between Maubere and Assimilado. Maubere was a common name (and in the myths of the Mambai region, in the Western part, is the name of the first man, Bibere being the name of the first woman). After the 1930s Colonial Act, two categories of persons were formed: the Indigenous and the Assimilados (those with Portuguese nationality). In Timor-Leste, this discrimination was understood as a distinction between Maubere and Assimilado, Maubere becoming the term to designate the ignorant, illiterate, dispossessed and peasant indigenous, up to a certain point combining the earliest distinction between Firaku and Kaladi in one of its meanings, the one that considers both as mountain people. The epithet ‘Maubere People’, coined by Ramos Horta after 1974,93 turned the page on the Portuguese ‘othering’, reversing the universe of meaning from a negative to a completely positive one.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>There was a Young Brother who left *. Timorese as 'maubere'.</th>
<th>Timor is 'raiklaran'. Portugal was Timorese</th>
<th>Tetum people were 'malae metan'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese as the returnee young brother</td>
<td>Maubere and Assimilado</td>
<td>Portuguese were/are 'malae mutin'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside brothers</td>
<td>Timorese as 'assimilado'. Portuguese as lords, even kings</td>
<td>Just malae</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* There are several versions assumed by different east Timorese cultures (although many times kept in secrecy) of an apparently common story. The story refers that a young brother left Timor (the island) and is expected to return or returned already as other (some Timorese who arrived by see, as well as the Portuguese and, even nowadays, the UN and other international cooperation professionals were believed to be the returned 'young brother').

4th othering (Indonesia)

Within the resistance, although the idea of ‘From taci-feto to taci-mane, from Lorosae to Loromono, One only People, One only Nation’ was constantly repeated, Loromono was synonymous to many Timorese as the ‘great door of invasion’ and of ‘collaborationism’ and, on the contrary, Lorosae was the same as ‘real warriors’ and ‘resistants’. Simultaneously, and in contradiction with this quite disseminated background assumption, the expression used from the resistant nation, ‘Maubere People’, coined by Ramos Horta, had its origin in Loromono (Aileu, Ermera and Maubisse), creating a renovation of the dichotomy Firaku-Kaladi, now understandable as Firaku-Maubere, which was connected in a rather complex way with Democracy vs Communism (Mauberism). Nevertheless, this dichotomy was partly hidden because ‘Maubere’ had been turned into a national emblem (‘Maubere People’) during the struggle facing a common enemy, and because Aileu was, in many traditional narratives, the Centre-of-the-Earth (Rai-Klaran) or the belly of the crocodile, and for others, it was even the origin of the world (hun) giving a certain legitimacy to a nationalist narrative. However, it was not before CNRM turned to CNRT, changing the ‘Maubere’ for ‘Timorese’, that all the various Timorese parties accepted belonging to that particular structure.

Although Benedict Anderson has suggested that the Indonesians were not ever capable of imagining Timorese as Indonesians, the Indonesians as a people have never been the “Other” to the Timorese. Even the Indonesian militaries were viewed in an ambiguous way; at least some of them understood the Timorese struggle. So, although Timorese differentiated themselves from the Indonesians, there is a continuation of wor(l)ds between them, expressed in several different ways (commonalities in language, in origin, in traditions, in the diaspora and counter-diaspora, etc).
### 5th othering (UN)

Throughout the UNTAET period, all the complexities of the Timorese past were oversimplified as the struggle of the Maubere People against the Indonesians and, although there was the knowledge of the divisions within the Timorese, those divisions were as a whole basically related to independence or autonomy, which in fact were as old as the political parties themselves and that the referendum and independence itself should put an end to those problems. Presumably because the Creole elite was the main interface but also because this period was understood by the Timorese as a ‘transitional’ period in a large ritual of coming to terms with themselves after a long history of colonization’s, the past was hidden from the foreigners. The majority of the co-operants (‘expats’), even when they have been there for some years, have never heard about lorosae and loromono. Resistance differendos, outsiders (returnees) versus the ones who stayed, as well as gender divisions, were much more visible. The Creole elite had difficulties (and perhaps still have) understanding the possibilities enhanced by cultural memory for the producing of pasts and have created the idea that Timor-Leste was on its way to Modernity, a well-accepted idea by the UN as well as by Portugal and Australia. The common Timorese citizen had an idea about the problems, but although they were too involved, they knew that the translation of the past has created an open field of possibilities. I believe that most of them did not know exactly that something would happen, but they thought it might! Dionisio Babo Soares was one of those inside voices, at least, through his PhD. On the side of the ‘malae’ people there were just four or five voices (Durand, Fox, Hohe, Silva and Seixas.) claiming that those divisions were there and that they should be tackled.
As Soares wrote, the trunk of nationalism was already diverse in its branches and had several tips and all this diversity was a challenge in terms of the unity of the nation. Kelly Cristiane da Silva focused part of her research on the ‘outsiders’ (returnees) -‘insiders’ (the ones who stayed) dichotomy and its pertinence on the transitional period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insiders: resistsants or just survivors</th>
<th>Insiders divided into Firaku and Kaladi</th>
<th>Outsiders: opportunists or politicians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insiders as nationalists</td>
<td>The ones 'from outside' and the ones 'from inside'</td>
<td>Outsiders as cultural mestizos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insiders as Maubere</td>
<td>Maubere people and the collaborationism/resistance question</td>
<td>Outsiders as just malae</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6th ‘Timorization’ as “indigenation”

As Rui Feijó wrote in 2006, the political democratic system was implemented in Timor-Leste without a proper transitional period and with an emphasis in the qualitative variables (gender issues for instance), when transition and stability of the system should have been the main focus. Although I generally agree with this perspective, my main argument is that the problem was more cultural than political and after independence or restauration of independence (May 20, 2002) the time that followed was one of the ‘returning of rituals’, meaning that, finally, the Timorese had to come to terms with themselves and with all their past identities and ‘otherings’. If not ‘Malae’, ‘Firaku’ or ‘Kaladi’, and also not ‘Portuguese’ (we may even add nor Indonesian)... and not even ‘Maubere,’ what were they? This was the main cultural question in 2003 and 2004 when ‘Kafir’ (as Kaladi + FIRaku, meaning rai-klaran or centre-of-the-earth and raiklaran or world) was tried in a tentative way as an answer, although that was in itself no more than a symptom of the problem. Indeed there was no more than divisions in a way that all the ‘Otherings’ were turning very difficult, if not even impossible at least on the crisis period, any common identity. The several identities and ‘otherings’ of the several pasts (including the plural interpretation of

---

94 Feijó (R.G.) 2006, Timor. Paisagem Tropical com Gente Dentro.
95 Seixas (P.) 2006f, “De Maubere a Kafir e Mais Além. O Meio da Terra em Movimento”.

78
them) have created a world of divisions: old brother and young brother; black brother and white brother; from the sea and from the land; from the mountain and from the plain; from ulun (head) and ikun (tale); Firaku and Kaladi; Maubere and Firaku; Maubere and Malae; Mestizos and Mauberes; insiders and outsiders; Tetum and Portuguese languages; resistant and collaborationists, FDTL and PNTL, Portuguese and Indonesians... In this sense, ‘Timorization’, as the necessary quicker transitional period demanded by the Timoreses, turned into an ‘indigenation’96 process in which the diversity of identities were put at stake by a diversity of agents into a big arena of social and symbolic (un)definitions.

There is enough evidence on problems which dealt with all those divisions: a) in the cantonment of FALINTIL’s quarter in 1999/2000; b) in the first Batallion of FDTL because of the large number of recruitment from Lorosae in 2001; c) in 2002, in the debate on Timorese Constitutional Law about the expression ‘Maubere People’ it was stated: “Maubere people. Section 11.1. The term Maubere does not represent all East Timorese but it is a concept that only represents certain parts of East Timor. The implication is that it will encourage tribal conflicts, “firaku and kaladi”; d) in December 2003, when 27 soldiers from FDTL were demobilized and it was referred that another 60 would also be in January. In fact in January 2004, 42 were demobilized and they claimed to be discriminated against for being Kaladi by their Firaku officials; e) in March 2004 there was an important incident in Los Palos with some elements of FDTL and afterwards the commandant of FDTL in Lautem eventually used the term Firaku as to justify the action taken. President Xanana went to Los Palos, an inquiry commission was created and, eventually, because of that situation, FDTL moved to Baucau.

These are just some of the main examples concerning divisions. We should add the many localized situations since 1999 concerning Firaku-Kaladi – Resistant vs Collaborationists, problems which occurred in Dili (referred to by Babo Soares in his PhD in 2003); the various problems at the border with Indonesia as well as with the return of the refugees; the

96 Appadurai (A.) 2004, op.cit.
problems with Veterans; the problem with the name of the country itself, from Timor Lorosae to Timor-Leste, etc.

4 - Crisis as translation

My main argument on this short text is that culture is a hidden and not considered variable in the case of Timor-Leste transition and, probably, in many post-colonial and post-war societies. Considering that there were just around 40 countries after the Second World War and that at the beginning of the 21st century the planet has around 200 countries, post-colonial (and, in several cases, post-war) societies representing around 80% of the countries in the planet.

The scattering of identities created through the process of coming to terms with the several pasts and its ‘otherings’ creates in those societies a symbolic, social and political arena in which translation is, I believe, a key word. Translating the multiple pasts is the only way to build a future in these societies and the challenge of understanding those processes is not only crucial in order to comprehend those societies and cultures, but also to build competences and capacities in the field of Cooperation and Development, or in another way, in Anthropology of Development and in Anthropology in Development.

Focusing on translations means that rather than looking for what differentiates one culture from another (construction of singularities) or what is common to several cultures (construction of similarities), it is worth looking for translations (construction of relativities). In the case of Timor-Leste, the crisis of 2005-2007 might be understood as a revelation of the translation processes. The crisis in translation to be seen between 1999 and 2004 was at the origin of the crisis as translation and cultural translation of traditions is at the core of nation building in Timor-Leste.
In his campaign for the presidency of Timor-Leste, the then Prime Minister, José Ramos-Horta, officially opened his campaign in the last week of February 2007 with the words, ‘Today, here, in this land of Laga, I declare to all the people of Timor-Leste, east and west, north and south, and to the rest of the world my candidacy for the Presidency of the Republic’ promising that were he elected he would be President of all of Timor-Leste -- north, south, east, and west. While Ramos-Horta may have been resorting to a conventional style of political rhetoric in order to emphasize his aspiration to be a president of all the Timorese, in light of the then prevailing political situation it is at least equally likely he was taking note of a curious development in the political rhetoric of the country. I refer here to the verbal distinction that in 2006 became fashionable in the press between ‘easterners’ (ema lorosa’e) and ‘westerners’ (ema loromonu) and continued to be used among some politically-motivated Timorese themselves as late as the early months of the following year. My intention in this paper is to examine the distinction and to assess its merits as an authentic verbal model of Timorese socio-political identity.

---

97 Mendes (P.R.) 2007, Timor Lorosae: Ramos-Horta Em Laga, Crónica de Um Anúncio Anunciado, “Hoje, aqui, nesta terra de Laga, digo a todo o povo de Timor-Leste, lorosae e loromonu, tasifetu e tasimane, e ao res to do mundo, a minha candidatura a Presidente da República”. Laga is a sub-district about 150 kilometers east of Dili.

98 My first period of research in Timor-Leste was carried out over nineteen months between 1966 and 1967, and was followed by a series of shorter investigations comprised of three weeks in 1999, six weeks in 2001, almost eight months in 2005, and a stay of two weeks in 2007. This paper is thus the product of over forty years of research in Timor-Leste in the course of which I have accumulated many debts. Of particular salience in respect of the
I shall commence with some ethnographic observations relevant to this inquiry and then discuss the origin of this dualism, consider its semantic nature, and examine the extent to which it is sociologically and politically viable. When other verbal markets of identity are considered in the context of this opposition, the problem – as we shall see – involves social classification and identification. Finally, taking into account claims that this contrast has the potential for weakening the nation-state I shall remark a division whose destructive potential is far realer than the alleged division between easterners and westerners.

Let us commence by establishing the range of meaning associated with the terms *ema lorosa’e* and *loromonu*. At once it becomes apparent that the two designations are not applied with consistency by the Timorese. If we concede them their most generous applications the appellation *ema lorosa’e* covers those populations in the four eastern districts, Lautem, Viqueque, Baucau, and Manatuto while *ema loromonu* refers to those indigenes in the western districts of Liquiçá, Ermera, Aileu, Ainaro, Manufahi, Cova Lima, Bobonaro, and Oe-Cussi (Figure 1 and 2).

---

present study are the following. Institutions: The London Committee of the London-Cornell Project for East and South East Asian Studies which was supported jointly by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Nuffield Foundation, the American Philosophical Society, the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, and the Fulbright Committee of the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board; individuals: Rudy de Asis, José Henriques Pereira. I also thank Rumiana Decheva, Vanessa Prüller, and Paulo Castro Seixas, who as members of the panel on Timor-Leste, commented on my paper when I read it on Friday, September 14, 2007 in Naples. My appreciation also goes to the conveners of the panel, Christine Cabasset-Semedo and Frédéric Durand, for their splendid work in efficiently bringing together and organizing an impressively large group of knowledgeable participants, among the most notable being Noemia Amaral, a Timorese researcher from Dili. I also wish to thank Drs. Cabasset-Semedo and Durand for commenting on an earlier version of this article and making suggestions that I have incorporated into my final version.
Figure 1. The Districts and Principal Towns of Timor-Leste and One Possible Line of Disjunction for the Alleged 'Ema Lorosa’e'/‘Ema Loromonu' Contrast.

Figure 2. The Principal Ethnolinguistic Groups on the Island of Timor.
The district of Dili, which as the figure shows, lies between these two sectors, is the nation’s conceptual centre. This so-called ‘division’, one may note, is that it is geographical and not linguistic or ‘ethnic’ (whatever *that* particular designation might mean in the context of Timor-Leste). As a comparison of Figure 1 and Figure 2 shows, the country’s linguistic geography is not coterminous with this geographical classification, the Tetum-speaking peoples, for instance, being located in both Eastern and Western sectors. Another discrepancy is that whereas the district of Oe-Cussi, which might lay a claim to be considered the exemplary *loromonu* district since it is the most westerly, is in my experience, usually disregarded as a component of the schema until called to the attention of one’s interlocutor. Another point of interest is the lack of consensus on the part of Timorese individuals themselves regarding the precise referents or even propriety of either pair of terms. Alex Tilman, for example, who is himself Timorese, recalls that he has always been aware of this distinction and has himself ‘often referred to those coming from the eastern half of Timor-Leste as Easterners and the other half as Westerners’, but nevertheless qualifies this statement by adding that ‘it never crossed my mind that this dichotomy would one day translate into such a depth dividing the East Timorese into two ethnicities’. In light of Mr. Tilman’s comments, therefore, perhaps it might be judged useful to examine the context in which this distinction seems to have become appropriated to suit the requirements of contingent ambitions. This appears to have occurred at least as early as January 2006. On the ninth

---

99 In the opinion of Constâncio Pinto, Minister-Counselor/Chargé d’Affaires, the distinction is merely geographical (Pinto (C.) 2007, Interview: 30 November, Washington, D.C.).

100 Trindade (José) and Castro (Bryant) (2007) *Rethinking Timorese Identity as a Peacebuilding Strategy: The Lorosa’e – Loromonu Conflict from a Traditional Perspective*, p.36). In their study of *loro sa’e/loromonu*, they write that Timorese whom they interviewed ‘mentioned various interpretations’ of the expression, ‘... some suggesting that many people view the terms as a reality and that they represent an actual social difference and division ...’ whereas ‘... others also thought otherwise ... [believing] the terms were not fundamentally discriminatory but simply a type of classification to distinguish two peoples from different regions ...’

of that month, one hundred and fifty-nine members of the Timorese armed forces, the *Falintil-FDTL* (F-FDTL) or *F-Forças Defensas Timor Lorosa’e (Falintil-Timor-Leste Defence Forces)*, at whose head was one Gasção Salsinha, signed a petition addressed to President José Alexandre (Xanana) Gusmão complaining about their conditions of work (International Crisis Group 2006:i). Evidently most ‘petitioners’, as they came to be dubbed, were natives of the more westerly districts and although the story is somewhat complex and has a number of interesting ramifications, all that needs remarking here is that when these aggrieved petitioners failed to receive sufficient measure of satisfaction from the authorities, they deserted their posts. This resulted in the commander in chief of *Falintil-FDTL*, Taur Matan Ruak, dismissing them. By his action he precipitated a convoluted sequence of events (including a number of killings) and overblown rhetoric; the most consequential of which was the petitioners complaining they were being discriminated against because they were *ema loromonu*. *Ema lorosa’e*, they asserted, were favoured in the army. That some political bias may have to some extent have been implicated is indicated in the *International Crisis Group’s Asia Report* of October 10, 2006 where it is suggested that, whereas President Gusmão inclined towards *ema loromonu*, Prime Minister Alkatiri was disposed towards *ema lorosa’e*\(^{102}\). In late April violence reasserted itself, in the form of several head-on clashes between the petitioners and the national police force, the *Policía Nacional de Timor-Leste* (PNTL), and these mêlées were quickly joined by unemployed youths. With the petitioners as their inspiration the young thugs adapted the *ema loromonu/ema lorosa’e* formula to discriminate among themselves in accordance with where their family homes were and used it to incite brawls. Looking for some easy explanation for what they cast in their media outlets as a collapse of civil order the international press found in this simple opposition an ideal, readily understood and simple, explanation. Meanwhile, although it may not have expressed itself in violence the expression’s rhetoric implications were heard throughout the nation. Hence, when -- many months later -- even if Ramos-Horta was not specifically alluding to it in his campaign, most Timorese would have understood what he was referring to. A newspaper article published by


the journalist, Loro Horta, on May 18, 2006, though more skeptical than most, underlined the facile acceptance that the contrast, *ema loromonu* /*ema lorosa’e*, had attained by that time as a handy piece of polemical rhetoric. He maintained in his account that ‘Regional rivalries are an even bigger problem. The five hundred [sic] soldiers who ignited the recent protests were predominantly from the western part of the country, and they had regularly complained about discriminatory practices in the allegedly eastern-dominated national army. When the riots broke out in Dili, many police officers from western areas refused to tackle the protesters, allowing what should have been an easy situation for a united force to control to disintegrate into a tragic circus.’

By early June another foreign organization, the *International Action by Churches Together*, had accepted and perhaps may be described as having itself exploited the presumed antagonism between easterners and westerners by redefining it as something of the order of a national cleavage. ‘What started as a conflict within the army in March 2006,’ it noted, ‘has since resulted in an extensive country-wide conflict between people from the Western part of the country with those from the east. The fighting first erupted in Dili where houses and offices were looted and set on fire and has since spread to affect all communities [sic]’103. In another publication, Paul Cleary, while commenting on the violence, likewise exaggerated the geographical extent to which the easterner /westerner antagonism -- even assuming it was at all valid -- applied: ‘At the core of this crisis’ he wrote, ‘was a dispute involving 600 soldiers [sic], representing almost half of the army, who claimed that senior officers from the eastern region discriminated against them104. The government’s decision to sack the soldiers created an angry mob, and this spiraled into widespread east-west violence.’

Even after the arrival of Australian troops in May 2006 and the assumption of the premiership by Ramos-Horta, this dialectical construction demonstrated its long legs, at least in the capital. There, the gangs -- whether or not they supported the disgruntled ex-troops -- extended the application of their rhetorical tool to the general populace as a means of coercing whomever they desired for whatever reason they

---

wished -- or even for no particular reason at all. Recalling the visit to his native land he made that summer, Mr. Fausto Belo Ximenes, a student at Stony Brook University, described how he had learnt of youthful thugs stopping taxis to inquire whether the occupants were *ema lorosa’e* or *ema loromonu* and threatening them if their answers were not registered as satisfactory.\(^{105}\)

So much, then, for the action that embraced the expression, but what of the terms of the opposition themselves?\(^{106}\) The terms *ema lorosa’e* and *ema loromonu* can be disassembled as follows. *Ema* = ‘people’, *lorosa’e* = ‘east’, ‘eastern’, ‘easterly’; while *loromonu* = ‘west’, ‘western’, ‘westerly’. Since *loro* = ‘sun’; *s’a’e* = ‘rise’, ‘come up’; and *monu* = ‘to fall’, ‘go down’, the derivations are clear enough. *Loromonu* = ‘the sun goes down or falls’; the ‘place where the sun goes down’, i.e., the ‘West’. Similarly *lorosa’e*, which translates as ‘the sun rises’; ‘the place where the sun rises’; ‘the place where the sun comes up’, i.e., the ‘East’. The complementary opposition, *Ema lorosa’e / Ema loromonu*, is all of a piece with the dualistic mode by which concepts and their verbal expressions are predominately ordered in Timorese classificatory thought\(^{107}\) and their pedigree may very well be ancient. But their being thoroughly engrained in Timorese classification should not encourage us to conclude they necessarily correspond to any socio-political – or even cultural – reality. I have already remarked the anomalous classificatory status of Oe-Cussi and that of the Tetum-speaking speakers residing along the southern coast, but there other discrepancies that undermine any attempt to impose an unambiguous moiety system on the Timor-Leste population. The three ethno-linguistic groups that occupy the island of Ataúro\(^{108}\) are frequently omitted from the schema, and the same might be said of the district in which Dili is located. Then there are the Galoli, who though residents of Manatuto district, are sometimes not

---


\(^{106}\) A commentary reproduced from emails posted on the East Timor Studies mailing List at the Australian National University on 26 May 2006 about the 2006 crisis of that month was devoted to the issue of easterners and westerners (East Timor Studies 2006).


\(^{108}\) Rêssuk, Raklung’u, and Rahêssuk (Duarte (J.B.), 1984, *Timor: Ritos e Mitos Ataúros*, p.15).
classed as *ema lorosa’e* even though geography would identity them as such (Figure 1).

*Ema lorosa’e/*ema loromonu*, however, is only one of a number of identificatory markers. One that some observers regard as coincident or virtually coincident with *ema lorosa’e*/*ema loromonu* is *firaku/kaladi* whose etymologies and semantic characters are obscure. In one exegesis, *firaku* is of Makassai origin and means ‘our relatives or friends’ (*fi* = the inclusive first person pronoun; *raku* = ‘relatives, friends’) (Ximenes 2007). According to another, *firaku* is said to derive from the Portuguese expression *vira o cu* (‘display one’s buttocks’) on the supposed grounds that easterners are temperamental and stubborn, possessed, one might say, of an ‘in your face’ attitude. *Kaladi* is said to have derived from two possible sources. One is the Portuguese word *calado* = ‘calm’, ‘quiet’, ‘silent’, ‘taciturn’, ‘sullen’, ‘dumb’, psychological and behavioural qualities the Portuguese allegedly detected in the people of the western districts and used to make a contrast with those of the *firaku*. A second possible derivation comes from the Mambai word *kaladi* (‘yam’). The argument here is that other Timorese originally borrowed it to refer to the Mambai people because yams are a staple in Mambai diet and thereafter presumably extended it to embrace the other westerners, the Bunaq (Bunak), Ema (Kemak), and the rest. Again, however, we meet with the same objections to the application of the terms as we encountered with *ema lorosa’e* and *ema loromonu*. How do the peoples of Oe-Cussi, Atauro, and Dili district outside of the capital and its immediate environs, and the Tetum-speaking peoples of the southern coast fit it? If, they fit in at all.

Another question involves the moral associations of these terms. In the opinion of some commentators, the two expressions have derogatory connotations that render them suitable as mutual deprecations. Perhaps in some contexts and for some individuals such may be the case, but I have not accumulated any evidence in support of this contention. To the contrary: one Tetum resident of Viqueque with whom I raised this issue

---

111 As they are in the diet of most hinterland Timorese.
recalled how when he was in the Timorese army in the early 1970s firaku and kaladi were used in a mutually friendly manner, implying a bond a social anthropologist would at once recognize as a joking relationship.112

In addition to ema lorosa’e, ema loromonu, ema firaku, and ema kaladi, another expression used in Timor-Leste may be heard in the Tetum dialect spoken in the Viqueque sub-district on the southern plain where we find foho/fehan being employed to distinguish the inhabitants of the plain (i.e., the Tetum themselves) from those who live in the mountains (the Makassai, Waimaq, Kairui, Nauete [Naueti], and others). In this expression foho = ‘mountain’, ‘hill’, ‘north’, ‘an inhabitant of the mountains’, ‘a northerner’; and fehan = ‘lowland’, ‘the southern plain’, ‘an inhabitant of the southern plain’. Finally, one might note that foho is applied by Dili residents to denote those Timorese (the majority of the population) who reside in the countryside,113 with the referent ‘countryside’ included within the word’s semantic range. This contrast, which can be represented as Dili/foho, though it has generated far less attention than lorosa’e/ema loromonu or firaku/kaladi, is more fraught with political potential than either,114 since it corresponds to political, cultural, and social differences between the capital and its hinterland that may not bode well for the unity of the nation-state.115

These are the most common global identifiers, but this much having been said, one must note that the most common indexes of identity resorted to in Timor are language, and – above all – place. Someone from Lospalos whose first language is Fataluku would be referred to as ema Fataluku or ema Lospalos; someone from Maubisse whose first language was Mambai would be referred to as ema Mambai or ema Maubisse.

To return for a moment to the expression ema lorosa’e/ema loromonu, it may be that Dili’s location influenced its creation and dissemination since though not located at the geographical centre of Timor-Leste the

112 Henriques (José Pereira ) 2007, Interview, July 1, Viqueque town.
113 Tilman (A.) 2007, op.cit., p.3.
114 Hicks (D.) 2007, “Community and Nation-State in East Timor: A View from the Periphery”.
115 This distinction corresponds, up to a point, with what Edward Shils has discerned as the concept of ‘centre/periphery’ (Shils (E.) 1975, Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology).
capital nevertheless does provide a convenient point of reference for applying them, all the more so since Dili’s ethnic diversity affords abundant opportunities for discriminating among the capital’s 150,000 inhabitants, who come from all the districts\textsuperscript{116}. But if the ethnic diversity and density of humanity in Dili offered a fertile environment in which this verbal distinction could originate and flourish what – one might ask – was the agent or agents that affected its transformation into a politically charged expression? In search of an answer we must return to the June, July, August, and September of 1999 when the Timorese were in the midst of deciding whether or not to accept the offer of autonomy made to them by the Government of Indonesia. At the time foreign observers raised the possibility that after the ballots had been counted voters in the more westerly districts might have voted for the autonomy option while those in the eastern districts might have rejected it, thus disclosing a fundamental political fissure in the political geography of the country. The ubiquitous displays of the Indonesian flag in Bobonaro, Ermera, Liquiçá, and Cova Lima in the days leading up to what was officially termed a ‘Consultation’, but which was popularly – and more realistically – characterized as a ‘referendum’ or ‘plebiscite’\textsuperscript{117} suggested as much. Then there was the history of Timor-Leste before the Indonesian invasion on December 7, 1975. In the nineteen months preceding that incursion, the pro-Indonesian party, \textit{Apodeti}, had found its firmest support in the sub-district of At Sabe, in Ermera district, whose chief, Guilherme Gonçalves, was among the most prominent proponents of integration into the republic. Contrarily, some of the strongest opposition to the Indonesian occupation had come from the eastern districts. Finally, there was, of course, the plain geographical fact of the western districts’ proximity to Indonesian Timor\textsuperscript{118}. The United Nations was cognizant of this issue and considered it of sufficient

\textsuperscript{116} Dionísio Babo Soares (2003, op.cit.) suggests that the expression might owe its birth to competition that resulted from Makassai-speakers, from the east, and Bunak-speakers, from the west, migrating to Dili following the Second World War.

\textsuperscript{117} When, in my capacity of observer with the Carter Center, I drove from Kupang to Dili in August 1999, only two weeks before the date of the consultation, I witnessed on the section of the road from Batugadé to the capital a multitude of Indonesian flags stuck outside homes on either side of the road.

\textsuperscript{118} Oe-Cussi, of course, is actually situated in the western part of Indonesian Timor.
concern to include among its protocols for the Consultation the provision that the ballots from all thirteen districts were to be mixed, thereby making it impossible to determine if such a pattern of voting eventuated. The possibility that this radical alignment, even if it never really existed, did in fact continue to persist hung there, seven years later, in the political atmosphere of Timor-Leste and was ripe for exploitation by any group of disaffected individuals nursing a grievance or looking for a violent way of expressing their discontent or ambitions. Or, for that matter, politicians. And, as it happened, there were the aggrieved solders at the ready, politicians on the make, and gangs of bored, young men hanging about Dili’s streets just waiting for something that would incite them into violence.

The observation made by Scambary, Gama, and Barreto that these youth gangs in the capital identified themselves as *ema lorosa’e* or *ema loromonu* in graffiti suggests that however the so-called ‘division’ came into existence, they, like some of the politicians, sensed its potential for exploitation. At least in the capital, to the extent of which the division might be acknowledged, it would appear to be almost entirely a phenomenon of Dili and its immediate environs. Support for this proposition is to be found in an episode which lasted from April 19 to May 7, 2005 in which young country men and women from all thirteen districts assembled in Dili to stage what became known as the *manifestasaun*. It involved thousands of young persons whom the Catholic clergy had transported from the hinterland (*foho*) into the capital to demonstrate their Church’s opposition to the premiership of Mari Alkatiri. Although orchestrated by the clergy, the demonstrators were unharnessed from the usual constraints imposed by their senior kin back home and were permitted generous expression of their personal

---

119 Had there been a break-down into districts and had such a pattern of preference been established there is little doubt the Indonesian government and those who wished for autonomy would have forcefully pressed the case for the western districts remaining in the Republic. And given the reluctance with which the Indonesian government eventually severed ties with Timor-Leste in October 1999 who can know whether Timor-Leste as we know it today would exist?

120 Scambary (J.) (with Gama (H. da) and Barreto (J.)) 2006, *A Survey of Gangs and Youth Groups in Dili, East Timor*. 
indulgences. Traditional dances and guitar strumming complemented overblown speeches and political rallies while more privately – and a lot more quietly - nocturnal couplings on the Dili beach complemented the hymns and prayers that the more devout offered to the night air. Given such liberal amplitude, one might have supposed that the demonstrators -- had they wished -- would have had every kind of opportunity to make the most of the ema lorosa’e/ema loromonu or ema firaku/ema kaladi identifications. But no such advantage was taken. The only distinctions publicly communicated – on placards -- were those identifying the demonstrators as being from one or other district. A more global expression of self-identity or ‘otherness’ was, it would seem, felt unnecessary.

I began by referring to Ramos-Horta’s campaign. Significantly, neither during the build-up to the presidential election, which took place on April 9, 2007, or in the subsequent run-off on May 9, 2007, did the issue of ema loromonu versus ema lorosa’e become a political bone of contention. Nor did it receive any sustained mention in the press. Following the presidential election came the parliamentary elections held in June, and for which my wife and I served as international observers with the Carter Center. We found ourselves suitably positioned to pay close attention to party rhetoric including that which evoked the ema loromonu and ema lorosa’e expression. If it was used, it was employed with little polemical power and all Timorese individuals with whom I discussed the expression, denied its socio-political authenticity.

In the political context of 2006, ema loromonu/ema lorosa’e is most cogently to be understood as a rhetorical device initially articulated for self-serving advantage by disgruntled Timorese soldiers and then assimilated as a handy marker of identity for young thugs. It was anyway, as remarked earlier, preeminently operational within the capital and its environs and found little acceptance in the hinterland.

---

121 Scambary (J.) & al., 2006, op.cit.
122 In a panel discussion sponsored by the East Timor Action Network (ETAN) I attended on July 7, 2006 in New York, there was general scepticism among the three Timorese speakers who participated regarding the legitimacy of the distinction ema lorosa’e/ema loromonu, one individual dismissing the expression as a mere stereotype and a second
The factitious character of the *ema lorosa’e/ema loromonu* opposition has also been remarked by the President of Timor-Leste’s Parliament, Francisco “Lu Olo” Guterres, who was reported to have said in an interview that the division was “an artificial creation within the crises”. His disclaimer notwithstanding, Guterres nevertheless still sought to turn to his own advantage a previous statement made by President Gusmão on March 23, that *lorosa’e* commenced with the district of Manatuto as suggesting the expression really carried political weight.

Although I conclude that in its substance *ema lorosa’e/ema loromonu* is little more than a geographical expression that happened to be manipulated to suit the politics of confrontation, this is not to deny that the designations have acquired a degree of social acceptance. Indeed, given the use that has been made of them, in the unsettled political environment of Timor-Leste today, they may well have the potential to become more definitive markers of Timorese identity. But as things stand at present, they lack sufficient socio-political force to pose anything like the threat to the integrity of the nation-state that the aforementioned accounts in the *International Crisis Group’s Asia Report* and Paul Cleary, among others might imply. This does not imply, however, that the nation-state does not have social or political divisions that threaten to subvert its integrity. One opposition cited here that may pose a serious challenge to the integrity of the Timorese polity is that of Dili/*foho* and another that has only recently become clear may be discerned in the results of the 2007 parliamentary elections. At first glance it may seem to converge upon the *ema lorosa’e/ema loromonu* contrast but closer inspection tells a different tale. This involves the localization of *Fretelin* support, which the election showed as occurring declaring it to have been ‘no big deal’ in the past though at the current time it was being used by politicians for their own ends.

---

124 As for the contrast, *firaku/kaladi*, we need to know more precisely which ethno-linguistic groups are implicated in this dualism. In the case of *foho/fehan* physical geography rather than ethno-linguistic affiliation appears to be the defining feature.
overwhelmingly in Baucau, Viqueque, and Lautem. By contrast, the party revealed itself to be relatively weak in the other districts, where apart from Cova Lima, other parties, principally the Congresso Nacional para a Reconstrução de Timor (CNRT) and the coalition party, ASDT/PSD (Associação Social Democrática Timorense/Partido Social Democrática Timor Lorosa’ê), triumphed. Given the anomalous status of Manatuto in the easterners/westerners typology, it is of interest that the Congresso Nacional para a Reconstrução de Timor (CNRT) was the decisive winner (gaining just over 30% of the votes) with the coalition party, ASDT/PSD (Associação Social Democrática Timorense/Partido Social Democrática Timor Lorosa’ê), and Fretilin sharing roughly the same percentage of the votes (just below 20%)\textsuperscript{126}. Within the districts that voted for Fretilin, however, there were sub-districts and suku that did not vote for that party and one would therefore be rash to regard the three ‘Fretilin’ districts in the East as constituting a solid block of support. While not a political reification of the ema lorosa’ê/ema loromonu contrast, then, this pattern is clearly a manifestation of real political differences, something that cannot be plausibly claimed for a rhetorical duality that was first exploited by aggrieved solders, then assimilated by Dili gangs and pressed into service by political opportunists, and subsequently seized upon and amplified in the international press.

\textsuperscript{126} Gusmão was born in this district, a natal circumstance that may have had some bearing on the result.
Nation building at the village level: First the house, then the Church and finally a modern state

Alexander Loch

Researcher: Senhor A., may I ask you a “strange” question?
Chefe de suku: You have lived in our village for almost three years and I am used to your questions. You are welcome. I will try to answer.

Researcher: Imagine, you are walking along a road, and at a junction this road splits up into three different paths. And now your governo says "Turn left!" And the Church says "go straight!" And your tradition requires you to turn right! Where would you go?
Chefe de suku: You must respect all three.

Researcher: Yes. But sometimes in life there are these difficult situations and you must make decisions. Imagine, Prime Minister Alkatiri says, “go left”, Bishop Basilio says “go straight”, and the old men of your uma lulik (sacred house) demand, to go right: Which track would you follow?
Chefe de suku: We really must respect the governo in Dili, the religiaun katoliko and our tradisaun - but if the situation is really, really hard, I think, I can never do anything against my sacred house. You know, even the Bishop has his sacred house. Everybody must respect the lisan (traditional law).

The above conversation represents a key-dialogue during three years (2002-2005) of action research on psychosocial reconstruction processes in East Timor, carried out in the context of developmental cooperation, with data primarily from the Makassae region. The following anthropological reflections will focus on the dimensions “tradition”, “Catholicism” and “modernity” stressed in the dialogue,
with relation to the question of nation building at the village level in a country, where over 80% of the population does not live in urban areas, but settle as subsistence farmers in rural hamlets127.

1 - Imagined modern communities, traditional structures and a powerful Church

From an anthropological perspective, East Timorese villages constitute communities, in which members know other members to a large degree personally, often linked by umane-fetosaan-relations (i.e. prescriptive marriage patterns/alliances), and engage thus in face-to-face interactions. The nation, on the other hand, can be understood as a kind of “imagined community”, characterized by the fact that members “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”128. Apparently from this constructivist point of view, nation-building is not merely a political endeavor in Dili, it is also a “constructive” action taking place in peoples minds. Oral traditions are strong in a country where only 50.1% of the population is literate129 and for a deeper understanding of East Timorese ‘imaginations’ one has to ask, who actually creates and shapes “images” about the others and the nation in remote discourses? Newspapers and other media are not very widespread, other “actors” or “constructors” psychologically influence the production, perception and processing of such (in)formations. In metaphoric terms, intuitively understandable for most East-Timorese farmers, “constructing a nation” is somehow similar to constructing a uma lulik (sacred house): it needs men and women, discourses, material, rituals, leader and a shared vision of a culturally appropriate shape and (spiritual) boundaries against “others”130. Reflecting the principles of “constructions” in a given

130 Barth Frederik (ed) 1969. Ethnic groups and boundaries.
cultural and historical environment often also helps to understand problems related to its “architecture” and processes associated with the building.

As argued elsewhere\textsuperscript{131}, for a deeper understanding of any phenomena related to mind, cognition or identity in East Timor, it is not enough to conceptualize only the prevalent dichotomy of ‘modern’ versus ‘traditional’. Indeed, there are powerful modernizers in Dili and there are strong conservative keepers of customary laws and lifestyles, but a specific third dimension has to be considered in East Timor as well, which distinguishes it considerably from neighbouring Indonesia and Australia, and that is its remarkable Catholicism\textsuperscript{132}. With more than 400 religious sisters and priests, involved not only in pastoral but also social and even in quasi-political work, the Catholic Church influences and pervades many public domains, owns land and is one of the most influential education providers (18\% of the schools in the country are operated by the Church including 17 of the 36 total secondary schools; curricula are developed and Catholic teachers trained according to international standards).

Being sensitized for the omnipresent co-existence of tradition, modernity and Catholicism, one encounters the trilogy everywhere in East Timor: Modern constructed graveyards may be decorated by traditional buffalo horns and topped by a Catholic cross; a CAVR-community reconciliation meeting may be organized according to modern international standards and supported by the United Nations, but it is eventually the traditional betel chewing ceremony and a \textit{juramento} (oath – involving often the drinking of palm wine with blood), which reconciles the actors, and Catholic prayers frame the ceremony. Studies on the World Bank’s community empowerment project heuristically used, among others, this three-dimensional perspective in order to analyse different views towards democratic decision-making

\textsuperscript{131} Loch Alexander 2007. \textit{Haus, Handy and Halleluja - Psychoziale Rekonstruktion in Osttimor.}

\textsuperscript{132} Durand Frédéric 2004. Catholicisme et Protestantisme dans l’Île de Timor 1556-2003.
processes\textsuperscript{133}. Systematic experiments on Timorese identity configurations with 241 subjects carried out in the Teachers Research and Resource Centre in Baucau verified in 2004 that individuals represent themselves on average as being equally modern, Catholic and traditional and these identity-dimensions correlate partly with the country’s language-tetralemma (i.e. preferences to use Tetum, Indonesian, Portuguese or English\textsuperscript{134}).

2 - (In)compatibilities, symbols and narratives

While on an individual level it may cause only occasional cognitive dissonance to pray on a Sunday morning in a Catholic mass to maromak (God), traditionally sacrifice a chicken to the matebian (ancestors) in the afternoon and watch at the end of the day a new Chinese produced VCD (if there is electricity available) containing scenes absolutely contrary to the value system of the latter, the three dimensions can be quite incompatible on society level. Two examples may illustrate this: (1) In Bobonaro, plans to build a monument after 2002 for the victims of the independence struggle were underway, displaying a person with a katana (traditional sword), a modern country’s flag and a Catholic cross. The appropriateness of the symbols, particularly the cross, was controversially disputed in the community. The intervention of the district administrator and a highly respected priest were necessary to agree on the final representation of all three dimensions. (2) In February 2005, the Fretilin government had a serious dispute with the Catholic Church, when they tried to abolish the thus far mandatory subject “religion” in public schools. Priests and religious sisters led demonstrations against the government on the streets (although the Vatican demanded no political involvement), youth associations and several dissatisfied society groups followed, and for days it became obvious that the clergy could easily mobilize the masses for political action, while the prime minister

\textsuperscript{133} Ospina Sofi, Hohe Tanja. 2001. \textit{Traditional Power Structures and the Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project}.

\textsuperscript{134} Loch Alexander 2007. \textit{Haus, Handy and Halleluja - Psychoziale Rekonstruktion in Osttimor}, p.255.
(at this time: Mari Alkatiri) had indeed legal power, but not the emotional means to reach his folks. His secular ambitions were doomed to fail; in May 2005, after President Xanana Gusmao’s mediation, he finally had to sign a declaration with the two Bishops, which reflects the self-image of the “nation under construction” at this point in history. The text recognized “the important contribution that religious values have in the construction of the national identity, in the construction of the nation and in the socio-economic, cultural and political level.”

First the house…

Returning back from Dili the same day to a small village, I could observe that the dialogue of the four *ema boot* (big person) about “religious values” was, in fact, discussed by the farmers. However, much more important for their life was a closer set of occurrences, centred on the recent reconstruction of their sacred houses (*uma lulik*). Over a relatively short period of two years, in the central Makassae region between Laga and Baguia, approximately 200 *uma lulik* were built by the local communities. This was an enormous logistic, economic and emotional challenge for the whole social fabric involved. The reconstruction of the houses of Leda Tame and Nami Bu’u, for example, required four buffaloes, six horses, 19 goats, 20 pigs, 31 sacks of rice, 1 traditional sword and 1500 USD in cash – during a time when half of the population lived below the poverty line.

Austronesian houses are well known in anthropological literature as being much more than mere shelters. They represent important social spaces and local cosmologies; they link extended families and are therefore the prerequisite and guarantee of the “flow of life.” The relevance of sacred houses in East Timor is a well documented phenomenon – from early accounts of Portuguese administrators, Dutch scholars, Indonesian authors and up to contemporary East

---

Timorese\textsuperscript{141} and international researchers concerned with reconstruction phenomena\textsuperscript{142}. In the context of nation building the relevance of these houses is at least threefold: (1) over centuries in East Timor sacred houses were built, rebuilt, and after 1975 often systematically destroyed by the Indonesian armed forces, and following 1999, again reconstructed. During the post-conflict period, the reconstruction of symbols of integrity was an important healing ritual of social wounds. The nation needed such area-wide ways of coping. (2) The houses have a pivotal role for the broader social functioning, since each \textit{uma} is linked to other \textit{houses} and each clan has therefore multiple alliance relations, which form a countrywide web of houses. Being a nation of interrelated houses, the imagined community is connected via these architectonic manifestations. Following Geertz’s (1973) prominent concept that people are suspended in ‘webs of significance they themselves have spun’ and “culture” can be taken as those webs, East Timorese Nation builders must be “webmasters”, able to deal with house-affairs. (3) Finally, modern East Timorese activists have meanwhile discovered the potential of building even a national \textit{uma lulik} for the transformation of national grievances and overcoming the east-west tensions of 2006. Trindade states: “\textit{Even if the origins remain unclear, the identification with Loromunu or Lorosa’e has become a serious vulnerability for East Timor, susceptible to manipulation in a context of new nation-building where people search for belonging and stability as identities are shifting}” and advises therefore: “\textit{The importance of the uma lulik in relation to the people of East Timor cannot be overstated. The sacred house embodies the ethos of communal unity and the binding relationships between the people, the land and their ancestry ...On the basis of the many positive responses we propose the creation of a National Uma Lulik in Dili as a symbol of East Timorese identity and solidarity. The National Uma Lulik will be seen as the focal point for local uma luliks across the country and the communities that associate with them}”\textsuperscript{143}.

\textsuperscript{140} i.e. Tjahjono Gunawan (ed.) 1998. \textit{Indonesian Heritage}.
\textsuperscript{141} i.e. Costa Christiano, Guterres Aureo da Costa & Lopes Justino. 2006. \textit{Exploring Makassae Culture}.
\textsuperscript{143} Trindade Jose, Bryant Castro. 2007. \textit{Rethinking Timorese Identity as a Peacebuilding Strategy}, p.12, 38.
...then the Church...

Understanding that the sacred house from it’s foundation – mostly male and female sacred pillars, at which annual sacrifices are performed – up to the top (in Makassae culture linking the living and the dead) is the most important manifestation of a worldview older than the arrival of Catholicism on the island, it is obvious that the church has more than ambivalent feelings towards these houses: in the best case, priests try to incorporate their symbolism into syncretistic forms or even build their sacral-architecture according to the same principles (see, for example, the house of the priest of Laga, the union hall in Baucau or the church in Los Palos). More often, the young East Timorese priests (and not so much the elder international missionaries) try to marginalize the remnants of the traditional system and prefer to integrate modern
techniques (Laptop & LCD-projector) in their toolbox to spread the gospel. The gentio (traditional believers/pagans) raise a smile, but their days are numbered since their age group is gradually declining. In his Christmas sermon (2004) Bishop Basilio de Nascimento criticized the immaturity of his parish believing that ancestral spirits are stronger than the gospel. However, interestingly the native East Timorese clergy, both madres and padres, can not be considered as pure antagonists of the traditional system, they are considered qua their own Timoreseness to be part of it and people know exactly, to which family/clan/house actually someone belongs and who has chosen to follow a religious career.

The role of the Catholic Church for the creation of images is multiform: Having the human resources and organizational structures to reach deep into villages, priests, missionaries, religious sisters and laymen are major players in defining in- and out-groups, heaven and hell, good and bad. They define more adequately than the text-formats of the weak judiciary system what a sala is (the Tetum word can mean both: a sin or a mistake). The Church shapes all important rites de passage (birth, marriage, death) and has through its Catholic school system access to the younger generations’ brains and visions. Most importantly and especially under consideration of the above mentioned regional fraction in 2006, it is the Church which produces uniting symbols and rituals. While an uma lulik of the Bunak looks different from the Fataluku ones, both groups recite exactly the same Lord’s Prayer. The gospel aims for love and harmony, not for disintegration. Like the traditional system, which provides symbols and rituals (like houses and sacred objects such as swords, drums, weavings etc), the Catholic Church has the power of definition over a set of images (cross, stories, ritual performances etc.). For the longest time they could even define, who actually is a Timorese (literally: a timor-oan, a child of Timor), by keeping a monopoly on baptism-certificates, which are later needed to get an identity-card.

…and finally a modern state

The term “modern” is not as easy to operationalise as “Catholic” or even “traditional” in the East Timorese context. European Modernity of 18th century enlightenment and 19th century industrialization can hardly be compared to 21st century post-conflict nation building in Asia’s least developed country. However, political elites and villagers have distinct
HOW TO BUILD A NEW NATION?

modern – sometimes even post-modern – visions and tendencies beyond Catholic and traditional ideas, which manifest themselves in the national development plan, the increased use of communication technology or impacts of globalization at local level. From a historical perspective, gender-equity or western-like democratic elections are - not only in East Timor - very recent developments, but are unforeseen in both, the Bible and the lisan (traditional law). Likewise “the nation” is a comparatively new concept, - though an older Timorese equivalent, the “rai” (land), exists.

People fought for their rai, many popular songs glorify the rai Timor and the liu rai (traditional landlord) represents, for many still nowadays, the authority who actually has the obligation to care for the land and the right to speak on behalf of its people (interestingly, even Jesus Christ is sometimes attributed to be a liu rai). This prototype of a relation-definition between the individual and his liu rai is crucial for understanding the relation of a citizen to his state.

Although nowadays the prime minister and the president are democratically elected, it is not assumed that this implicates any kind of ownership of the nation, whom these ema boot (big person) represent. They get the respeito (respect), but not a stakeholders interest, as long as they perform well – similar to the liu rai, it is assumed that they have the responsibility to care. Nation-building is one of their duties.

There is a deeply felt sense of being Timor oan (Timorese) belonging to the rai Timor. But its government is somehow geographically distant (in the capital) as well as emotionally far away (often personified as its prime minister, Mari Alkatiri, at that time). It is a perfect image to be blamed for unfulfilled expectations. "Governo tenke halo!" (The government must do it!) became a coined phrase expressing that responsibility for transformation and (re-)construction. It was not the task of the people, but the nation-builders in distant Dili. Their efforts to build some-thing, including a nation-thing, was seen as their business – comparable to the effort of another village to build a house to which one does not belong by family ties (and therefore not obliged to assist in the construction). Communities can afford enormous capital to build their own sacred house, work together under the hot sun and develop outstanding logistic competences to get things organized. Members of
the same community will answer to the question “Couldn’t you not spend an additional half day to fix also the roof of the primary school next to the uma lulik?” most likely “Governo tenke halo!” Obviously, one challenge of nation-builders is thus, to create a house-image of the nation.

Conclusion

In village discourses, all three dimensions are discussed: the last sermon of the Catholic priest, traditional berlake (prescribed reciprocal transfers, often misleadingly translated only as ‘dowry’ or ‘bride wealth’) and the contemporary national challenges such as education, health services or oil revenues. The question, if traditional, Catholic or modern ideas are actually considered more important is, of course, primarily an academic one. The above mentioned identity-experiments in Baucau showed a tendency that East Timorese in 2004 perceived themselves slightly more modern than traditional; but there was evidence that for most people all three dimensions are highly relevant. However, in critical situations people must indeed make choices: A very sick child can be brought to a modern hospital or to a traditional matan-dook (healer) or a religious sister for prayer and help. The three dimensions are not mutually exclusive – a malnourished child can be treated by a modern doctor, obtain some traditional medicine as well as receiving careful follow-up from a madre. Nation building is also a critical process, and one of the challenges for an imagined modern community is to integrate likewise traditional concepts and Catholic values. In moments of incompatibility, at the village level a preference emerges: First the house, then the Church and finally a modern state.
Denying peripheral status, claiming a role in the nation: sacred words and ritual practices as legitimating identity of a local community in the context of the new nation

Lúcio Sousa

The purpose of this article is to discuss the role of adat - an Indonesian term, developed during Dutch colonization, and that is used widely in East Timor after the Indonesian occupation period- and its contribution to nation building in local communities of East Timor from their point of view (emic perspective). In this context adat refers to the recurrent term used by Timorese people to designate the belief and practice of religious cult concerning their ancestors, their sacred houses and rituals, as well as people who perform or have a task in this system.

In certain contexts adat is equated to tradisaun or costume, tradition and custom; the old Portuguese term estilu or cultura is also used as others say that their practices are “ita nia cultura, ita nia tradisaun” – our culture, our tradition. The dimensions of adat selected to work in this article concern community ritual practices and oral narratives.

---

144 Research funded by Fundação Oriente (small and PhD grant) and Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian (small grant). The participation in EuroSeas 2007 Panel 28: Timor-Leste: How to Build a New Nation in Southeast Asia in the 21st Century? in Naples, was possible with the funding of Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian. Thanks to Claudine Friedberg for comments and suggestions and Ângela Lopes and Manuela Pinto for reviewing the English text.
Community ritual practices are an exceptional opportunity to analyse how ideology and practice of identity are worked out by local actors, namely through narratives of origin which stand as an example of identity and denial of peripheral position as often depicted from a hegemonic centre that seems to devalue the historical process of local entities.

Community ritual practices are important as cultural heritage but also as social and ritual markers of distinction and identity. It seems that their value as “national building” tools are relegated to the sphere of folklore and used in specific times of State or Church agenda, legitimating, above all, these two entities. Nevertheless, for local communities ritual practices are seen as resources not only in local contexts but also for the nation.

1 - The renewal of ritual practice in East Timor: periphery or core of the nation?

According to statistics in 1970, at the brink of Independence and Indonesia Invasion, the population of East Timor was only 26.5% Catholic\textsuperscript{145}. The major part of its population still maintains its traditional beliefs. Torn by war and occupation, obliged by the new Indonesian authorities to choose a monotheist religion, and supported in their suffering by many priests, the country has become predominantly Catholic as statistics presented in 1998, reported that 84.1% of the population as Catholic, and after independence, 93.4% in 2001\textsuperscript{146}. It seems that the country was no longer gentiu... I experienced that in my first year in East Timor when some of my Timorese colleagues reported to me that gentius were “savages from the past and no longer existed”. Interestingly, in the second year some of these same colleagues led me to their sacred spaces and to meet adat leaders.

In 1999, the country became free from Indonesia and began a process of regaining its independence through a UN lead operation. In the mountains of East Timor, rituals were held to favor the independence movement and encourage their members. After the referendum, in the wake of the rampage destruction carried out by militias backed by the Indonesians, certain villages in the mountains performed once again more rituals of war for their ancient *Falintil* fighters, restructured along traditional lines of social organization, and prepared themselves to defend their villages with traditional weapons.

Since 2000, there have been sightings reported in many districts of the reactivation of major collective rituals in the villages and the reconstruction of sacred houses. This is not to say that during the Indonesian "time" there were no rituals or sacred house rebuilding - McWilliam (2005) comments the fact that during the occupation, Indonesia "(…) sought to promote the image of East Timorese house forms as a part of its ideological integration of the territory within Indonesia". Many communities held certain local rituals, in the Bobonaro area *sau batar* or *an tia*, and even regional rituals like *be malai* continued to attract many visitors, namely Indonesian officials, just as in Portuguese times. The Be Malae ceremony at the lagoon located near Atabae area took place again in 2002. Once more, major local and national government officials attended the ceremony, a little like the photos depicted in Album Fontoura (2002) in the thirties and the description that Rui Cinatty writes in 1964 with his article "A Pescaria da Bé-Malai". The sacred houses never ceased to exist; however, due to the conditions of war, many were rebuilt with new materials and different shapes from the traditional ones. Today the effort to reconstruct them along the traditional materials and structure is in order again.

---

149 I had the opportunity to visit two sacred houses rebuilt during the eighties in Bobonaro and Lolotoe sub-districts, one Kemak and the other Bunak. I also attended a ceremony in Ainaro district at another house rebuilt along traditional lines in 1998/1999 and which escaped the destruction of 1999.
The May 20, 2002 marked the transferece of political power from the UN to the Timorese. A main ceremony was held in Dili, where traditional myths were reproduced, dancers and singers from all the districts acted and traditional spokespersons from all the districts, known mainly as lia nain, the Tetum word for the Lord of the Words.

Although the ceremony was transmitted by television to the main districts and sub districts, local arrangements were made including traditional dancers, singers and adat oratory to welcome the new flag, the symbol of the nation.

Nevertheless, the restarting of major community rituals, the marriage practices concerning bride wealth and sacred houses are being faced with either with praises or criticisms, both from the State and the Church. That discussion is linked to the dichotomy centre-periphery. In the independent East Timor there is the distinction between the centre, associated with the ongoing process of change in major cities, the sea (particularly in the Northern coast), and the periphery, associated mostly with the mountains and small towns and villages where culture is mostly traditional. The main characteristic of this dichotomy are depicted below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centre = sea = urban areas (30%)</th>
<th>Periphery = mountain = rural areas (70%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Díli as the centre of the political realm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- economical enterprise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- educational opportunities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- civilized / innovative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- culture as &quot;process&quot;²</td>
<td>- mountains as the distant, backward, (self) depicted as ignorant and brute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- economically deprived</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- lack of educational facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- politically absent from major decisions concerning nation/region (only &quot;represented&quot; in the suku council³)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- culture as &quot;tradition&quot;⁴</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The centre is associated with the sea, seen as a boarder but also a point of contact or origin of outsiders, power and authority that is still continued until today as the seating of the central government and its political power and the spiritual (catholic) source of authority. The periphery is in this context mostly reserved for secondary powers, namely local power and administrations and culture is tradition; this is passiveness and immobility via the action and mobility of the “process” vision.

How is *adat* seen from the State's perspective and the Church's perspective? At an idyllic level, the mountains, their inhabitants, and the ancestors are considered the souls of the country. *Adat* is praised as the “soul” of the nation/used in reconciliation processes/ecological benefits (*tara bandu*) and used as national “folklore”, namely in the reception of foreign dignitaries. Concerning the 2006 political-military crisis these are two examples, one from the Church and another from the State concerning how traditions/*adat* are thought: a) “Concerning the difficult situation in which we live and the search for a solution, I heard the bishop of Baucau, D. Basílio do Nascimento, suggest in a local radio interview, that the old ones, the elders and the villages’ chiefs should be heard. Timor has traditions. It has a history. It has a culture. If the most pragmatic, but also less internalised western ways fail, why don’t we try to profit from what we have in the search for peace for our country?” 151; b) “President Gusmão further said he has launched a commission to gather all the traditional elders (lia nain) of the 13 sacred houses to follow with the tradition, which he said has not been observed following the end of the invasion. He said he has been criticized for this but [he] would like to follow the ancestral traditions. It is believed that the recent crisis is partly the result of not following in the tradition of putting back the swords to rest, which were taken and used as protection during the war.” 152

Nevertheless, there is a critique of economical, ecological and social aspects (slaughter of livestock, burning of grasses, and money in bride wealth). At the political level, traditional power structures are not

---

151 Ângela Carrascalão Friday, June 2, 2006 [free translation from Portuguese] in: http://timor2006.blogspot.com/
recognized as equal partners, although many of the politicians rely on their local bases to raise legitimacy.

What is the vision of the Catholic Church concerning these issues? It seems that the church is at a crossroad of enculturation, perceived as inevitable but frightened by the possibility of syncretism. An estimated 1.7% of East-Timorese declare themselves as animists and a greater number of Catholics still practice their traditional beliefs. In 2002, a young priest working in a remote village told me with some bitterness that his Timorese parish members go to church but as soon as they turn their backs they go back to their traditional rituals. The existence of a cosmological vision that incorporates masculine and feminine is well known by the original Catholic entrepreneurs, leading them to stimulate the worship of Mary, the mother of Christ, in a way to integrate local practices (feminine) with Catholic “masculine” ones. At one level there is the incorporation of certain traditional practices and clothing in liturgy. Receptions of Bishops are welcomed with traditional lía nains recites, and even certain priests are eager to visit their sacred houses when they become priests, as I witnessed in a ceremony in the Ainaro area in 2002 when two priests went to pay homage to their fathers’ village and had a special lunch at their sacred houses while wearing traditional outfits and eating with traditional tools and food.

But, on the other hand, at the national level it seems that there is a will to integrate local culture with the Catholic faith and not to let it be used “to serve as justification to devotion towards local “gods””156. At the local level some examples can depict what seems to be a will to portray old beliefs in the worst way and occupy their space. Two examples of this can be seen in Bobonaro area. In the old place of Malilait sacred houses there is now a giant cross and a virgin Mary cave, near some stones with a comment “diabo” – devil, addressing old practices. In Marobo, studied by Clamagirand (1982), the place where a

HOW TO BUILD A NEW NATION?

major ritual “tui” used to take place is now occupied by a church constructed during the Indonesian time.

On arriving in Dili in September 2005 to start my fieldwork, I heard a radio interview in which a priest claimed “uma lisan yes, uma lulik no; uma lulik is the church”, this is hard to translate as “lisan” in Mambae is kin to the term “lulik” in Tetum and so there seems to be an incongruity. However, the explanation claims that there could be no sacred house, that the sacred house is the Church and that the house could only be a house of tradition and costume, like a “museu” – museum, as mentioned afterwards.

It is difficult to know if this is the official position of the Catholic Church concerning the issue. The practices of some priests favor certain ritual practices, namely the ones concerning the cult of ancestors, but others do not. At the end of my year of field research, the local parish was proposing to some local communities, both in the Quemak and Bunak area, to “tau krus ida iha lulik makas imi fiar liu” - “to put a cross in the most sacred place you worship more”… What was under scrutiny was not unperceived by local adat leaders who said: “sira hakarak koa ita nia abut” “they want to cut our roots”.

2 - The role of local communities and traditional rulers in the context of the nation (emic vision)

The suggestion of roots being cut is extremely important if we want to understand local perspectives of life and nation. In the botanic terminology of the lal gomo, the roots of the people linked them to a territory and its people: their ancestors, their kinsmen and allies “desde uluk kedas” – since the beginning of time. Roots in this sense are territorial markers but also metaphors of life and life vitality (of the individual, the House and the community). Maintaining the roots of people is much more than the mere vision of adat as a tradition to use in public State/Church displays. Adat as roots is essential for relating land
and people, their history and present, to maintain land and life, and from the local insight to sustain the nation.

The main idea I get from traditional power leaders is that they are not considered in the process of nation building and some claim that the present situation of disorder and conflict in East Timor is due to this fact. “ema la fiar ba ita nia cultura” – these people (the leaders) do not trust our culture, the one in which: “katuas adora cultura bei ala sira” – the old ones love the culture of the ancestors.

According to them, East Timor is composed of State, Church and adat and they all have a role to play, none are excluded from the nation endeavour, but: “Estadu, greja no adat hanesan, ida la bele liu” - “State, church and adat are at the same level, one cannot go ahead of the others”. According to my interlocutors, the fact that the State or the Church dispute prominence is not good for the development of the nation, especially when they both mistrust adat. There is resentment because they are not considered as equals: the State does not consult them (power) and the Church denies them the role as life keepers in the traditional religious system (authority).157

Their notion of citizenship evolves around the possibility of being Timorese, Catholic and adat believers. A sense of loss prevails concerning the risks of forgetfulness: “Ita la bele soe ita nia cultura, ita nia avo” – we cannot throw away our culture, our ancestors. Culture and ancestors are indistinguishable and this is identity and memory as practised in daily lives: Adat mai husi lalehan – adat comes from the sky.

If there is no controversy around the place of adat and Catholicism, the problems arise concerning the limitations of each other. In some rituals the blessing of food or to make the sign of the cross is discussible by some. The adat are connected to the fact that formally they were “gentiu” - “gentiu uluk, sarani ikus.” – Firstly we were pagan, only after we became Catholic.

157 An angry adat elder told me that Xanana should come and talk with him. Maybe he could help, but it was not up to him to go and look for Xanana but the other way round. This is like the Mambae parabola of the rock and tree who stand and wait (Traube Elisabeth, 1982, Cosmology and Social Life – Ritual Exchange among the Mambai of East Timor).
3 - Tradition - *adat* manifold dimensions

Time and space are important features of this discussion as they are often forgotten by those who are at the political centre: daily life results from a continuous interaction with the land and with the ancestors. Culture as tradition is not the absence of process. On the contrary: vitality, procreation and reproduction are paramount themes for these societies\(^{158}\). But, these are only attained if there is “*unidade*” – unity, among the community, expressed as “*liafuan ida deit*” – only one word\(^{159}\) or in Bunak as “*daga ni kere diol ni uen*” – one speech one word.

Mambae depicted by Traube (1986) were seen as passive onlookers, they depicted themselves as the *rock and tree* keepers. But this passive role occults a major notion of centrality by those who ensure that the land and the world continue. The *adat* works with the main symbols of the source or origin of life but also with politics concerning territory and community, economics – namely food security and poverty – and religion/belief on the fertility and health, all concerning the management of the flow of life of plants, animals and humans and, by extension, the country.

---


\(^{159}\) There should be noted that *lia* is joined with *fuan* – word for heart, interior.
As Barraud and Friedberg (1996) comment concerning the Kei and Bunak societies:

“Performing rituals is part of everyday work and necessary in order to be a human social being, to maintain the society through the continuity of the relationships with other beings (human and non-human) and, particularly in the case of these two societies, (but maybe also of other Indonesian societies) with the territory.”

4 - Claiming centrality to the interior: the case of a Bunak domain

The Bunak are a non-Austronesian speaking people who inhabit the centre of Timor divided along the border of East Timor, West Timor and Indonesia. The Bunak of Lamakneen in West Timor were extensively studied by Berthe (1971) and Friedberg (1978, 1980). These have an oral tradition recounting the migrations and encounters they had along the way to their present location and the constitution of their Houses.

The Bunak of East Timor, and particularly the ones I work with in Bobonaro sub-district have a different world vision of the notion of centre and periphery. The distinctiveness of these people, considered among the oldest ones to come to East Timor, is the fact that their journey is described in an extensive oral poetry collected by Berthe (1971). But, the particularity of the domain under study - Tapo (sacred axe) - is already recognised by Friedberg (1972, p.47) who mentions the unique “recentralisation du monde connu autour de Taqpoq”.

---

161 Berthe Louis, 1971, Bei Gua – Itinéraire des Ancêstres.
162 Friedberg Claudine, 1978, Comment fut Tranchée la Liane Céleste et autres textes de littérature orale bunaq; and Friedberg Claudine, 1980, Boiled Woman and Broiled Man: Myths and Agricultural Rituals of the Bunaq of Central Timor.
According to local concepts the centre is the interior and the periphery is the exterior. The interior is hidden from the outside because of its task of safekeeping the mother heart. The interior is feminine and the exterior is masculine, the interior is night and black, the outside exterior is day and white. This reverse analysis is only discussed in close circles and it is not openly displayed. According to local history, the presence and subordination to the exterior in which Bobonaro and Ai Asa are at the first level (a second level would be the colonial powers) is explained as a subjugation to hide the interior because the real power is in the hands of the mountaineers. This fact is described by the walk of the flag: the national flag follows the same way as the old symbols of foreign dominance, and it is stored in a sacred House, the masculine House which gives the exterior extended power relations (a feminine House also exists concerning the interior).

In local oral recitations the proper name of the *tas* is *pan po` mug po`* - sacred sky sacred land, or also *pan gibis mug ilin* – the sky navel the middle land. The origins of the land and the people are nearby the Lakus Mountain. The point of contact amid sky and earth is linked by a stair or a *liana*. This is the place where the first house, the first *hima* and the first humans evolved. Local perceptions of places of origin are highly disputed and some *lal gomo* – the Lord of the Words - recognized that there is more than one point of contact between the sky and the earth. Nevertheless, in local politics of power concerning the possession of words and performance of rituals the most important thing is to know the exact location of these places. Just to mention a cosmogonist concept similar to that mentioned, the Kemak of Atsabe, recently studied by Molnar (2005) also have an ideology of origin based on the mountain.

The new nation, the exterior and coming from the periphery, is incorporated by the ritual of the flag in the interior, the centre: the origin of earth and life. Thus, the nation becomes part of the interior, along with the ancestors who are the forefathers of the actual Houses in the domain. As such, the ritual acts they perform are not only for the domain but also for East Timor and the world. Hence, there is the need

163 A *tas* is the main village of the *suku* the equivalent to the Tetum *knuu.*
to keep the oral traditions (source of individual, House and community prestige) in order to fulfill by words the acts accomplished in ritual process and by the social organization that is ritual organization. There is a conscientious effort to maintain all the Houses as they all perform ritual duties.

Contrary to concepts of origin claimed by Wehali the lal gomo proclaim Likosaen (Likosaen Raidol as Friedberg (1971) mentions as being in nearby Ai Asa as the entity associated with the centre and eastern part of the island and configuring the actual State of East Timor. Another entity associated with East Timor is “Biba ao luaben” the place where according to the myth the elder and the younger brother – the Portuguese – separated (there are other ways associated with different nationalities), leaving an older brother behind with the tools to care for mother land, the younger leaves taking the pen and the paper. At the end of ritual, while taking wine, the words are: “Biba Timor-Leste, Biba Luaben”.

These ways are described in the lal hurug – cool words. In the lal tino – hot words, we have descriptions of the wars. It is difficult to analyse if these are previous to the Portuguese presence or concomitant. The fact is that the places where war is reported are very similar to current borders between East Timor and West Timor/Indonesia.

As far as the House is concerned, ritual practices of unity include the iel gie `on – to make it grow- a prayer performed by the hima gomo of the house with a woman, hima pana or an ally of the house attending the ceremony. In this prayer, all allies of the House, either donors or givers of women, are mentioned. It is considered as a main knowledge of every hima gomo. Those who do not know this do not take their forefathers seriously - “la kaer metin ita nia avo”.

Rituals of the domain are mostly important as an tia and il po ho`. The first one takes place every year (Interrupted during the war period

---

165 Friedberg, Claudine, 1971, Mission Ethnologique chez les Bunaq de Timor Portugais.
following the Indonesian invasion, the ritual restarted in the eighties, after the remaining and dispersed, members of the community resume the reoccupation of the village destroyed during the war) and concerns the chase of wild pigs which are, in fact, seeds. The second one took place in 2005 which was more than thirty years after the first ritual occurred. In these rituals, along the axis of walk that always lead the members to come to the interior of the *tas*, a major distribution of food takes place among all the Houses of the domain but also among functions, namely the ones that represent the State: village chief and the *suku* chief. These are told as *dato ebi* and are portrayed as representatives of the nation. From this point of view, the distribution of food includes the interior and the exterior, the local and the national\textsuperscript{166}.

### Conclusion: disputed centres of East Timor – roots of a nation?

If the two fundamental axis of life in East Timor\textsuperscript{167} are “house of common origin, linking individuals with ancestors, and the second axis being alliance”, the Bunak from Bobonaro also seem to invest in the vision of a common territory as a base for life to spread. Namely the fundamental idea that individuals, their families and their communities are linked by a common history and memory that unite them and that is not only based on alliance, but also a community of territory and history.

As in the ritual to call the soul back to the body of a person, it seems that a ritual is needed to be performed in order to call back the soul of the country. But, this is only possible if authority and respect are recognised by the State and the Church to those who perform it. Is it possible to share the power and authority turning it in a major actor in

\textsuperscript{166} A *bai lika* can last for hours. It includes all the Houses of the domain as well the functions that are assigned to them in the community. The distribution of food is made to the Houses, and a personal distribution only occurs to those who have a role not heritage within a house, like the Chefe de Suku or the Chefe de Aldeia (the head of Suku and the head of a village), or occasional outsiders.

the political arena and belief? Being Timorese is mostly for mountaineers to be a member of a community, a tangible and practical agenda for daily life survival. But, being a member of a community is essential for recognizing the membership of the nation as long as the nation is also willing to fully accept its heritage.

The notion of roots seems to be pertinent in the current situation of East Timor. Roots allow a tree to maintain its trunk, and they are basic elements for memory to prevail and East Timor needs a memory. But, memory only works if respect, a role, is attributed to those who keep these roots in the context of the new nation. Is there a place for them in the nation lead State/Church couple? As the former Bishop of Díli once said, while discussing the “soul” of the Timorese and the persistence of syncretism: “there is more hidden beneath the Ramelau than what we know”\textsuperscript{168}. In this sense, major studies are still in order, by foreigners and above all by the Timorese.

\textsuperscript{168} Statement made at a Seminar “Nation and Identity”, attended by the author, held in Díli in March 2002.
matas Paulo Mota (deceased August 2006) renowned lal gomo (lord of the words) and hima gomo of the House Namau Deu Masak at the opi op (the mount, the mountain) in 2004. He led a local team of lian nain as the district representatives during the ceremonies of May 20 in Dili in 2002. © Lucio Sousa
tei at the mot of Tapo` during il po` ho 2005: dance involving the female and male officers of the ritual in the square of dance of the village during the ceremony to fetch the sacred water) . © Lucio Sousa
PART 3
Politics, legitimacy and electoral processes
Elections and Social Dimensions of Democracy, Lessons from Timor-Leste

Rui Graça Feijó

1 - From 1975 to the Independence

On May 20, 2002, Timor-Leste became the first independent nation of the twenty-first century. Kofi Annan was present at the ceremony that marked the end of the UN rule (generally labeled ‘benevolent autocracy’), as was Sergio Vieira de Mello, the main face of the UN operation in the territory between September 1999 and May 2002, and a great number of international dignitaries, amongst whom special mention is due to Megawati Sukarnoputri, then President of the Republic of Indonesia – that had invaded the territory in December 1975 only to be defeated by a popular referendum under UN supervision on August 30, 1999, and had then engaged in a fortnight of folly and destruction – and Jorge Sampaio, President of the colonial power that claimed sovereignty over Timor-Leste for four and a half centuries. No greater show of convergence and congratulatory mood could have been dreamed of.

At midnight on May 20, 2002, in the ample field of Tasi Tolu, a few kilometers west of Dili, where Pope John Paul II had been welcomed several years before, an enormous crowd witnessed peacefully the rising of the Timorese national flag, heard the new national anthem, and saw Xanana Gusmão deliver the oath of allegiance as the first democratically elected President of the Republic of Timor-Leste, promising to respect and defend the Constitution of the new country. Indeed, under the UN
administration, competitive general elections for a constituent assembly were held to international applause, and considered free and fair, on August 30, 2001. That Assembly had in due course voted for the new Constitution and decided to assume legislative powers for the first legislature. Fresh direct elections for the presidency were held with two opposing candidates – and Xanana, conquered there and then his constitutional mandate defeating by the vote, not only by his historical, political and military – that is, revolutionary legitimacy, the man who had read the proclamation of independence back in November 28, 1975. A government based on the parliamentary majority was ready to be sworn in later in the day. The judicial system had embryonic forms on the ground. The press was free to report. No stain on the democratic credentials of the new regime was visible.

When the sun rose the East, Timor had become – literally overnight – an independent country with a (nominally) democratic form of government and political organization. Political institutions were now managed by the Timorese themselves, and the cost of decisions would now fall entirely on their shoulders. Elsewhere, I argued that this circumstance implied that Timor has not passed through a typical period of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy169. Indeed, Timor was set on the road to consolidate the virgin democratic institutions and practices without an actual transition – and thus was prone to witness a phase of democratic consolidation both longer in its temporal extension and perhaps more agitated in the sense of a pressing need to coordinate the new political approach (based on internationally accepted democratic principles) to the social realities of one people who had never witnessed such a form of political organization and kept faith in historically grounded forms of policy making – as has been noticed by numerous observers who have both called the attention to the traditional forms of political organization that existed on the terrain, and cast doubts on the readiness of the Timorese to fully endorse the international community “paradigm” of democratic state.170

169 Feijo (R.) 2006, Timor-Leste: Paisagem Tropical com Gente Dentro
Five years have now elapsed – and five years is the constitutional measure of one political cycle, being the length of both the mandate of the President of the Republic and of the National Parliament. In fact, the end of the first political cycle in Timor-Leste was protracted and may be said to have begun somehow earlier than anticipated with the crisis in the early months of 2006, and has lasted until the post-electoral new government was formed and sworn in place.

The lines above sketch a framework for the analysis of the recent electoral cycle, assuming that the period of democratic consolidation is rather long and calls for a dialogue with features more commonly associated with previous steps on “transition/consolidation” road. I will now present and discuss the results from those elections.

2 - The electoral cycle of 2007: a systemic perspective

The first cycle of political life in independent Timor-Leste came about with the combination of presidential and parliamentary elections that took place between April and the end of June. In striking contrast with the rebellious events that marked the first very serious crisis in the new country in April and May 2006, elections were generally peaceful, mobilized the electorate in a significant manner, and produced results that were overwhelmingly recognized by all actors as truthful to the voters’ wishes, and by international observers as free and fair. These elections deserve to be singled out on a number of accounts.171

First, they were organized by the Timorese authorities, with the support of international aid, in accordance with the broad rules set out in the Constitution. As such, they reveal the depth of acceptance of constitutional procedures much to be stressed in a young democracy faced with enormous problems.

Secondly, all major political actors in Timor have placed their hope of gaining power in these elections, refusing any way out to the crisis that erupted in 2006 which would not be centered on this constitutional device. Special words of praise are due to the President of the Republic, who refrained from extending his power further than would be constitutionally allowed, or even making use of constitutional powers related to the declaration of the state of emergency (which might have caused serious delays to the electoral process); to Ramos Horta who accepted to head a government not of his choice in the interim period necessary to prepare and hold elections; and to the vast majority of parliamentarians who understood the need for such an interim period before elections could actually be called, and gave their best to offer the country an electoral regime that has been criticized (by Timorese players and international organizations alike172) for a good number of shortcomings, but which allowed elections to be held in a fair and free way. A sign of democratic maturity is clearly visible in these options.

Third, the sequence of elections (first the presidential, later the parliamentarian) has proved to be well adjusted to the situation in the field. Voting first in an election with two rounds, enabling voters to chose their candidate in the first round and to oppose the one they most disliked in the second and final round, that is, giving the voters the opportunity to adapt to the circumstances or correct their own vote, the system was important to deal with the imperfections encountered during the first voting procedure (notably at vote counting and tabulating). Also, the choice of the symbol of national unity before that of political parties, by nature more divisive and prone to radicalization, was a positive contribution to the peaceful grounding of the electoral system. The fact that this sequence is bound to be repeated in the future (unless a dissolution of parliament occurs that would distance elections more than they are normally separated and inverts the situation) deserves mention, as this sequence was a hotly contested issue prior to this year’s electoral cycle The press release of the Presidency of the

172 The UN Electoral Certification Team produced several critical reports on all steps of the electoral process; as for the views of different Timorese, see the documents produced by IFES from March 2006 on.
Republic on 16 January 2006 conveys abundant evidence in this respect.\textsuperscript{173}

In the fourth place, elections revealed a plural country and arranged a new distribution of power leading to the defeat of the former ruling party which had scored a comfortable victory in the ‘local elections’ held not long before, and had ample control of the electoral machinery through its dependency on government. To this we turn now.

3 - The 2007 electoral cycle: clear electoral choices

The Presidential race

Xanana was elected as President of the Republic (PR), after stating various times he was not seeking the job, and sworn in as the first President a few minutes after midnight, on May 20, 2002. During that electoral campaign, several leaders of Fretilin – the party that had won the elections for the constitutional assembly earlier in August 2001 - distanced themselves from the candidate without clearly opposing him. This position came not long after Fretilin had left the CNRT (established as a nationalist unitarian platform in 1998), thus precipitating its dissolution and the emergence of a “political party polity”; its roots can also be traced back to the 1980s, when Xanana broke off with Fretilin and sought to establish a new form of nationalist leadership\textsuperscript{174}. All those years of accumulating tension were only appeased by the momentous tasks deriving from the referendum and later from the proclamation of independence. The relations between the PR and the Prime Minister were austere, but actually only succumbed in the wake of the rebellion in May 2006, and the clarification of power was necessary on various grounds.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[173] See also Feijo (R.) 2006, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.98-109, for a justification of this option and part of the criticism it generated.
\item[174] Mattoso (J.) 2005, \textit{A Dignidade. Konis Santana e a Resistência Timorense}, is the critical reference to this historical background.
\end{footnotes}
Xanana made it clear he would not seek reelection – and therefore he would not be playing the role many had “reserved” for him in the Constitution - thus opening up the door for a process in which all the players (lacking the sort of charisma still claimed by the historical leader) would fight for the job on equal terms. Fretilin –as the majority party - was then confronted with the need to express a clear point of view: either to field their own candidate or support someone who might bridge gaps and enjoy wider support. They chose to present a candidate of their own, Francisco Guterres Lu Olo, the speaker of the house. It was the very first candidate to be publicly presented, so it must correspond to a deeply meditated political option of ‘going alone’.
On their part, those who opposed Fretilin took advantage of the electoral system of a two-round election to field a number of candidates who would test their popularity in the first round, to gather around the one who would secure enough votes to be in the second round. The gamble was, of course, that a second round was necessary (no single candidate would have more than half the number of valid votes) and that Fretilin’s candidate would pass the hurdle and fight the second round. As a matter of fact, reality proved to be in accordance with these estimates, as seen in Table 1.

Lu Olo and Ramos Horta acceded the second round, and Tilman was the only defeated candidate to transfer his votes to Lu Olo, all others rallying behind Ramos Horta.

Table 2 - National Result of the Second and Final ballot of the Presidential Election, May 9, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Registered Voters</td>
<td>524,073</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Voters</td>
<td>424,712</td>
<td>81.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank Votes</td>
<td>2,015</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null Votes</td>
<td>9,238</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polling Stations</td>
<td>705</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Guterres Lu Olo</td>
<td>127,342</td>
<td>30.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Ramos Horta</td>
<td>285,535</td>
<td>69.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNE

Although Lu Olo managed to capitalize almost all the votes previously given to Tilman (actually, he fell short by less than 2,000 votes), the coalition behind Ramos Horta carried the day by a landslide (and this candidate surpassed the sum of votes in the first round for the candidates that rallied behind him by 10,000 votes). The first act of the play was over, and now Fretilin had lost its gamble. As far as electoral
behavior is concerned, the fluctuation of votes between the two rounds was minimal, suggesting a consistent option on the part of electors. This fact will be brought into consideration further down, for it suggests a deep bond between the Timorese main politicians and their electors.

Three remarks on the figures presented above are due. First, to point the fact that the electoral register was changed between the two ballots and increased by over one thousand new voters – a fact that suggests that the tendency exists for this register to grow increasingly away from the number of actual voters because deceased people are not removed (only additions were taken, according to some sources – although no document was found with clear instructions on the issue); levels of abstention must take this fact into consideration.

Second, to register the high level of participation, almost equal on both ballots, at over 80%, in spite of the basic electoral register used being several years old (which may have increased the “technical” abstention, that is, the presence of deceased people in the records).

Third, to notice the number of blank and null votes has decreased from very high levels to figures comparable with international standards, which may be due both to voters’ education and to better means at the disposal of those who count them.

The Parliamentary elections

On June 30, electors were called for the third time in three months to cast their vote, now for political parties. No less than fourteen parties entered this race. Rules for this election were relatively new in comparison with what had happened in the previous party election. A minimum of 3% was imposed as a threshold to guarantee access to the National Parliament, and the d’Hondt method was now adopted for the transformation of votes into seats. The results were as follows:
The immediate outcome of this table is the inexistence of a single party majority in parliament, and thus the floor was open for a debate on the formation of government. But this single fact is due to a huge loss of electoral confidence by Fretilin. Back in 2001, Fretilin scored close to 60 percent of the vote, and now its strength was halved. Of great importance is to recall that the vote for Fretilin in the capital district, Dili, was down to circa twenty percent – a symbol of the mistrust vis-à-vis the
key figures of this party in the largest and more politically active region of the country, the one to larger exposition to political activity and media coverage. This is the most notable fact of this election insofar as it reveals a clear sign of discontent with the route Fretilin was leading the country.

The second noticeable fact is the emergence of a new party with national relevance – Xanana’s CNRT. Although there are no voter’s surveys or statistical data on vote transfer, it does not seem far from reality to suggest that this new party gained most of its strength in the voters abandoning Fretilin. Taken together, these two facts seem to indicate that the clarification of the (antagonistic) relationship between Fretilin and Xanana in the wake of the crisis of 2006 has found its electoral expression, and is perhaps the major new phenomenon of the current political cycle.

The third feature is the exclusion from parliament of two parties on grounds of the 3% threshold law (PNT, 2.42%; and PDRT, 1.96%). In fact, each MP elected by CNRT “costed” 1.31% and Fretilin 1.37% of the total vote, less than the percentage of these two smaller parties.

The comparison between voting patterns in the presidential first round and the parliamentary elections, although the field of candidates was different, should also be view in detail.

| Table 4 - Comparisons between presidential's first ballot, and parliamentary elections for selected candidates |
|---------------------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|------------------|
| Lu Olo / Fretilin               | 112,666          | 27.89         | 120,592          | 28.78            |
| Fernando Lasama Araujo / PD     | 77,459           | 19.18         | 46,946           | 11.33            |
| Francisco Xavier do Amaral + Lúcia Lobato / ASDT / PSD | 110,414 | 27.25 | 65,358 | 15.77 |
| Manuel Tilman / KOTA / PPT      | 16,534           | 4.09          | 13,294           | 3.20             |
| José Ramos Horta / CNRT         | 88,102           | 21.81         | 100,175          | 24.26            |

Source: composition based on the previous tables
Fretilin and Lu Olo score fairly similar results, polling between 110,000-120,000 votes (or 130,000 if one considers the second round with the support of Manuel Tilman). Three results of the same magnitude in a short lapse of time award consistency to the voting procedures and the dimension of their support. Manuel Tilman and the coalition KOTA/PPT also score very consistent results (and were able to “migrate” as a group to Lu Olo camp in the second round of the presidential race). Ramos Horta, presented as an independent candidate, before CNRT was formally launched, scores less, but not more than 2.5 percentual points than Xanana - the mythical leader of the Resistance.

In the cases of Fernando Lasama, Lucia Lobato and Xavier do Amaral, their own parties or coalition of parties could not secure their good performance, and lost a substantial number of votes. It must be kept in mind that there were far more political parties (14) than presidential candidates (8), and the number of votes cast which did not translate into elected seats is significantly high – almost 40,000, or 9% of total number of votes cast. In this case we may consider that there is room for an improved relationship between political leaders and party organizations.

All being considered, the emerging scenario is that of an electorate that is much less volatile than could be expected. This image is further stressed by a major feature yet to be presented and discussed: regional distribution of votes. It has nevertheless been noticed by several other observers, not least Cabasset-Semedo and Durand.175

**National candidatures, regional results**

Much has been written on the internal “fractures” of Timor-Leste, mainly along “ethnic” lines, following the crisis of 2006 and the (re)emergence of the lorosae/loromunu divide. Prior to these events, most commentators had praised the “unity” of the “nation” in the face of the external enemy. The issue is far more important that we can address in the frame of this paper, but some comments derived from the electoral results are perhaps timely.

---

175 Cabasset-Semedo (C.) and Durand (F.) 2007, “Les elections présidentielles de 2007 à Timor-Leste.” p 7 (point number 14)
Considering the presidential race in the first place, it is important to notice the scores of Lu Olo in the easternmost part of the country: he was the winner in Baucau (66.52%), Lautem (50.99%) and Viqueque (67.97%). Fretilin won in those very same districts on June 30 (62.6%, 45.5% and 59.9%), plus Covalima where a mere 28.5% guaranteed victory (against a sound defeat of Lu Olo with 23.65%). The image of consistency of successive results on a regional basis is thus reinforced in this case: Fretilin is very much the majoritarian political party in the east of the country, consistently polling about 50% or more of the vote. The pattern of consistency and regional relevance can be found in inverted terms in the western part of Timor-Leste, where the very same party hardly reaches the 10% threshold.

When one considers the local, rather than regional level of powerbase, one case in point is that of Manuel Tilman who performed with a poor 4.09% in the presidential first ballot, but who came in a close second in Ainaro. The KOTA/PPT coalition which he led also came in second place to ASDT/PSD coalition with 18.69% of the vote in the same district, which compares with the 3.20% national score. Manuel Tilman was a political refugee in Portugal, where he once was a MP, and after returning to Timor set his residence in Dili, where he has been the head of his own party and a member of the National Parliament. The relations between this politician and a regional powerbase cannot be simply explained in terms of modern political, constituency-type of policies and behavior.

Similar kinds of relationships could be established between one politician (and his political party) and segmented parts of the Timorese society. Although the actual results have been “diluted” in the figures for the district of Dili, it was widely spread that Xavier do Amaral had polled a landslide in the refugee camps near Metinaro; and he polled above 45% both in Aileu, Ainaro and Manufahi. As for Lasama, he also has a regional powerbase south and southwest of the capital city (Bobonaro, Ermera and Covalima). Fernanda Borges’ PUN is another case in point, scoring a national 4.55%, but peaking in Ermera at 19.67 (and falling in Lautem to a residual 0.54%).
All these figures suggest that there is a real sociological meaning for the distribution of votes, which are more consistent from one election to the other than many would have guessed\textsuperscript{176}. The pre-existent social structures of power allocation and distribution should be brought under close scrutiny if one is to grasp the meaning of modern politicking at local level, and to assess the capacity of the present political superstructure to gain roots or to be challenged from below. To put it in other words, what seems to be appearing behind the surface is a complex relationship between the “modern” political party system and some form of “traditional” power structures at local/regional level, which are not mutually exclusive but enter some form of “dialogue”.

CNRT comes into the picture in a somewhat different perspective. On the one hand, Xanana’s party never rises above 45\% of the vote, that is, it does not establish what we could call a “preferential constituency” (even if the fact that its highest score is in Dili itself, and thus in the most urbanized segment of the country itself, cannot be discarded); on the other hand, its score does not fall below 10\%, guaranteeing a minimum level of regional representation (this kind of support distribution explains why CNRT has got the lowest ratio of votes per MP).

As opposed to CNRT’s “balanced” representation of the national opinion, regional (in the case of Fretilin, PD, PSD, ASDT) or even local (KOTA, PUN) currents of opinion find their way into national political life through other parties, which tend to become associated with those “imagined constituencies”.

The overall pattern is not of a country divided in two. Even in the area of strongest single-party domination, the east, Lu Olo/Fretilin only represents between half and two-thirds of the vote, and CNRT manages to score close to 15\%; on the western side (those districts won on the second ballot by Ramos Horta) the role of “leading party” is fairly divided among the other parties, each one having a peak in one or two districts – which seems to indicate, once again, a close form of

\textsuperscript{176} One could recall the recurring argument according to which the results of the 2001 election had been unduly marked by the short time allowed for political parties to formalize and legalize. The short notice given would represent a favour to the long established Fretilin, which was to take full advantage of the difficulties created to its adversaries.
articulation of the new political machinery with more deep rooted forms of political organization from the past.

4 - After the Vote

To sum up the meaning of those results, one might say that a new majority surfaced, and that there is now (explicit) convergence of President, Parliament and Government – something quite banal in presidential or parliamentary regimes, but not necessarily so in semi-presidential ones (in fact, it represents one of the main lines of criticism of the model in the framework of transition and consolidation of democratic regimes). The fact that this new majority – with its own dynamic requiring further attention – gained power through elections generally accepted as free and fair, and acceded the reins of governance in a basically peaceful manner (there were public demonstrations against this, but no serious attempt at blocking the change in government or at challenging the presidential decisions in its proper locus, the supreme court of the land) must be underlined. In many cases of transitions to democracy, the moment at which a government is peacefully replaced by another one formed by the previous opposition after competitive elections marks the moment at which transition ends and consolidation begins. Both Spain (where the socialist Felipe Gonzalez replaced the centrist UCD in 1981) or in Cabo Verde (where the opposition leader defeated the historical PAICV in 1991) are cases in point. In this sense, the electoral cycle of 2007 may be interpreted as a clear sign of progress in the consolidation of democracy in Timor-Leste. It also leaves a number of challenges for the political actors.

Conclusion

On Election Day, I saw many Timorese exiting the polling station and proudly exhibiting their finger with the ink mark that signified he or she had voted; in the following days, many others still showed their proof of voting with a smile in their faces. Marred with difficulties and
problems as they were, the elections of 2007 were a major success: they were organized by the Timorese authorities themselves, supported by international aid, as a form of expression of sovereignty; they took place in the regular period prescribed by the Constitution, in spite of a serious crisis that paralyzed much of the country in 2006; they drove large numbers to vote without fear of disturbances; they showed the vote to be stable and consequential (and presumably not easily subject to forms of manipulation); and they returned a new majority and therefore a new government who succeeded the previous one in a peaceful manner. As such, these elections will be recorded as a landmark in Timorese history: elections are a regular feature in the life of a democratic nation, and these elections have honored their people. So, Timor will have to meditate on what has happened and prepare for the future. The recent cycle of elections has indeed offered the young Timorese democracy a much needed second breadth.

My final argument is that democracy as a regime that empowers the electorate to exert its right of choice requires more than a top-down process of “explaining” how formal voting operates or the mechanics of party policy-making, or a down-up process based on disparate local historical features. Democracy cannot be built upon the “clash of paradigms”\(^\text{177}\)–nor on the suppression of any popular form of representation. As Calhoun as recently argued:

> Ordinary people in many countries have achieved a modicum of democracy, and a number of other gains, but they did not chose the “race” in which electoral democracy is one of their partial victories (...) Most ordinary people experienced a loss of collective self determination before the eventual gains of (...) democratization. They experienced this loss as the communities and institutions they had created were overrun and undermined by state and market forces (...) And there are threats of similar losses today if neoliberal ideology leads to both the “extensification” and the “intensification” of market economies and capitalist production without provisions of greater equity.\(^\text{178}\)

\(^{177}\) Hohe (T.) 2002, op. cit.
The results of the 2007 cycle of elections in Timor-Leste suggest that both mechanisms are at work in the political process. On the one hand there is consistency of voting from one election to the next, which is akin to a low degree of volatility, and which can be read as meaning a competent use of the voting mechanism on the part of the voters at large – a feature that should be underlined given the fact that those voters do have low levels of literacy and do not possess a long record of elections as a means of decision - although elections per se were not so infrequent in the territory over the last thirty years, as shown by Frederic Durand179.

On the other hand, the regional distribution of votes, and more specifically, the local concentration of votes in some parties, suggests that apart from the “ideological” matrix or policy stances of those organizations, there are “underground” associations, presumably of an inter-personal nature, that affect the performance of the parties. Electoral results cannot simply be read “how much does this party count” in the country, it calls for another question “how much did one community – local, regional, etc - manage to make itself heard at national level”. These movements may or may not converge – but even when they converge, there is no mechanical way of articulating them without a previous exercise of translation.

Translation and its implied capacity to operate in such a way that the speakers of both languages can communicate in a third, common language, as well as the practical need to bring forward to the ground actual, life-size translators, is therefore the key concept to exploit when our purpose is to study the social dimensions of democracy. Timor-Leste will certainly be a good case in this process.

When I came back from Australia and saw from up there, I cried.
Poor Timor, that’s too much suffering.(...)  
D. Tomásia Alves, March 2007

In the first semester of 2007, East Timor, as an independent country, held its first presidential and parliamentary elections. The political and social crisis of 2006 was the background for the pleas which led Ramos-Horta to the Presidency of the Republic and Xanana Gusmão to the post of Prime Minister. This article discusses certain aspects of the dispute for political legitimacy in the access to the leadership of the East-Timorese National State. The analysis is based on the dynamics of the first turn of the presidential election campaign in 2007. In order to identify some of the moral and sociological principles that structuralize the claim for modern political authority of the different groups of the local elite, we proceed to an ethnographic observation of electoral phenomena such as political rallies, radio and television programs and media coverage. In this context, emphasis will be given to the role played by the veterans of FALINTIL (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor), amongst other things. Such a fact, when associated with the discussion around the public performances of the candidates throughout their campaigns, is considered an indication of the precedence that values such as suffering, dignity and recognition\textsuperscript{180} have in the East-Timorese

\textsuperscript{180} Dumont (L.) 1997, \textit{Homo Hierarchicus: o sistema de castas e suas implicações}.  

Kelly da Silva
contemporary political culture repertoire. It is also contemplated the hypothesis that some modern institutions – political parties and the EastTimorese National State – have been legitimated and achieved a feeling of belonging due to the political alliances between the cosmopolitan urban elites and local authorities, mediated by the veterans of the resistance181.

This text is divided into three sections. The first one presents some characteristics of the social and institutional atmosphere in which the elections were carried out, pointing out the protagonists of the observed disputes. In the sequence, the campaign itself is the subject of the discussion, being analyzed some aspects of the rallies common to several candidates. Throughout this article I indicate, then, some variables that guide the dispute for modern political legitimacy, which I suggest should be taken as pertaining to the emergent Creole political culture of the new country.182 At the end of this article I present some new issues to the debate183.

1 - Context

Eight candidates were running for the Presidency of the Democratic Republic of East Timor in 2007184: Francisco Guterrez Lu Olo (Fretilin – Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente/ Revolutionary Front for

---

181 This text is one of the first products of a research project named “A nação em urnas: projetos civilizatórios em disputa no contexto pós-colonial timorense”, supported by CNPq (Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico). This investigation also counts on the sponsorship of FCT (Fundação de Ciência e Tecnologia – Foundation of Science and Technology - from Portugal), for the project “Traduzindo a Cultura, Cultura da Tradução: a negociação cultural como patrimônio central em Timor-Leste.”


183 During the production of this article, I could count on the attentive reading and constructive critique of Christine Cabasset-Semedo, Frédéric Durand and Daniel S. Simião, for which I am very grateful. The support of FINATEC (Fundação de Empreendimentos Científicos e Tecnológicos) made possible my participation at the V Euroseas meeting, for which this text was originally prepared.

184 It is interesting to notice that in 2002, only two people ran for the Presidency of the Republic: Xavier do Amaral and Xanana Gusmão. The meaning of such an important increase in the number of candidates may indicate something on the pulverization of political leadership in the country.
HOW TO BUILD A NEW NATION?

Independent East-Timor); Avelino Coelho (PST – Partido Socialista Timorense/East-Timorese Socialist Party); Manuel Tilman (Klibur Timor Oan Aswa’ in - KOTA); Xavier do Amaral (ASDT - Associação Social Democrata Timorense/ East-Timorese Social Democratic Association); Lúcia Lobato (PSD – Partido Social Democrata/ Social Democratic Party); José Ramos-Horta (independent candidate); João Carrascalão (UDT – União Democrática Timorense/ East-Timorese Democratic Union) and Fernando Lasama (PD – Partido Democrático/ Democratic Party). From the legal point of view, candidatures were not associated to political parties. Candidates should present themselves to the State and to the population by exploring only their individual identity. In pragmatic terms, however, association to political parties was strategically used. Fretilin, for example, ostensibly related the figure of Lu Olo to the history of the party, whereas João Carrascalão avoided using the name of the UDT in his campaign.

Candidatures were presented and campaigns took place in an unstable political atmosphere, the legacy of the social and political crisis in 2006, whose reasons were not yet very clear for many of the East-Timorese. Refugee camps; Australian-led multinational military forces on the streets; armed deserters coming both from East Timor National Police (PNTL) and from F-FDTL (FALINTIL – Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste/East-Timor Defense Forces) on the mountains; actions organized by martial arts groups; rice supply in crisis; absence of local police forces, among others, were some of the elements found in the context of the electoral disputes in the country, spreading the feeling of fear and insecurity over a great part of the population. One could wake up in Dili, in the middle of the night, with the sounds of shots, screams and cries of fear, mainly if he/she lived near the regions of Comoro and Bairro Pité. There was no region in the city completely free of political commotion.

Technically, the elections were carried out by the United Nations, assisted by the East-Timorese Technical Secretariat for Election Administration (STAE) – a national organ connected to the Ministry of State Administration – and supervised by the National Electoral Committee (CNE), a local institution detached from the Government. The results of the elections were ratified by the Court of Appeal. In a situation of institutional frailty, the elite members of the political parties,
assisted by numerous international consultants, would debate everything from the date of the elections to the vote counting method. More than ten days before the elections, for instance, the Parliament, under request of Fretilin, was still discussing the possibility of using the symbols of the parties in the ballots.

2 - Campaign

Officially, the campaign for the first round of East Timor Presidency was carried out on from March 23, 2007 to April 4, 2007. But it had, in fact, started months before that, when the leaders from the different parties began to reorganize and dispute their political basis looking for support. Such processes culminated in happenings called party consolidations.

Besides party consolidations that, as well as the political rallies, can be described as a demonstration of strength by the candidates and/or parties in the regions in which they took place, the East-Timorese public presidential campaign was officially composed of the following elements: candidacy launching (formally and informally), campaign opening, political rallies, door-to-door canvassing, radio and television programs, pamphlets distribution and motorcades. I will discuss below the characteristics common to the morphological and discursive constitution of some of these phenomena, such as cognitive windows that reveal variables and mechanisms over which modern legitimate political authority has been constructed and disputed in the country.

Biographies

It could be noticed in a considerable number of campaign vehicles a common way to introduce the candidates to the population: their history of life was described by presenting their biographies, divided in, at least, four common moments/categories: 1) formal education; 2) participation in the resistance movement; 3) professional experience; 4) political trajectory in the post-independence period.

---

186 Palmeira (M.) & Heredia (B.) 1995, “Os comícios e a política de facções.”
Concerning the first category, in Manuel Tilman’s campaign material, for example, could be found:

He learned the ABC in the Catholic School of the mission of Ainaro, where he learned to read and to write, between the years 1955 and 1956. Between the years of 1956 and 1961 he went to the Catholic School of Soiaba, coordinated by Jesuit priests, where he attended to Primary School. (...) He studied Law at Universidade Clássica in Lisbon, Portugal, between 1971 and 1976.187

As for the resistance trajectory, it was pictured, in one of the pamphlets of Fernando Araújo Lasama, in such terms:

In 1988 Lasama and some classmates founded RENETIL (Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste – National Resistance of East Timorese Students). (...) As a clandestine political organization, its function was to gather students and intellectuals from Indonesia, East Timor and other countries. Between June 1988 and 2000, Lasama was the General Secretary of RENETIL. In such post, Lasama managed to organize (...) students, intellectuals and young people from several locations, such as Dili, Denpasar, Mataram, Surabaya (...). And even from other countries, as Portugal, (Foreign Independent Headship of RENETIL), Australia, England and Ireland.188

With regard to professional experience, Xavier do Amaral’s biography was so described:


As to political experience, there is a description of Lu Olo’s role as the President of the National Parliament narrated in his folder campaign:

Lu Olo as the Parliament President: I learned to receive and to evaluate with justice and good will the wishes of several parties; I learned how to mediate and decide according to the majority’s will; I learned how to take important decisions to people’s lives; I learned how the Government, Parliament, Courts and Presidency execute their functions and how they relate according to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor; I learned what a State is and also how to consolidate its institutions.\(^{190}\)

The presentation of the candidates’ biography, using the four above-mentioned structural categories, was a resource exploited in most of the campaign events – candidature launchings, rallies, radio and TV propagandas, etc – and it could happen by reading the candidates’ Curriculum Vitae or even by paying a newspaper in Dili to publish it. Such biographical plot indicates the minimal conditions that socially qualified the candidates as able to accomplish modern political functions: 1) participation in the resistance movement against Indonesian occupation; 2) formal education; 3) experience in politics and, to a certain extent, 4) significant professional experience.

It was also a common practice to identify the family origins of the candidate in the campaigns. Both Manuel Tilman and Xavier do Amaral have always highlighted the fact that their families descended from important local Royal houses.\(^{191}\) Lu Olo, Lasama and Lúcia Lobato emphasized their condition of genuine East-Timorese due to their autochthonic origins, in opposition to the situation of Ramos-Horta and João Carrascalão, who come from a family composed by a Portuguese father and an East-Timorese mother. The antagonism between mestizo and genuine East-Timorese would sometimes be mentioned in the candidates’ speech, and explored as a political argument.

\(^{190}\) Vota ba LuOlo, 2007. Free translation from the original in Tetum.

\(^{191}\) Manuel Tilman belongs to the Biluha House, from Maubisse, Ainaro.
Rhetorics of Pain and Suffering

Another common aspect to all candidates in their performances in the political campaign was the reference to the suffering (terus) and the difficulties (susar) experienced by the East-Timorese population both in past and present times. On their respective rhetoric, the sharing of suffering was the element that fraternized the electors as a specific entirety, instituting them really as East-Timorese. The attempt to create identification with their potential electors was made by the candidates by evoking their own suffering experiences, particularly those they have been through during the Indonesian occupation. Reports and images showing pain and famine would appear in many campaign acts, both in oral speech or in the makeup of the podiums, in which the former FALINTIL guerrillas were always present. In this context, the ex-FALINTIL became symbols of terus, and their support, the object of dispute among the parties.

The movie entitled The Uprise of the mauberes (Maubere oan sira hamrik ba, in Tétum, O levante dos mauberes, in Portuguese) was one of the main pieces in the Fretilin campaign. Images of the suffering of East-Timorese people, both during the colonial period and the Indonesian occupation appeared frequently in the plot. In the first part of the video, some women related their long-lasting bond with the party, with emphasis on the testimonial of Ilda Maria da Conceição, former vice-minister of Education. The suffering undergone by her family during the period of the Indonesian administration is a well-known story in the country. In the same video, another woman asserts: “I have suffered with Fretilin, and I shall remain with it. Back in that time Fretilin was all that existed and that’s why I am Fretilin forever”.  

When Lu Olo launched his candidature, in Ossu, Viqueque, Mari Alkatiri, a few moments before handing the microphone to the candidate, stated:

I would like to say that when Fretilin organized the gathering, the long-lasting meeting to decide if the candidate would be Lu Olo, he said 'I come from a poor family, I lived all my life among the folk, suffering with them, I couldn’t prepare myself to run for presidency. It’s better to choose another fellow.’ And I said: ‘No. It’s exactly

\[192\] Free translation from the original in Tetum.
because of this, because you have a humble origin, and remained among the people and has suffered with them, because you really know them, that’s the reason why you must be the president of the Republic’.\footnote{Free translation from the original in Tetum.}

In the campaign leaflet of Lasama the following report can be found:

When he was twelve years old, Lasama already knew what the folk’s suffering was. In 1975 he witnessed the bloodshed and murdering of 18 people from his family by the Indonesian troops (…).\footnote{Vota ba Lasama, 2007 Free translation from the original in Tetum. My emphasis.}

In her radio broadcasted speech, Lúcia Lobato constantly used, "long-suffering East-Timorese people" as a vocative to address her potential electors. She said, among other things,

Many comments are being made about what criteria we should follow to choose the president of the country. Some people say that the president must be someone well-known and also a person with experience, but no one knows how to measure experience when it is related to ruling over a nation. (…) what we need is a president who is able to feel the folk’s suffering, able to love the people from the bottom of his heart, listen to its difficulties and struggles, and stimulate the government to take the necessary measures to improve the quality of life of the poor. The long-lasting suffering of East-Timorese people needs but a woman to understand its children’s suffering and difficulties. The long-lasting suffering of East-Timorese people calls for a President that can be a family example; Timor, being in pain, needs, as a President, someone able to make peace and promote stability, to surpass this current crisis. Timor needs, as a President, someone bold enough to make decisions in the name of its people.\footnote{Free translation from the original in Tetum. My emphasis.}
“Consolidating justice, developing stability and wiping tears” was the motto of Xavier do Amaral’s campaign. In one of the materials for his campaign the following text can be found:

(…) Choose by yourselves. Trust your vote to whom who governs with the mind and the heart. Do not trust those who govern with ambition, who are only worried about personal aspirations, who are proud, who only fraternize among themselves, who do not recognize folks’ suffering, who do not know about other people’s contribution”. (…) It is true that I have not suffered as others have, but I have not done any harm to the East-Timorese.196

In the campaigns, suffering was evoked in association with claims for correct recognition,197 which were supposed to be expressed by the very act of voting. In this context, the candidates tried to objectify their trajectories of pain and self-sacrifice as a symbolic capital that would qualify them to be given the entrustment (fiar), the recognition and also the votes of the electors.

The articulation of these two themes (suffering and recognition), has played, for a long time, an important role structuralizing the local political dynamics. In 2005, the government attempted to transform Catholic education as an optional subject in Primary School. In that context, the high hierarchy of the Catholic Church of East Timor claimed to be the genuine depositary of the sufferings of the population during the Indonesian occupation, and to whom the due respect should be shown, by maintaining the religious education as an obligatory discipline. In order to enfeeble the project it was suggested that the most powerful governmental group, which means, at that time, the ones who have returned from Mozambique under the leadership of Mari Alkatiri, had not suffered side by side with the population, as the Church had done.198

196 During the first years of Indonesian occupation, Xavier do Amaral was accused of betraying the leaderships of Fretilin. Having surrendered to the occupying forces, he spent the years of occupation exiled, outside East-Timorese territory, in Indonesia. Free translation from the original in Tetum. My emphasis.
This issue – the suffering undergone during the Indonesian occupation – is also one of the most important sources of meaning to the antagonism between outsiders (the ones which returned to the country after the East-Timorese Diaspora) and insiders (the ones who remained there and experienced the occupation in their everyday lives), which are so present in the new Creole society of Dili.

During the campaign period, on March 8, 2007, International Women’s Day, a book named *Hau fo midar, hau simu moruk. Midar no valor iha tempo luta, lafolin iha tempo rekonesementu* (I gave sweetness, bitterness is what I got back. Gentleness and worthiness during times of struggle are priceless in the times of recognition) was released. Many of the women who attended the release expressed their pain for not being given the correct recognition for their work in the resistance movement during the Indonesian occupation. Micató, a prominent East-Timorese public figure and co-author of the book, said in her speech that: “The ones who have not fought have an easy life. Those who fought do not have any recognition. This is how it is in many places in the world. It is the way it is in Mozambique too”. Mana Bilola, another important figure for the local women's movement closed festivity stating: “Our sacrifice (*terus*) has made us one.”

It is also known that part of the political crisis in 2006 was triggered by protests of approximately one third of the F-FDTL members, who were basically men of *loromonu* origin. The petitioners – as they were later denominated – claimed to be victims of discrimination in the corporation because of their regional origin. They stated that part of their co-workers and superior commandants of *lorosae* origin declared that *loromonus* had not struggled – and suffered – for the independence as much as the *lorosae*, which would supposedly justify to the *loromonus* the restricted access to career promotions, among other things.

What actually happened inside the F-FDTL is still the object of polemic. In order to base the proposed analysis, I would like to mention only one dimension of the 2006 conflict: the then-President Xanana Gusmão’s effort to dissolve any doubts concerning the involvement and suffering of *lorosae* and *loromonus* in the struggle for freedom, due to the

---

199 Free translation from the original in Tetum.
disruptive potential of such issue in the context of the crisis and, why not, in contemporary East-Timorese political culture.

**Maromak & Matebians**

Religious practice and adhesion was an issue largely evoked in the electoral campaigns. All the candidates tried to present themselves as “good Christians” in order to seem reliable to the population. In the ritual pragmatics of East-Timorese politics from that time, Catholic and Christian liturgy would appear in a rather explicit way. Many public events would be started and finished with a prayer.

Ramos-Horta was one of the candidates who more frequently explored religious imagery in the campaign. In his public activities as a candidate he would appear wearing a T-shirt with the face of Jesus Christ printed on it. Some of his campaign material consisted of posters with pictures in which he appeared by the side of Bishop D. Ximenes Belo or the Pope Benedict XVI, with the slogan “Vote for Ramos-Horta”. On March 24, 2007, at his rally in Aileu, he said goodbye to the electors with the sentence “May God be with you”.

Lúcia Lobato, on the other hand, has occasionally paid for the celebration of a thanksgiving mass in the districts and subdistricts where her rallies would take place. On March 27, during a rally in Aileu, a UDT national representative prayed for *Maromak* (God) to free the population from suffering. Lu Olo introduced himself as a “convinced Catholic” in his campaign material (*Vota ba Lu Olo*, 2007).

The compromise of partnership and good relations with Catholic Church in East Timor was part of the promises of all candidates and the relations between some of the politics of the State and religious practices were explored during the electoral period, even before the beginning of the campaign. From mid February onwards, for example, criticism on the educational cooperation agreements between East-Timorese (where Fretilin still had power) and Cuban governments started to emerge on East-Timorese public space. Members of the High Hierarchy of the Catholic Church, who informally supported Ramos-Horta or Fernando Lasama, accused the government of promoting the abandonment of religious practices among the students who were sent to Cuba, alleging that the East-Timorese who lived in that country in order to study medicine did not have opportunities to go to Mass nor to confess,
amongst other religious obligations. This polemic motivated the then Minister of Education, Rosália Corte-Real, to travel to Cuba. After her regress, statements and pictures of East-Timorese going to church in Cuba were published. This is an example of how international cooperation practises are politicized by different elite groups and used as munitions in games of power.  

*Maromak* (God) and *Matebians* (the dead) were constantly evoked during the campaigns in an evident overlap of autochtone cosmologies and bonds of belonging to the Nation-state. After the opening prayer in each rally, the orator asked the public for one minute of silence in memory of the freedom heroes (*heróis da libertação*). In a PD rally in Gleno, in order to begin the works, the presence of dead people’s spirits and God was evoked at the same time. In the party consolidation of Fretilin, in Same, on February 11, 2007, Nicolau Lobato’s son, when on the podium, evoked the memory of his father who died in that region in 1978.

Bonds of institutional belonging of the dead “freedom heroes”, to which Nicolau Lobato is the model figure, were constantly celebrated by Fretilin during the campaign and the resistance was presented as an exclusive legacy of this party. In this context, Fretilin presented itself as the only depository of the population’s history of resilience, as a symbol of their struggle for freedom, with deep roots in East-Timorese tradition.

**Podiums**

On April 25, 2007, I attended Fernando Lasama’s (PD) rally, in Ermera. As it usually happened, I was driven there by the party leaders from Dili. When we got there, we had lunch at the house of commandant Fitun, a well-known leader in the district and, not by accident, a former guerrilla. Back to the center of Gleno, while we were waiting for the arrival of the PD caravan, one of the young leaders of the party told me if he went up on the podium and made a speech, it would be useless. People would not even listen to him. According to him, that would happen because he had not spent the years of the resistance *suffering* with them. They did not know who he was; hence, they would not trust him. Because of that, the role of those who stayed in the mountains

---

200 Silva (K. da) and Simião (D.) 2007, *Timor-Leste por trás do palco*. 

150
during the resistance was so fundamental. The organization of that rally was possible because of two members of the party having such a profile, the former guerrillas Dudu and Fitun, he reported. It is not by accident that the former commandant Dudu was on the podium, seated at the left side of Lasama.

The presence of FALINTIL veterans or people who had an important role in the resistance in the mountains was common and wanted as part of the political campaign. There was a dispute among candidates for the support of those veterans, who were seen as popular and charismatic figures because of their history – of suffering – shared with people in the countryside (no mato). It was also stated that those characters had a great power of influence over local authorities – suco chiefs, village chiefs, lia nain, matan dook – and the authorities influenced the vote of people from their village or suco. Besides, former guerrillas played the role of symbols of suffering and resistance on the podiums and created an identity between electors and candidates.

At Lúcia Lobato’s rally, in Manatuto, on March 26, for instance, another FALINTIL veteran was on the podium: Riak Leman. On the way to the district, the party’s personnel commented proudly the adhesion of Major Tara – an F-FDTL petitionary and former guerrilla – to her candidature. It was expected that this adhesion would attract voters from the district of Ermera, region where Major Tara was born and was still living.

201 In the last years of occupation, the East-Timorese resistance was organized in three fronts, under the supervision of the CNRT (Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense - National Council of East-Timorese Resistance): the armed front, represented by the FALINTIL; the clandestine front, composed by integrants of East-Timorese civil society in the territory and; the diplomatic front, formed by members of East-Timorese diaspora in Australia, Portugal, Mozambique and Angola. Each of these fronts had organical relations among themselves. The FALINTIL, for example, survived for 24 years with weapons and other kinds of commodities which were property of the Indonesian Army or sent by the clandestine front. Portuguese was the language used for communication by the elites of the movement. For a description of the different phases the resistance movements have gone through, from 1975 to 1999, see Magalhães (A. B. de) 1999, Timor-Leste na encruzilhada da transição indonésia.

202 Suco is an administrative unity formed by a set of villages.
In Aileu, March 24, Cornélio Gama (L-7) and representatives of Colimau 2000203 attended Ramos-Horta’s rally. It was also commented that Ramos-Horta wanted the support of Rai-Lós, another petitionary and former guerrilla, for his campaign. Besides them, Ramos-Horta also counted on the support of the most notorious former FALINTIL still living, the president at the time, Xanana Gusmão, who brought with him the support of many ex-combatants and veterans decorated by the former combatants recognition committees.

In the party consolidations of Fretilin in Viqueque district, deputies Antônio Machado, Joaquim dos Santos and Madalena da Silva played an important role on the podium and also in the organization of that event. The three were born in the district and lived there during the Indonesian occupation. Besides, it is important to highlight that the Fretilin candidate at that time, Lu Olo, was also a former guerrilla; a fact that would always be mentioned by the several campaign vehicles of his party.

In addition to the resistance veterans, it was common to see on the campaign podiums, or even in the audience, lia nain’s, suco or village chiefs or former liurai relatives. Incidently, João Carrascalão’s campaign entourage, traveled around the country carrying a white flag with the image of Kaebauk, the symbol of the liurai. In his rally in Viqueque, on March 24, 2007, the attendance of a former liurai of the district was remarked upon. According to the coordinator of his campaign, Ângela Carrascalão, João counted on the support of several noble families from the Aileu region. In this same district, at a PD rally, a lia nain was in the front line of the podium. In Suai, where his candidature was launched, the closure of the rally consisted of taking Lasama to the local Uma Lisan (House of Tradition). In Ossu, when Lu Olo’s candidature was released, a lia nain from his family pronounced a speech in which he made public his support for the Fretilin candidate because they belonged to the same family.

There was also another common feature to all the rallies: the candidates who were running for presidency would always be the last ones to make their speech in the events. Before them, eminent

203 L-7, besides being a former guerrilla, is the founder-leader of an organization called Sagrada Família, which, as Colimau 2000, has a political character.
personalities of the local or national political scenario who supported the candidates addressed the spectators. Things happened as if such authorities (veterans, *lia nain’s*, *suco* or village chiefs), when pronouncing their speeches, would transfer their charisma and *mana*\(^{204}\) to the candidate; covered and dignified by such moral forces, he would then make his speech.

It is interesting to notice that the electoral events in districts and subdistricts were, in most of the cases, organized by the leaders of local supportive bases of the parties. These leaders could be former guerrillas, traditional chiefs or local figures of the State administration offices: *suco* or village chiefs. The success of the rallies in the countryside was in part due to the charisma of the local political parties representatives based in the regions in which the events took place. On the other hand, many of the prominent characters from the parties in Dili were not known by the countryside population. For this reason, however, they would speak at campaign events in order to make themselves known. At a PD rally in Ermera, for example, João Boavida, Mariano Sabino, Rui Menezes, among others, made speeches before Fernando Lasama orated. Maria Paixão, João Gonçalves and others also took part in the Manatuto rally during Lúcia Lobato’s campaign.

Political leaderships, oldish and new, modern and “traditional”, met each other on East-Timorese podiums, their strength being mutually increased, in an act of diffuse reciprocity, by the resources each one would give in order to make possible the execution of the rallies. Financial funds collected by the cosmopolitan urban leaderships of each party were distributed among their bases, making possible the organization of rallies, which consisted, among other things, of hiring trucks for transportation, distributing meals, providing musical concerts and so on. Local leaders, when introducing themselves as the ones responsible for organizing such events, became stronger before their bases. On the other hand, their presence on the podiums would transfer their charisma to the presidential candidate who they supported. When they organized such events, they also created objective conditions so that young and old national leaders grew stronger before the eyes of the countryside inhabitants.

\(^{204}\) Mauss (M.) 1974, “Ensaio sobre a dádiva”
Bibliographic references concerning the electoral dynamic in Indonesia under the New Order regime have suggested that local authorities and others leaderships (village leaders, suco leaders, subdistricts administrators, civil servants, etc.) are fundamental brokers to the modern political system, sources of vote canvassing and hegemony consolidation of political forces on a national range. The protagonism of such social actors in practices of that nature would be settled in patronage relations, sociologically qualified as patron-client relations, a category that sounds rather familiar to those educated according to the Brazilian Social Science analytical tradition.

Therefore, it is from this historical background that East-Timorese contemporary electoral dynamics should be comprehended, since it was under Indonesian administration that East-Timorese elites and local people had the contact with electoral practices, until that time unfamiliar during Portuguese colonization.

I suggest, therefore, that the attention to the phenomenology of rallies leads us to some clues to apprehend the mechanisms by which the dialectic of modernization has been happening in East Timor since independence was restored. From the clues that have been noticed in the events listed above, it is possible to propose that such a phenomenon occurs by means of alliances between the cosmopolitan urban and local ("traditional") elites, mediated and strengthened by the support of some former guerrillas.

3 - Final Perspectives

This article is one of the first products of a work in progress. Here, I have tried to point out some sources of legitimacy for the execution of political functions in the modern East-Timorese State. Such sources of

---


206 cf. Leal (V.N.) 1986, Coronelismo, enxada e voto; Lanna (M.) 1995, A Dívida Divina; Palmeira (M) & Heredia (B.) 1995, “Os comícios e a política de facções.”.

legitimacy could, perhaps, be considered part of the emergent creole political culture *repertoire*. Temporarily, I call East-Timorese creole culture the mass of symbolical references existing in Dili and other semi-urban spaces, produced by the dialectic interaction between the principles of social classification common to several ethnolinguistic groups who live in the country, to the Portuguese colonization, to the Indonesian occupation and to the international cosmopolitan administration experiences.

Suffering and correct recognition appear as fundamental values of the symbolic *repertoire* that compose the political events related above. Popular attention to the operations of the resistance veterans and FALINTIL former combatants recognition committees, as well as the implications of Xanana Gusmão’s speeches in social and political conflicts in 2006 testify, once more, the central focus of this subject in East-Timorese postcolonial scenario. The following variables seem to be conditioners of the modern political legitimacy in the country: 1) formal education; 2) professional experience; 3) participation in the resistance movement (as source of suffering); and 4) former experience on modern State institutions.

The results of the elections suggest that the regional belonging is an issue in a process of increasing politization in the country. In Eastern region, a great support to Fretilin is noticed, whereas in the Western region it is pulverized to the several parties and candidates who opposed the governance led by that party. The comprehension of how these processes were formed over time is one of the challenges to better understand the formation of the Nation-State in East Timor.
Avelino Coelho’s candidature release at Hotel Timor. © Kelly Silva.
A fretilin podium in Ossu, where Lu Olo candidature was released. © Kelly Silva.
Crisis and Nation-building in Timor-Leste

Sara Gonzalez Devant

In 1999, the United Nations, under UNAMET, supervised a popular consultation in which 78.5% of the population of Timor-Leste voted for independence from Indonesia. Following this, the Indonesian army withdrew from East Timor, ending a twenty-four year long occupation, but leaving behind it militias trained to destroy and intimidate the population. The militias carried out a devastating scorched-earth campaign decimating 70 per cent of the country’s infrastructure, and displaced three quarters of its population. Of these, about 250,000 were forcibly deported across the border into Indonesian West Timor, where they remained under militia control208.

In response to the post-consultation mayhem, the United Nations Security Council approved the first of several peacekeeping missions, United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on October 25, 1999 (S/RES/1272). The UN mission launched an unprecedented form of international administration. The international community restored the institutional vacuum left by the Indonesian withdrawal, taking executive, legislative and judicial authority in the mission, and appointed the charismatic Sergio Vieira de Mello as Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator209. In reality, the body corporate of the intervention [UNTAET] would inherit the status of sovereignty – something that had not happened at the international level.

208 CAVR (2005) 7.3.7. paragraph 74.
209 Vieira de Mello was killed in the bombing of UN Headquarters in Baghdad in 2003, where he served as the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative after leaving Timor-Leste.
since the fall of the Holy Roman Empire and the 1648 Treaty Westphalia. In effect, it would be state-building through UN statehood\textsuperscript{210}.

UN administration was intended to phase out gradually\textsuperscript{211}. The UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) was a political mission while its predecessors had integrated institutional support and peacekeeping. UNOTIL’s mandate was due to expire on May 20, 2006, to be replaced by a minimal UN support mission\textsuperscript{212} (actually UNOTIL’s mission was extended after violence broke out in April 2006, and was in fact succeeded by a strengthened UN mission, UNMIT). Donors were convinced that UN support had achieved its goals as late as April 2006 when the World Bank President, Paul Wolfowitz, stated in a closing press conference in Timor-Leste, April 10, 2006: ‘The bustling markets, the rebuilt schools, the functioning Government – and above all the peace and stability – attest to sensible leadership and sound decisions\textsuperscript{213}.

As Wolfowitz made this statement in Dili’s top hotel, crowded buses transported the first internally displaced persons (IDPs) of the 2006 crisis out of the capital and into the Eastern districts of Timor-Leste\textsuperscript{214}. And a profound crisis developed in Timor-Leste, bringing the success story to an abrupt ending. The crisis was triggered by a confrontation between security forces, collapsing state institutions and undermining the achievements of the entire state-building effort.

This paper explores the impact of the crisis on nation-building in Timor-Leste from the perspective of society. It argues that the


\textsuperscript{211} UN missions in East Timor to date are: UNAMET (June-October 1999), mandated with ensuring a free and fair ballot. UNTAET (October 1999- May 2002) ushered the nation to independence and was succeeded by support missions UNMISET (2002-2005); and UNOTIL (2005-2006). The current mission, UNMIT, was established in 2006.


\textsuperscript{214} Violence erupted in some neighbourhoods against Easterners following Xanana Gusmao’s address to the petitioners (27 March 2006). See op. cit. ICG. 2006. p.8.
international community’s intimate involvement in ushering the nation into statehood has narrowed down what the crisis is “about” to institutional failure, without taking into account the social dimensions of the crisis. This paper addresses the need for conflict analysis to, in Christopher Cramer’s (2006) words, steer between over-rationalizing and mystifying the conflict: 'The great challenge, in trying to explain and make sense of violence and war, and their relationship to profound societal changes at local, national, regional and global levels, is to steer between mystifying and over-rationalizing.'

The first section critiques the dominant top-down understanding of the crisis and its limitations. The second section situates crisis knowledge along a hierarchy of credibility and proposes an alternative approach to the relationship between the crisis and nation-building. The third section illustrates the social dimensions of the crisis, exploring leaders’ reliance on violence experts during the crisis, an issue that has escaped much prevailing analysis. The final section approaches the relationship between the conflict and nation-building, scrutinizing the sovereignty, impersonality and legitimacy of the Timorese state, as well as the challenges they face.

1 - The crisis and nation-building: the top-down approach

After the outbreak of the violence in 2006, international actors acknowledged that UN missions had faced serious challenges in Timor-Leste. Firstly, reliance on donors meant that short UN missions had to factor in an uncomplicated exit in their mandates. Secondly, effective public administration was undermined by too many functions to perform, particularly in the first critical phase under UNTAET.

Timor-Leste was razed to the ground in 1999. And the international community espoused the “ideological reflex” of a blank slate once

---

215 Cramer Christopher. 2006. Civil war is not a stupid thing, p.7.
Indonesia withdrew, because the very exercise of state-building as part of a broad emergency response presumes that the state stands above society. However, critics such as Hohe (2002) and Chopra (2002) have argued that the Timorese population retained latent systems of authority and legitimacy from the liberation struggle and thereafter, which the international community failed to recognize: “social structures of indigenous communities invariably generate sources of political legitimacy according to their own paradigm.” These indigenous systems of legitimacy have continued to evolve throughout Timor-Leste's history and into the present, despite their continued relevance being obscured by the international community’s need to reaffirm its role in state-building.

Two interrelated problems arise when the production of knowledge originates at the heart of the nation-building effort: an emphasis on institutions and politics induce a top-down approach; and epistemological risks are involved “when the very same terms used to describe the aims of government serve also as the analytical apparatus deployed by sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and the like.” In short, literature born in the state-building context tends to have an innate inability to look beyond itself; analysis born out of state-building participates in the state-versus-society perspective. Consequently, the literature is too grand and far-removed from the everyday experience of conflict.

This perspective dominates the production of knowledge about Timor-Leste, and has unintentionally distanced society from the state, both conceptually (in crisis analysis) and in reality (making the state more abstract and distant from people’s everyday aspirations and desires). Despite the failings of the UN administration in Timor-Leste, its expansive mandate and limited lifespan, the crisis was not exclusively, nor even predominantly a result of institutional failure. Nor was the humanitarian crisis a mere consequence of the political crisis. The persistence of displacement, the inability to contain low-level violence,

---

219 Spyer P. 2006. Some Notes on Disorder in the Indonesian Postcolony, p.188.
and the emergence of regional identities attest to the fact that shifting social realities have not only prolonged the crisis but have become its organizing features. These crisis dynamics are essential in understanding that the state is embedded in society, and that these dynamics, however destructive, play a role in articulating the conflict and therefore, in how the state resolves it.

2 - Locating crisis knowledge along a hierarchy of credibility

In order to escape falling into the chronic narcissism of nation-building literature, this section explores the production of knowledge during the crisis. It contrasts authoritative accounts, such as the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) report, with rumor, a localized form of knowledge.

Although taken from a different context, a “hierarchy of credibility” is perhaps the best way to locate the production of crisis knowledge in Timor-Leste. In a hierarchy of credibility, those in powerful or high-status positions in society who offer opinions about controversial topics will have their definitions accepted, because such spokesmen are understood to have access to more accurate or more specialized information on topics than the majority of the population.

In nation-building contexts authoritative accounts have the added pressure of being policy-relevant, preferably informing best practices and lessons learned. The COI stands at the apex of the hierarchy of credibility: mandated by the Security Council to clarify facts, it effectively arbitrated crisis knowledge in Timor-Leste, establishing where all other readings of the crisis ought to be located (below) in the hierarchy of credibility. Its mandate enabled it to access privileged

---

221 Becker in Hall S. et al.1978. Policing the Crisis: "Mugging" the State and Law and Order.
information (through interviews and special privileges) in order to do so.

Although the report referred to the human and social impact of the events of April and May 2006, the COI’s mandate obliged it to focus on events that provoked the breakdown of the state, the role and criminal responsibility of individuals, and on making recommendations on holding those criminally responsible accountable for their actions. In executing this mission, it established an authoritative narrative of events and legitimized the incumbent government. While not exonerating President Xanana Gusmao and Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, the report recommended the prosecution of, among others, ousted Minister of Interior Rogerio Lobato. The report entrenched a top-down perspective of the crisis by virtue of its high-profile mandate – it focused on the Timorese state rather than its society in relation to nation-building.

Although it was the most persuasive account of the conflict, the COI report was by no means the only interpretation. In fact, the men, women and children displaced or carrying out the violence engaged in knowledge production through continuous conflict interpretation. Furthermore, the population also reacted to this localized form of knowledge, based on past experience and on the ongoing interpretation of the uncertainty of the present. These interpretations in turn spurred on further arson and violence and increasingly articulated the violence along East/West lines – the “language” of the 2006/07 conflict.

The turmoil that overran Dili in the early months of the crisis provides a classic example of a shifting climate of insecurity where a population can entirely ignore authoritative accounts, be it because they are inaccessible or because the circumstances make them unreliable. In Timor-Leste, the virtual paralysis of public administration meant that an array of different interpretations were able to compete for credibility. Amidst social chaos and a climate of insecurity, rumor, anticipatory practices and new network affiliations (such as regional identification) all played and continue to play their part.

---

Localized knowledge is not merely an instance of misinformation that contrasts with the fact-finding established at the apex of the “hierarchy of credibility”. Rather, the nature of this form of knowledge production makes it an interesting feature of the conflict. Some instances carry a hidden agenda, while others recall insights from past conflicts and are manifest in behavior such as anticipatory displacement\textsuperscript{226}. This form of crisis knowledge originates in society, in the lived experiences of the population that is involved in the violence. These local, intersubjective forms of crisis knowledge can and have greatly shaped what the conflict was about, a fact lost to most state-building literature.

A different but related way to understand these localized forms of knowledge are through “crisis dynamics”\textsuperscript{227}. Crisis dynamics shape the nature of the conflict, and its meanings; and are both the consequences and substance of the conflict. Crisis dynamics fundamentally shift social realities because they create renewed possibilities of conflict. Low-level normalized violence, ongoing displacement, and the emergence of regional identities have been key crisis dynamics to date\textsuperscript{228}. They are organizing dynamics of the crisis because they inadvertently determine what is at stake. Crisis dynamics are rooted in the past and draw their histories into future peace and conflict. Thus, a crisis that originated in the F-FDTL during the first years of independence toppled a government and generated “ethnic polarization” in 2006/7\textsuperscript{229}.

While analyses near the top of the “hierarchy of credibility” establish authoritative accounts, they do so only to the extent that they seek to speak to all members of society on a more or less equal basis. During the conflict, authoritative accounts were directed at the international community and the political elite in Timor-Leste, because they responded to an international agenda of good governance and capacity-building. Although internationally these appear as domestic questions, domestically they appear as external matters.\textsuperscript{230} Moreover, in the crisis context, the need to establish the country’s position in relation

\textsuperscript{229} Trindade Jose, Castro Bryant. 2007: Technical Assistance to the National Dialogue Process in Timor-Leste, p.2
\textsuperscript{230} See Chandler J. 2005, p.23 on the case of Bosnia.
to these principles is particularly urgent. Localised forms of knowledge are lost in the process of establishing authoritative, outwardly objective, accounts. The detachment between the two extremes of the hierarchy of credibility calls for a different approach to the crisis and its relationship with nation-building.

3 - The role of personal loyalties and violence experts

This section aims to better understand the conflict from the perspective of society by examining the role of leaders and the activity of loyalty networks during the crisis. The conflict may best be understood as occurring at what Bertrand (2004) calls a critical juncture, where “the predictability of the institutional environment [was] lost and the stakes [rose] dramatically.” The conflict opened the opportunity for reconfiguring narratives of resistance, in effect the building blocks of Timorese nationalism, which had lost their force with the end of Indonesian occupation. Resistance – to the Indonesian occupation, to Fretilin authority, to foreign (UN) presence – has now been re-interpreted in order to redefine the relationship between the Timorese state and its people.

An example of how the conflict reconfigured the relationship between the state and society was the role of personal loyalties and violence experts during the crisis. The link between state-society on the one hand, and personalised loyalties on the other, is obscured in top-down accounts. A report commissioned by USAID (2006), for example, explains “disagreements and rivalries amongst Timor-Leste’s elite”, a root cause of the conflict, as:

Largely due to institutional dysfunction and weaknesses, and in some cases due to a flagrant disregard for the new democratic ‘rules of the game’, the elite struggle evolved from a legitimate contest for political control into a battle of personalities and individual influence. It also ensnared the general population

---

in a test of personal loyalties and the propagation of both longstanding and petty grievances\textsuperscript{232}.

In reality, the highly personalised nature of the political crisis was not just a top-down process, as described above. Such reports ignore the fact that the pledging of loyalties to individual leaders was reciprocated by leaders’ reliance, and not just use of, “violence experts”. The nature of the Timorese struggle for liberation meant that individuals in the general population were trained and acclimatized to violence. This conflict know-how remains in independence. The large pool of “violence experts” that had been active during the liberation struggle could not be easily assimilated into a peaceful Timorese state. Some, but not all, were formally co-opted into the body of the state in government (Xanana Gusmao for one) and the security forces\textsuperscript{233}. Reliance on civilians and other violence experts to carry out the violence to begin with, and to contain it later, was a fundamental aspect of the 2006 conflict. The prominent role of civilian ex-guerrillas (veterans), or those assimilated into the security forces; and youths organized in gangs (or a combination – veteran youths organized in gangs) marked the conflict from the onset\textsuperscript{234}.

The group Colimau 2000, “seen as a sort of rent-a-mob”\textsuperscript{235}, is a case in point. Colimau 2000’s spokesperson Ozorio Leki’s speech incited violence to secure a change in government during the April 2006

\textsuperscript{232} Brady C., Timberman D. G. 2006. The Crisis in Timor-Leste: Causes, Consequences and Options for Conflict Management and Mitigation, p.8.

\textsuperscript{233} The recruitment process of the F-FDTL, independent Timor-Leste’s armed forces, was highly controversial. Rees (2004) explains that there was a trade-off between Falintil guerrilla High Command and the UN administration, UNTAET. The former cooperated in retiring the majority of Falintil combatants in exchange for a free hand in selecting new recruits. (60) This is crucial to understanding the origins of the East/West split and the 2006 crisis.

\textsuperscript{234} “Veterans” is a deceptive term. Violence experts range across the sexes and generations. A timely report by AusAID (2006) noted that youth organizations play a crucial role in engaging this disenfranchised demographic. When I refer to “gangs” I refer to violent martial arts groups, although it is important to note that the role of violent groups is complex and predates the conflict. See AusAID. 2006. A survey of gangs and youth group in Dili.

petitioners’ protest outside the Government Palace\textsuperscript{236}. However, the group is conversely believed to have been peaceful and disciplined during the violence sparked by the arrest of Major Reinaldo in Caicoli (Dili) although the group was camped close by in Matadouro\textsuperscript{237}. AusAID lists other groups that like Colimau 2000, had grievances from the past towards the Fretilin government: CPD-RDTL, Sagrada Familia, and Orsnaco. It was a deliberate policy by the transitional crisis government to attempt to co-opt the sometimes-violent groups in order to curb the violence.

In addition to the involvement of organized violent groups, the conflict prompted the emergence of many key actors – civilians and defectors – such as Major Alfredo Reinaldo (military police), Gastão Salsinha (spokesperson for the petitioners, employed by the PNTL but operating and armed under F-FDTL), Major Tara (F-FDTL officer) Vicente da Conceição “Rai Los” (ex-guerrilla and discharged from F-FDTL since 2003), and Abilio Audian “Mausoko” (a former resistance leader, as well as a police commander and leader or “warga” of the group PSHT, a youth group identified with PSD and PD parties), among others. The emergence of these actors, individual and group, caused a network of loyalties to kick in when the state lost its monopoly of the legitimate use of force.

The political elite established an ambiguous relationship with “violence experts”, who, whether operating at the centre or margins of formal structures of power, were readily mobilized in the crisis. Rai Los and his paramilitary group played a notorious role in the crisis. Armed and uniformed by the Minister of Interior Rogerio Lobato, Rai Los came clean and pledged his allegiance to Xanana Gusmao, but only after attacking a patrol of F-FDTL soldiers killing five and seriously injuring two (Taci Tolu/Tibar on May 24, 2006). This disclosure mounted pressure on Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri to resign\textsuperscript{238}. Ironically, Rai Los and his men achieved a kind of emblematic status and, despite their civilian status and questionable role in the crisis, marched in the inauguration ceremony of the interim Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta.

\textsuperscript{238} Alkatiri resigned on 26 June 2006.
The case of another “violence expert”, Major Alfredo, is just as interesting and marked by ambiguity. He escaped with his men from the downtown Dili prison in a walk-out in broad daylight. Various attempts to recapture the Major proved fruitless. Reinaldo was defiant in hiding, and attempted to negotiate his outlaw status with the authorities until the end. For the authorities, the inability to bring him into the formal justice system and his popular support base make him an inconvenient liability. The Major was shot dead after allegedly attempting to assassinate President Ramos-Horta and ordering an attack on Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao on February 11, 2008. The President was seriously injured in the attack.

Reliance on violence experts illustrates how indigenous systems of authority were at work when public institutions disintegrated. Loyalties persisted and were re-forged outside this public realm, but these collaborations affected the institutional set-up of the state. The difficulty arises for the post-crisis government that is anxious to demonstrate its commitment to good government and transparency externally, because it may be unable to handle violence experts on these terms. The relationship between the state and violence experts is therefore tenuous, but it is important to note that this relationship does not vanish in the absence of conflict. Top-down approaches remain silent about the sanctioned actions of violence experts who operate on the margins of the public sphere.

4 - Sovereignty, impersonality and legitimacy—The three crises of the Timorese State

The 2006/07 crisis challenged the sovereignty, legitimacy and impersonality of the state of Timor-Leste. These challenges, although interrelated, can be considered separately for analytical purposes as three distinct crises.

Timor-Leste experienced challenges on several fronts. The first was a crisis of sovereignty, the principle of the supremacy of the state. In Weberian terms, the state is defined as a set of institutions that hold the monopoly of the legitimate use of force over a population in a fixed
territory. The 2006 conflict struck down the state’s ability to do this. The disintegration of and confrontation between, and within, security forces provoked a generalized breakdown of law and order, in the words of one witness, “East against West, soldiers against soldiers, police against soldiers, everyone against everyone … It’s total madness”239.

The rapid disbanding of security forces exposed loyalties and affiliations to different political players, revealing the second crisis: a crisis of impersonality. In an ideal modern state, persons act in an official capacity in name of the state, and are obeyed to the extent that they safeguard and embody the principles of, broadly speaking, the constitution. The political stand-off between President Xanana and Prime Minister Alkatiri not only revealed their differing national projects, but redefined the configuration of the army and the police – some of whom defected, while others continued to operate, armed and clandestinely, outside Dili.

The third crisis was a crisis of legitimacy. The legitimate state is one where the state has supreme authority because its population tacitly wills it so. By means of a healthy contestation of government decisions, the democratic process and dialogue with civil society reaffirm the legitimacy of the state. However, Timor-Leste’s society had undergone a number of alienating processes since the exit of the Indonesian occupation. The first was the failure of the UN administration to include the Timorese in state-building240. The second was the Fretilin party’s exclusionary politics. Both processes of alienation led to the disjuncture between nation-building and state-building.

Fretilin’s expertise in administration and public management put it at a clear advantage above other parties, and its historical legacy made it the natural heir to UN sovereign rule in the fledgling country. The constitutional set-up strengthened Fretilin’s position in power through a parliamentary majority and a semi-presidential system, but simultaneously fuelled disaffection among the young intelligentsia and confronted Prime Minister and President241. Apart from the problematic institutional set-up, the popularity of Xanana’s persona alone was

239 Barker Anne. 27 May 2006. “Total madness” as gangs fight in Dili ABC Australia.
sufficient to challenge the notion that Fretilin’s historical hegemony legitimised what was widely perceived to be exclusionary politics\textsuperscript{242}. These three crises outlined here reveal the complex relationship between (institutional) state-building and (ideological) nation-building. Whereas state-building is an act of “constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security”\textsuperscript{243}, nation-building is a broader process which does not necessarily run in sync with institutional development. Nation-building is understood broadly to be the product of aligning collective claims with a given institutional set-up. It may also result in the creation of new institutions. Nation-building is an evolving process, the link between the institutional make-up of the state and a mobilised political force that embodies “the restoration of community, assertion of identity, emergence of new cultural practices” –nationalism as described by Edward Said (1994:263). The tension between state-building and nation-building explored here provides the final key to reinterpreting the role of the crisis in the nation-building process.

**Conclusion**

Some accounts, which lie high up in the hierarchy of credibility tend to interpret the 2006/07 conflict as a symptom of state-failing. This is partly because Timor-Leste’s sanctioned forms of authority broke down rapidly, to be replaced by informal, personalized networks of loyalty. The breakdown of law and order was also expressed with social meaning: the crisis was interpreted by those involved in it. The reliance on “violence experts” revealed that indigenous systems of authority continue to determine the relationship between state and society in Timor-Leste. Accounts that privilege the institutional set-up of the state are ill-equipped to analyze this conflict, because the literature implicitly separates state from society, the public realm from the private realm. It also disregards localized forms of crisis knowledge, partly because they


may be forms of misinformation, but partly also because they arise from the subjective experience of violence, both past and present. Yet these forms of knowledge, and how the population reacts to them, determine what the crisis is about.

Rather than being an instance of “state-failing”, the 2006/07 conflict was a manifestation of challenges to the sovereignty, impersonality and legitimacy of the state of Timor-Leste. These three crises reveal the social embeddedness of the state. More broadly, the confluence of issues purporting to be what the crisis was “about” (situated at different levels of the hierarchy of credibility) exhibited the disparity between state-building and nation-building in Timor-Leste. Approaching the conflict not as Timorese state-failing but rather as Timorese society engaging in nation-building can help avoid both mystifying and over-rationalising the 2006/07 conflict. Whether or not the state will overcome the conflict soon will depend on its ability to recognise that social realities have fundamentally shifted since March/April 2006, as have the stakes of the conflict. Realigning a mobilised political force to a collective national project and institutional set-up is the greatest problem faced by Timor-Leste again, or rather, still.
PART 4
Tracks for the construction of the future
Crisis and uncertainties as a sign of a lack of Timorese project of society

Frédéric Durand

In 2002, at the time of the accession to independence, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste was regularly presented as the “poorest country of Asia” and as a State that the United Nations had to construct “from scratch”. These formulations lead to mistakes. Timor-Leste is rich of resources in hydrocarbons, but also of a real agricultural potential. Furthermore, the Timorese have deep and strong traditions that constitute a very rich culture.

In this context, the numerous crises on political and economical basis that the country faced during its five first years of independence can be analysed like a deficit of specific project society. In other terms, they could be regarded more precisely as a lack of consultation and as a sign of inadequacy between what is proposed to the population, the traditional political and economic values and the expectations in term of “development”.

Indeed, although occupied for almost 25 years by Indonesia, East Timor has not been completely isolated. It was influenced especially from the end of the 1980s by the “developmentalist” mental representations of Indonesia and the hope of gaining comfort and modernity along with freedom. Since 1999, international experts reinforced these aspirations, notably through the National Development Plan, drafted in 2002 and supposed to project the future of the country by 2020. Yet to the analysis, this type of document shows a lack of reflection on what could be Timorese values.
1 - Pertinence and ambiguity in concepts of “viability” and “poverty”

During the preparation of Timor-Leste’s independence, which occurred on May 20, 2002, the old and somehow specious argument about the alleged “non-viability” of the country was often heard. As early as the 1970s, this argument was presented by Indonesian military leaders, in order to justify its will to annex the territory. The country was deemed “too small”, “without enough resources”, and “underpopulated”. After the invasion in December 1975, the argument was used again by the Western allies of Indonesia, while a year before, large amounts of gas had been discovered within Timor’s waters. This “non-viability” idea is more than questionable since a quarter of world’s countries have a size and population inferior or similar to that of Timor-Leste. The 40 countries with a smaller or equivalent size include Luxembourg, Singapore, Lebanon, Palestine, Kuwait, El Salvador, or Kosovo.

Because of these interrogations, the concept of “poverty” also needs to be questioned. The reliability of GDP per capita is now often criticized. However, in the 2000s, the international community utilizes it to state that, with less than $370 per inhabitant, East Timor would have been the “poorest Asian country” and one of the 20 most underprivileged states on the planet. But the use of monetary values is ill-suited to measure the living standards of populations mainly living from agriculture auto-consumption. In fact, even if there were food shortages during the last few years, by and large the rural population of Timor-Leste is no worse off than those of Indonesia or Vietnam.

GDP per capita was presented as decreasing within the last few years, especially since the independence, though it remains above that of the end of the Indonesian occupation in current value.

---

244 Defert (Gabriel) 1992, Timor-Est, le génocide oublié, droit d’un peuple et raisons d’Etats, p.64.
Table 1 - GDP per capita evolution in Timor-Leste (1999-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current GDP Per capita</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per capita PPP</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Several causes can be identified. First, the GDP increased artificially during the UN period, especially during 2000 and 2001 when money injected by the UN represented one fourth of the country’s GDP. Second, the GDP-PPP\(^\text{245}\) also suffered from the arrival of international staff which increased the cost of living, especially in Dili. Finally, most documents on the country situation use “non-gas” per capita GDP. However, it is more and more disconnected from the global revenues of Timor-Leste. In 2007, with the growth of hydrocarbon production and the increase in gas prices, the country received up to $100 million a month, rendering possible the opening of a gas fund in a US bank account amounting to $2 billion. GDP per capita of Timor-Leste in 2007 was therefore not $370 but around $1,500. This value is not very high when compared to that of OECD countries ($30,000) or even ASEAN countries, but it helps keep the situation in perspective, especially vis à vis countries such as Laos (less than $2,000) or Cambodia and Vietnam ($2,500 and $3,000 respectively). A similar reasoning can be reached with HDI.\(^\text{246}\)

2 - A country destroyed and rebuilt “from scratch”?

The importance of the destruction in September 1999 tends to be forgotten as it occurred ten years ago. In some regions, up to 75% of the houses were burnt by the Indonesian army and its trained militias, while

\(^{245}\) PPP: Purchasing Power Parity.

administrative buildings were systematically destroyed together with their archives and equipment. In 2008, many ruins are still visible throughout the country. A similar fate affected the livestock that was largely decimated in 1999, especially in the western part of Timor-Leste. At the time of the 2004 census, the number of buffalos, horses and pigs remained below that of the end of the Portuguese period in the early 1970s, while the population had increased by 30%.

However, these “material” destructions may also be misleading. Many speeches emphasized the role of the UN and of its “experts” in the reconstruction of the country from scratch from October 1999 to May 2002. These statements are more than debatable and their implications are detrimental to the comprehension of actual situation. East Timorese society is indeed composed of several complex strata which interact, sometimes in an antagonistic way, while searching for a project for their nation. Hence, beyond the differences induced by the great ethnolinguistic diversity, four main elements can be identified:

1) The pre-Portuguese time was particularly neglected by the international community. The majority of experts considered that Timor-Leste had to “forsake its past” in order to turn itself towards the future, assuming that prior to 1999, everything would have been “poverty”, “lack of technique” or “suffering”. But Timorese have values on which their culture is based and which are essential to building their identity. Among those values one finds: endurance, courage, sobriety, simplicity, a weak attachment to material goods, a sense of community, of honor, and of the given word. Paradoxically, while praised and displayed in principle by international discourse, these values are less emphasized in reality than the individual capacity to accumulate wealth. Another major component of Timor’s worldview lies in the dualistic concept that joins together opposite and complementary poles in the search for balance. Traditional society, while not ideal, emphasized balance, moderation, especially on environmental issues, i.e. things that modern societies tend to forget even when they promote the so-called “sustainable development”.

2) The Portuguese period was often abusively denigrated. It is true, that their material realizations are rather limited after four centuries in the island. However, outside of Dili, East-Timor was largely managed following the principle of indirect-rule. Moreover, much of what was
built was destroyed by the bombings, which occurred during the Japanese occupation (1942-1945). Pictures from the 1970s show that, while not flourishing, the situation was not catastrophic. The destructions started again in 1975 and 1999. More profoundly, even if its material vestiges are few, the Portuguese period imparted strong cultural and moral values, which explains why many East Timorese are certainly prouder of the shared history with Portugal than many former colonies may be.

3) During the 1975 - September 1999 period, several great aspiring trends fostered. In Timor itself, after the hard phases of the occupation and until the 1980s, Timorese had to compose with Indonesians. Some became resigned to the annexation while others were fighting for independence. In both cases, the media that reached them made the Timorese share the same ideal of “development” as the Indonesians based on the idea of “catching up” with countries of the first industrial era. In parallel, a Diaspora was formed outside the country. It was numerically less important, but it included several leaders such as José Ramos-Horta or Mari Alkatiri. They too imagined the future of Timor, by following different influences taken from the countries in which they resided (mainly Portugal, Mozambique and Australia), and the political inclinations which emerged in 1974-75 (Liberal, Social-democrats, Marxist).

4) The post-referendum period strengthened aspirations to “development” initiated in the 1980s and 1990s while exacerbating confrontations among the previous ones.

3 - 1999-2006: a problematic transition between aid with ambiguous effects and political crisis

Timor-Leste was also described as the country that received the greatest per capital help in post-conflict periods. It is estimated that within the first 3 years, Timor-Leste received on average twice as much per capita than Bosnia Herzegovina and eight times more than Afghanistan. In fact, from the end of 1999 to March 2006, Timor-Leste received 2 billion dollars of international aid.
However, the use of this amount must be clarified. A significant part of it did not directly benefit the Timorese. As an example, 80% of the money spent by the UN was used for expenses incurred outside of Timor, 15% went to international staff or for the import of goods to their benefit, and only the remaining 5% was directly given to the Timorese. The distribution of this aid by sector is also problematic. During the 1999-2006 period, UN Peace Keeping Forces (PKF) accounted for almost 30% of the expenses while the UN police accounted for 8%. Next to this, emergency and technical help represented 15% and 46% respectively. This stated -and it is the most delicate point to evaluate-, this aid was used to pay the high salaries of contractors and technical consultants who, for an important part, had little knowledge of the country or even of Asia. Their work was not necessarily well-suited, and many of them were unable to train people or transfer a pertinent savoir faire if only because of language problems.247

The evolution in time of aid fluxes must also be considered. Logically, the main part was used between the referendum and the independence. Starting as of May 2002, principally at the request of President Xanana Gusmão, the UN presence strongly diminished, going from 8,000 personnel in 2000 to 275 in 2005. Indeed, President Gusmão was worrying about the revenue gap between international experts and Timorese having a hard time earning a few dollars to feed their families. The UN would have even pulled back all of its personnel in May 2006 had troubles not forced it to sent troops back again. Beyond costs, even if it were necessary to turn the page of assistance and trusteeship, the pullback without a real preparation would have been destabilizing, as shown by the country's GDP decrease after 2001. This was particularly obvious in Dili, where local businesses faced slack times. At this point, a major distinction must be drawn between the capital and the rest of the country. Indeed, because of its opening up to the outside world, of the importance of political dealings and of its non-agricultural economic activities, Dili is far from representative of a country, which is 80% rural. Many transient observers do not necessarily appraise this. This does not mean that what happens in Dili is without consequences, but rather that

there is a growing gap between the urban preoccupations of the capital’s inhabitants and those of the bulk of a population that continues to live from an agriculture of subsistence.

The gap is also a political one. In 2002, a constitution largely based on the Portuguese model was drafted under the aegis of the UN. Based on strong parliamentary powers, it gave the President of the Republic a role that is more symbolic than managerial, in relative contravention of Timorese traditions of power exercise. Thus, between 2002 and 2007, President Xanana Gusmão had limited possibility to act practically. Decisions were mostly taken by the government of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, leader of Fretilin, the party enjoying a large majority in the Parliament. During these five years, popular support to Fretilin progressively weakened, especially after a series of crisis. In November-December 2002, anti-government demonstrations resulted in the destruction of administrative buildings, of shops, and of houses belonging to people close to the government. In April-May 2005, demonstrations started all over Dili to protest against a plan to reduce the influence of religion in education.

By that time, several splits became apparent between different components of the population, notably within the governing body. It happened thus between the Timorese Diaspora turned towards the Anglo-Saxon worlds (Australia, USA) and that of the Portuguese speaking countries (Portugal and its former colonies in Africa). Their decisions were not necessarily well-accepted by a population which had remained in Timor during the Indonesian occupation, especially the youth. The youth, who were educated in the Indonesian language, became strongly marginalized. Indeed, measures, such as the exclusive opening of civil servant’s jobs to Portuguese speaking people or such as the use of that language in Parliament, were poorly received, since Portuguese was spoken by less than 15% of all Timorese. Certain choices by Fretilin, based on a secular conception of society, did not help either in bringing together a population that declared itself 95% Catholic.248

In January 2006, a petition of soldiers who felt victims of discriminations because of their connection to the Western part of the

---

248 Durand (Frédéric) 2004, Catholicisme et protestantisme dans l’île de Timor 1556-2003, construction d’une identité chrétienne et engagement politique contemporain.
country started a new crisis that later degenerated. Indeed, an ancient distinction exists between the populations of the West of Timor-Leste (Kaladi/Loromonu) and those of the great-East (Firaku/Lorosae), but it is neither ethnic nor linguistic. This split took shape during the Portuguese colonial time, between the populations of the West, in the vicinity of Dili, which were considered to be more “assimilated” than those of the East, presented as more “backwards”. This difference was reinforced from 1975 to 1999, when most of the armed resistance connected to Fretilin was concentrated in the Eastern part of the country because it was less controlled by the Indonesian army.

The initial leader of this petition, Lieutenant Gastão Salsinha, was later joined by Major Alfredo Reinado who quickly became an emblematic figure of the movement. In 2006, troubles consecutive to these East/West tensions caused the death of 37 people, and the displacement of another 150,000. They rendered necessary the return of a multi-national force. The poor management of these crises forced Prime Minister Alkatiri to resign and leave his seat to José Ramos-Horta.

4 - 2007-2008: elections and rebellious attacks revealing instability

After these crises, the context of the 2007 presidential elections was particularly tense, with a population divided between continuity and aspiration for change. Eight candidates were running during the first round of elections. The main two were Francisco Guterres (“Lu Olo”), president of Fretilin, and José Ramos-Horta, the then Prime Minister, who enjoyed a great aura because of his role as defender of the Timorese on the international scene, a role which earned him the Nobel Peace Price in 1996. Fernando de Araujo was another personality who attracted attention. Known under the code name “Lasama” from the time he was a leader of the resistance against Indonesia in the 1980s, he embodied the new Indonesian speaking generation which felt shunned from responsibilities. Its PD party (Democratic Party) had reached the second
best score in 2001. Moreover, he had received the support of the Catholic Church as well as that of Major Alfredo Reinado.

Aside from some minor incidents, the first round of elections took place on April 9, 2007 peacefully. It was “free and fair” according to independent observers.249 The results were relatively close. Fretilin came first, but with 28% of the votes, versus 22% for Ramos Horta, and 19% for Fernando de Araujo.250

Table 2 - Results of the first round of the 2007 presidential election and of the 2001 parliamentary elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personalities running during the 1st round of 2007 presidential election</th>
<th>Francisco Guterres</th>
<th>José Ramos-Horta</th>
<th>Fernando de Araujo</th>
<th>F.X. do Amaral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Fretilin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>ASDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score in 2001, parliamentary elections</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st round 2007, presidential elections</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When compared to the results of the 2001 parliamentary elections, these scores indicate a decline of Fretilin. The series of crisis since 2002 and also the challenge of José Ramos-Horta may explain this. José Ramos-Horta was running with the support of outgoing President Xanana Gusmão who had just recreated in 2007 the CNRT (National Congress for the Reconstruction of Timor).251 The first round also indicates a tendency towards regionalism, following local origin of the candidates. This phenomenon reoccurred during the second round of elections.

250 Cabasset-Semedo (Christine) & Durand (Frédéric) 2007, “Les élections présidentielles de 2007 à Timor-Leste”.
251 Xanana Gusmão had co-founded the first CNTR (National Council of Timorese Resistance) in 1998, to bring together a platform of the 1974/75 parties, in view of a possible referendum for self determination. It was dissolved in 2001.
the presidential election of May 9, 2007. José Ramos-Horta, who had received the support of Fernando de Araujo (PD) and of almost all of the other minority parties, largely won the election with 69.2% of the votes. Francisco Guterres, who represented Fretilin, was defeated nationally but managed to come first in the three Eastern districts of Baucau, Lautem and Viqueque. These elections showed a certain desire for change, even if the Timorese also wished for continuity since they elected a pioneer of independence.

The parliamentary elections that followed on June 30, 2007 confirmed this trend. Fretilin arrived first, but with only 29% of the votes, ahead of CNRT (24%), ASDT-PSD (16%), and PD (11%). These last three groups formed a coalition led by former President Xanana Gusmão. This allowed him to become Prime Minister. However, his nomination was not without difficulty. Indeed, a constitutional ambiguity required the President to ask the party winning the elections or a majority coalition to form a government. But the new President José Ramos-Horta was aware of the weariness of Fretilin and of the risk of seeing an increase in turmoil, and he did not wish to give the government to Fretilin, as in any case, it would have been unable to form a majority. It was only at the beginning of August 2007, after more than one month of turbulent and sometimes violent demonstrations in the three Eastern districts that José Ramos-Horta decided to nominate Xanana Gusmão as the new Prime Minister.

The stakes are particularly sensitive. Indeed, the transition period under UN aegis from 1999 to May 2002, then the first parliamentary mandate of the independence era from May 2002 to June 2007, could be construed as trial periods. The new government will probably no longer benefit from the same indulgence, as many problems remain to be solved. In fact, the two failed attacks of February 2008 against the newly elected President and the Prime Minister, which were carried out by the rebels Alfredo Reinado and Gastão Salsinha, and were followed by the death of the former and the surrender of the latter, ended the most delicate part of the crisis started in 2006. Nevertheless, they did not clear all of its socio-cultural, political and economic aspects.
5 - Ideologically contradictory and sometimes naïve visions

After at least four crisis during the five first years of independence, the necessity to request the return of foreign military forces to restore the country’s peace made several analysts say that Timor-Leste could be a failed State, a “country having failed to become a State”. In 2007, the American foundation “Fund for Peace” and the magazine Foreign Policy ranked Timor-Leste at the 19th position on the list of the 32 failed States that they considered in an alert situation. If the country’s place is far behind Sudan, the Ivory Coast, Afghanistan, or Myanmar, it nevertheless leaves open the question of the country’s future.

Based on what was previously stated, I considered that the failed States concept is not applicable, especially here, since it takes into account only the ability to imitate the Western model. The concept of “a country that has yet to set up how to bring together traditions and the economic and political requirements of the modern world” will be preferred. Indeed, the evolution of the world since the industrial revolution shows that countries regarded, as “successful examples” are countries that managed to conciliate their social and cultural values with the institutional and technical transformations required by globalization. Japan and South Korea are the most emblematic examples, having managed to maintain their strong traditions. It is more generally the case with East Asia, even if it was at the price of a more or less artificial reconstruction of “Asian values”. Inversely, countries considered as “failures” have seldom managed this conciliation or have not been able to go beyond a caricatured vision of the past.

For Timor-Leste, the stakes are very critical because, unlike countries such as Japan or South Korea, there are no “main” cultural currents that can federate diversity. In fact, Timor-Leste is characterized by a great cultural diversity in a large sense, i.e. ethno-linguistic, but also historical, and political. The cultures meet and sometimes clash within a very diverse society of more than 20 ethno-linguistic groups, which have been rocked, since the mid 1970s, by more than 30 years of chaotic and destabilizing events. In that regard, the arrival of the international community in 1999 and the access to independence did not resolve the
contractions. On the contrary, they often exacerbated them, giving rise to frustrations within people who believed that their “dreams” were about to come true, even if they often did not have a clear vision of what they would bring. Many were disappointed by the lack of improvement of their situation or the fact that they were kept away from the path of success.

At this moment, the national development plan for the year 2020, which was endorsed in 2002 by the cabinet of the Prime Minister, but largely drafted following UN recommendations, reveals the lack of insight on the country’s situation. This is not necessarily specific to Timor-Leste. Many other so-called “developing” countries are faced with similar situations. However, the problems certainly reached a special dimension in Timor because of the late accession to independence and the great scope of the people’s expectations.

**Vision of development in Timor-Leste for the next generation, in the year 2020**

- East Timor will be a democratic country with a vibrant traditional culture and a sustainable development;
- It will be a prosperous society with adequate food, shelter and clothing for all people;
- Communities will live in safety, with no discrimination;
- People will be literate, knowledgeable and skilled. They will be healthy, and live a long, productive life. They will actively participate in economic, social and political development, promoting social equality and national unity;
- People will no longer be isolated, because there will be good roads, transports, electricity, and communications in the towns and villages, in all regions of the country;
- Production and employment will increase in all sectors – agriculture, fisheries and forestry;
- Living standards and services will improve for all East Timorese, and income will be fairly distributed;
- Prices will be stable, and food supplies secure, based on sound management and sustainable management of natural resources;
- The economy and finances of the state will be managed efficiently, transparently, and will be free from corruption;
- The state will be based on the rule of law. Government, private sector, civil society and community leaders will be fully responsible to those by whom they were chosen or elected.


---

Development proposals for the year 2020 reveal these weaknesses, even if it is not because of the proposals *per se*, since they gather everyone’s support without any great difficulty. Indeed, they first and foremost convey general and politically correct concepts that are naïve because they hide tensions and contradictions. Moreover, they are not specifically “Timorese”. Anyone could replace the name of “East-Timor” by that of any other State to turn it into a standard UN national project.

The “concrete goals” of that document are of the same register. However, beyond the “politically correct” formulations and a manifest lack of synthesis, which tend to give rise to repetitions and confusions, their analysis reveals other ideological oppositions. Four main currents appear:

1- A “humanistic” vision inspired by universal values (health, education, respect for all).

2- Proposals coming from good governance rules that enjoy a worldwide consensus (separation of powers, effective carrying-out of the laws, safeguards against abuse and corruption).

3- General recommendations requiring a greater involvement of the State (a responsible and creative government, a network of social safety nets, a reduction of poverty).

4- Precise recommendations requiring, inversely, that the State’s role be as limited as possible, and that the economy be liberalized as much as possible.

This last point is probably the most significant. It reveals a strong tendency of contemporary economic and political thought to emphasize economic growth above anything else, by means of a maximized reduction of the public sector, of privatizations, of transforming population into “disciplined labor force” and of the opening up of markets. This position is not the only one appearing in the document, hence the ideological contradictions between registers 3 and 4. Liberal recommendations are often much more explicit and precise, since they advise to:

- *Transform the subsistence agriculture into a market economy;*
- *Achieve a stronger financial and banking sector;*
- *Maintain a competitive real exchange rate with more exports and less imports;*
EAST-TIMOR

- Promote private initiatives;
- Promote a competent, productive, and disciplined labor force;
- Monitor and remedy the potential excesses of the government and its functionaries.\textsuperscript{253}

All these recommendations are not necessarily bad or negative in themselves, but they show a tendency to push “Southern” countries into sacrificing social projects and cultural practices in order to promote at all cost an “economic growth” which may be more destructive than constructive. “Growth” itself may be a step, notably in a country like Timor-Leste which faced so many destructions, but it cannot be a goal in itself, especially since, in a world with finite resources and with what we know of environmental threats such as global warming, it is unrealistic to imagine that all of the planet’s inhabitants may reach the Western-Japanese life-style.

At the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, nobody has a "ready-made" recipe for success, not even Western countries or “UN experts” who see a multiplication of crisis in the North and a confirmation of the oil peak threat and environmental degradations. In East-Timor’s case, considering the difficult living conditions that the country inherited in 1999 and thanks to financial means provided by international aid, and more recently by hydrocarbons, successive governments have had a tendency to give a strong role to the State. Supporting the population through social and economic aid rather than liberalizing the economy by diminishing the role of the public sector was a choice that did not always succeed, and its realizations were slow. But to abstain from doing it would have certainly caused social troubles and unrest. Unlike many “developing” countries, Timor-Leste should have, at least in the coming decades, the means to carry out real social policies given its relatively limited population and its important revenues.

\textsuperscript{253} Ibid, pp.20-21.
6 - Which “project of society” for the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste?

Beyond available financial means, Timor-Leste’s most crucial need is more certainly that of a real “project of society” based on the values of the country. The general goal to build a “democratic country with a vibrant traditional culture and a sustainable development”, where society will be “prosperous with adequate food, shelter and clothing for all people” is too vague to constitute a real project. Indeed, beyond the upholding of traditional ceremonies, what does a “traditional vibrant culture” concretely mean in the case of East-Timor when a majority of Timorese have different local “traditions” but are mostly ignorant of their “history”?

When questioned, civil society’s leaders and representatives indicate that taking their country to the Singapore model is an idea that does not attract them much. However, it is generally what is implicit in speeches regarding “economic development”, as well as in idealized images or pictures found in the humblest homes or on the banners of CNRT during the legislative elections of 2007.

A real reflection and introspection have yet to be carried out, in order to define the values on which the inhabitants, in their diversity, want to build their country. Such a project was initiated in 2002, but it yielded mainly ready-made images that mostly emphasized basic needs. An endeavor to define a more precise and more “cultural” project will not be easy because aspirations and expectations are not identical in all the components of society. They may even be antagonistic sometimes among political currents, generations, and regions of the country. It will first require that the growing gap between the inhabitants of Dili and those of the rest of the country be filled. Moreover, within the next decades, Timor-Leste will have to face strong challenges such as an unprecedented demographic growth, a time limit on the oil revenues and on the international aid, and environmental risks connected to the consequences of global warming on an island with a dry tropical climate.

In a world that is more and more global, this reflection will not be possible if one does not take also into account the geopolitical context
and the orientations or proposals of partners and neighbors, whether they be in Europe with Portugal, in Asia with ASEAN, Japan and China, or in the Pacific region with Australia. The challenge for Timor-Leste will probably be to continue to travel the path of a greater integration in the international community, starting with the entry in structures such as ASEAN, while standing on, rediscovering, or rebuilding national values that emphasize the specificities of the Timorese and enable them to feel pride. Among these values found in myths, in anthropological studies, and all throughout the history of East-Timor, are the following: a strong sense of justice, a capacity to limit the power of leaders whose role was to guarantee a stable and sustainable community, a tie to regional lands going from sea to mountain regions, a prudent management of diversity, especially in agricultural practices, a deep attachment to spiritual and sacred values, a search for balance and fair assessment, particularly in order to manage the environment, and a strong will toward independence, whether it be political or economic.

It is probably more through the search for roots and justifications of these practices to adapt them to the modern world than through the imposition of outside models that Timor-Leste will manage to define its model for society and for the future.
Refugee Camp in Dili in 2007. © Frédéric Durand

UN cars in 2007. © Frédéric Durand
Fretilin banner in 2007. © Frédéric Durand
Human safety, security and resilience:
Making narrative spaces for dissent in Timor-Leste

Jacqueline Aquino Siapno


(Translation: “I can say that there is discrimination. Why? Because since 2001 up to now, we have never seen a female being promoted (in Lautem). Never seen a female being sent for training. Training courses seem to be just for males...males choose other males to undergo more training. Those who get to have more training are predominantly male. If possible, we women should also be included...to give us an opportunity to step forward. Even speaking in public is not allowed, only men are allowed.” (Interview with female PNTL Officer, Lautem.)

In Timor-Leste, the process of building a new nation in Southeast Asia in the 21st Century has unfortunately, as has happened in other Third World countries coming out of colonialism, often excluded the narratives and lived experiences of villagers in the rural districts and especially of poor women (including female ex-Falintil veterans), the elderly, children, and peasant farmers. Nobody listens to a poor man, a

poor woman, or a poor child. In his book, “Seeing Like a State”, James Scott argues that certain kinds of seeing (e.g. state simplifications of complex phenomena) are necessary in order for the state to be able to organize and govern. In the case of the first quote above, for example, the official rhetoric of the state is that “there is no discrimination” (against women in the PNTL or FFDTL, or against the Petisionarios-FFDTL who left the armed forces in 2006.) At the level of political rhetoric/ideals, there is strong state support for equality, but in everyday reality and practice, classic patriarchy in the home, in village councils and national institutions which continue to be predominantly male and male-dominated provides little democratic space for women, except for a few elite women (e.g. at present there are 5 women in the Council of Ministers and 19 women MPs out of 65 MPs in Parliament). The crucial issue however is not “adding more women and stir” (at the elite level), but valuing, respecting, and recognizing the work the village peasant women, mothers, and girls as farmers, primary child and elderly-caregivers, community educators, household managers, peace-makers, who constitute the backbone of the nation-building process, but who in the current division of labour are tasks that are extremely under-valued, unpaid, and considered “inferior”. It will be very tragic indeed, but also a rather predictable pattern, which has already happened in other post-colonial societies, if political party machines only “use’ poor people to get power, instead of the other way around: poor people “using” political parties to improve their life conditions.

Not only is there a way of “seeing like a state”, there is also a style of “representing the state” through various mechanisms, among them

---

255 Timothy Mitchell makes a powerful analysis of this in his chapter on “Nobody Listens to a Poor Man”, 2002. On resilience and “speaking beyond trauma”, Sylvia Tiwon argues that there is a tendency to professionalize “victims” to speak trauma only, but not beyond. Engaging Spivak’s article “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Tiwon argues that the subaltern does speak, but we are not equipped, we do not have the capacity, patience, nor training to listen. She argues that subaltern women, in particular, do speak –but we do not listen. See Sylvia Tiwon, 2007, “Narratives of Women’s Experiences,” Paper presented to conference on “The Peace Process in Aceh,” Asia Center, Harvard University, Oct.24-27, 2007.

256 I am saying this also from a personal perspective of someone who lives in an “official state residence” (the home of the President of National Parliament in Farol) and is also disciplined by protocols of “state representation” when “appearing in public”, but is also
the increasing prominence given to militaristic parades during November 28 (declaration of Independence) and May 20 (restoration of Independence) each year. One of the representations of the new nation-state is that it is “mentally healthy”, inspite of the fact that numerous psycho-social reports, and even the current work-in-progress internal “State of the Nation” report acknowledges that many people continue to suffer from trauma (see for example the work of Pradet), post-traumatic stress disorder, and other health problems as a result of the crisis of 2006, and up to now have not had psychological counselling, or medical treatment for PNTL women, and ex-Falintil women for that matter, who continue to have bullet wounds in their bodies257. Another sensitive issue on which several sectors of the state seem to be “in denial” is corruption, the permeability of the state, and the porousness of borders (during our research on PNTL and FFDTL in the borders, we uncovered evidence, for example that TNI illegal businesses which existed during the Indonesian occupation, such as smuggling continue to this day). This paper attempts to look at some of the ways of seeing and narrating “like a state” and the counter-hegemonic narrative spaces from seeing like an ordinary person in the villages who are often unable to speak, or speak only with a great deal of trepidation, against state power.

In his analysis about “hegemony”, Gramsci argues that rather than viewing “civil society” as a limit upon or a counter-balance against state power, “the ensemble of organisms commonly called ’private’ “ – including civic associations and religious institutions – helps to maintain the power of the bourgeois state by facilitating rule through the mobilization of consent, or, in his terminology, hegemony, perhaps most commonly defined from his writings as “the spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group”258. Gramsci’s work sketches the continuous movement of an expanding capitalist class as it seeks, in a gradual fashion and with varying degrees of success, to absorb allied and even antagonistic groups into a dominant

privileged in observing and tracing some of the minute transformations in personnel and policy decision-making within the government.


bloc of social forces through a range of methods and mechanisms. Louis Althusser further elaborated the role of a plurality of private and public institutions – or “ideological state apparatuses” – in the mobilization and reproduction of consent. The process of mobilizing and reproducing consent, Althusser argued, involves the “interpellation” of the “individual as a [free] subject…in order that he shall [freely] accept his subjection”\textsuperscript{259}.

During the process of setting-up the “School of Democratic Economics” (SDE)\textsuperscript{260} in Timor-Leste, so as to introduce a new kind of governance and new methods of learning, the founder of SDE Hendro Sangkoyo, would often interrogate conventional methods of mapping: “Timor-Leste is a part of Maubara village. Not Maubara village is a part of Timor-Leste.” It can be argued that nation-building has been run primarily by a group of “old boys’ networks” and their “bureaucratic capital”, and that development administration has become increasingly centralized in Dili. The rhetorical structure of most public meetings is such that the hierarchical arrangement in society – from the highest ranking in descending order -- is also socially represented in the opening greetings: “Hau nia respeita ba Senyor Presidente, Presidente Parlamento, Primeiro Ministro…” from the most important person to the least important in descending order– a social representation of who is deemed “worthy” of taking up public space (predominantly men), who can speak, who can criticize. There is a paradox between the ideals of

\textsuperscript{259} Louis Althusser, 1984, Essays on Ideology.

\textsuperscript{260} The School of Democratic Economics (SDE) is a cross-border learning-network in Southeast Asia, founded by Dr. Hendro Sangkoyo, who is based in Jakarta. The SDE framework is based upon more than ten years of ethnographic fieldwork in different societies in Southeast Asia, providing an analytical framework for food-water-energy nexus on the theoretical and applied (local, national, and global) levels. At the social-praxis level, SDE has worked directly with villages, developing field schools, as well as collaborating with progressive scholars and economic policy-makers. SDE also facilitates curricular reform and course material development to reclaim the social-ecological in the modalities of economic expansion and in understanding the state of the crises in Southeast Asian countries (for example, to this day, most universities in Southeast Asia, including Timor-Leste, only teach neo-liberal economics.) SDE also works with government Ministries to develop a more inclusive, participatory, and consultative “National Development Plan”, which can sometimes be hijacked and held hostage by the hyper-fragmented nature of ministerial portfolios and the absence of vision and political will of key political figures and stakeholders.
democratization which is often lauded and the everyday reality of the continuing resilience of a traditional culture of hierarchy and "phenomena ema boot" (literally, "big people", are allowed to speak first) and also "ema matenek" (literally, "the intelligent ones", but it can also mean "those who think they know it all"), in descending order of importance in the state bureaucracy. This is not unusual to Timor-Leste – it was also the regime of order in the Malay world, in Aceh, in traditional hikayat, where everyone from the sultan to the slave knew their place, where to sit, which color can be worn by whom, and in what level of language one can address the "rulers".

This article is an attempt at articulating another "narrative space" - listening to the common sense analysis, embodied experiences, and perspectives of "ema kiik" (literally, "little people") - young and old women in rural villages, disempowered youth and students, and discriminated policewomen and military women –mostly articulated in whispered confidences, speaking with a great deal of trepidation, repressed speech, hidden transcripts, and unfulfilled speech acts.

The gap between the new methods of learning and the old ways of learning and governing are most evident, for example, in "Security Sector Reform" (SSR). The question of "human safety" and "national security" (which often prioritizes militarized security rather than food security) is often hijacked by so-called "alto nivel" (high level) government officials and their "expert advisors" (often excluding, if not marginalizing safety at the household and village levels). The budget for Defense for example (US$53.850 million) is larger than the budget for Education (US$51.359 million), in the July 2008 budget ratification. In a recent meeting on the “State of the Defence Sector”, the Secretary of State for Defence, Julio Tomas Pinto, spoke of the importance of making as wide a consultation as possible ("halo consultasaun ba ema barak") in formulating a National Security Policy (Politika Seguransa Nasional). In practice however, even key leaders in civil society organizations, for example Jose Luis Oliveira in Assosiasaun Hak, expressed strong

concern that they do not even have any access to, have not seen nor read,
nor have any idea about what Forsa 2020 is about (the Defence Plan
2020) produced by the Ministry of Defence. One of the predominant
ideas about “security”, outlined in the Forsa 2020, but also in current
state and even civil society discussions, is that Timor-Leste needs high-
tech equipment and military, naval, coastguard resources to guard its
most “valuable” resource in the sea: oil. But can you really guard the oil
with armed forces? Even if Timor-Leste invested all its money to buy
more military equipment, it could still not compete with Australia and
Indonesia – whose military might is far superior. Would it not be better
to focus on negotiations with Australia? In withdrawing from the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and unilaterally issuing
licences, Australia has shown greedy contempt for international law.262
A similar situation exists with regards to “weak” negotiations vis-à-vis
Indonesia, in terms of “Truth and Reconciliation”: when Acehnese who
wanted to learn from the TRC experience of East Timor, asked a PNTL
officer, Agent Inacio Leto Mali Soares, why the Timor-Leste government
does not have the political will to push for the Indonesian Generals to go
to prison for their crimes against humanity, he responded: “Because
almost 100% of the goods that make up our basic needs are imported
from Indonesia.” Hendro Sangkoyo notes that this kind of “common
sense wisdom if not genius,” as in the example above, often takes two
years for other so-called “scientific experts” to research, but for ordinary
people struggling to survive – this sharp economic insight comes from
socially-embedded, embodied everyday experience.

1 - New methods of local and international
collaboration not based on domination?

Economic development and the formulation of a “National
Development Plan” is also often assigned to a small group of “ema
matenek elite,” with a propensity to depend on the World Bank, IMF,

262 For in-depth analysis of the negotiations between Timor-Leste and Australia, see reports
by NGOs such as Lao Hamotuk, ETAN, Haburas; also, Kathryn Kamsi, “A Settlement to
the Timor Sea Dispute?,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, Volume IX, No.4, Fall 2005.
UNDP and other advisors. Yet writing about the IMF and WB, Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist in the WB and Adviser to former President Clinton writes: “the IMF casts itself as the monopoly supplier of “sound” advice…” but “such organizations are opaque rather than transparent, and not only does far too little information radiate from inside to the outside world, perhaps even less information from outside is able to penetrate the organization. The opaqueness also means that it is hard for information from the bottom of the organization to percolate to the top”263.

In the current government, in spite of the political will of Aliança Maioria Parlamentaria (AMP) to promote the nationalist idea of “Ita Timor oan moos bele” (“We Timorese can also do this,” the words of the Prime Minister, Xanana Gusmao, often cited by the Minister of Economy and Development, and the Commission on Research and Development responsible for designing the “Relatorio do Estado da Nasaun” upon which the “Plano Desenvolvimento Nasional” (National Development Plan) will be based), in practice, it is not only a question of “changing of guards” or personnel, but a more fundamental problem of a continuum of similar paradigms. It is instructive to return to and reflect upon Frantz Fanon’s diagnosis in “The Wretched of the Earth”: colonial rulers leave, but they are replaced by the national elite who may be indigenous, but because they are products of anti-democratic colonial systems and of colonial mentality, will continue to think and behave like their previous colonizers, unless a process of de-colonization of the mind is initiated. While the AMP government’s identification of “2008 National Priorities”264 (written for them with assistance from the WB) looks ideal on paper, it remains to be seen how the gap between state power idealism and its implementation in the rural districts, especially amongst groups that are often left-out, will unfold. There is also always this lurking spectre of how much sense of “national ownership” the Timorese government and other stakeholders have over these “ideal” plans designed together with international agencies and advisers.

Ironically, key leaders in the government often talk about “primeira vez Timor oan halo” (the first time that Timorese are making this) – i.e. the current State of the Nation Report and National Development Plan – focusing primarily on “race” and on people, but not on problematic systems and structures. In an informal conversation I had with a high-ranking UN official, he (Finn Riske Nielsen, UN Deputy SRSG) noted: “It seems that members of Parliament and the government hardly know anything about the Petroleum Fund.” In December 2008, through the School of Democratic Economics, I organized a Seminar on the Petroleum Fund in the Universidade Nacional Timor-Leste, where a member of the PF Advisory Board Council, Francisco Vasconcelos and Researcher from Luta Hamutuk, Tomas Freitas, gave presentations. During that discussion, we were able to identify the gaps in terms of students, civil society, Parliament’s, and government’s knowledge about the Petroleum Fund.

Another example of the gap between state ideals and everyday reality is on “border control” and the importance of the role of the security institutions (i.e. police and military) in stopping illegal border activities. In everyday practice, however, smuggling and other illegal activities, including the continuum of TNI illegal businesses continue to be rife, with the involvement of PNTL forces. For poor women in Oecussi, smuggling is the only way to survive, as the prices of imported goods continue to rise. The borders as a productive, not just a state-disciplining site, for all kinds of trade and exchange activities, but also of violence, continues to be a complex phenomenon which is under-studied in Timor-Leste. As one example, the current Unit Commander of Unidade Patrolha Fronteira (Border Patrol Unit) dismissed 33 female PNTL in UPF, apparently for no reason, other than that “they are female and unsuitable for the tasks involved in the UPF, and that the conditions and infrastructure does not allow females to work on the borders.” We conducted interviews with female PNTL ex-UPF, now posted in Maliana, who were very angry about their arbitrary dismissal. Apparently, the Commander did not even send them a formal letter of dismissal nor an explanation for why they were being removed from UPF. High-level males who are

in charge of policy and administration continued the refrain of justification that the infrastructural conditions in the borders are not suitable for women (i.e. lack of toilets for women, separate rooms for women). However, the women PNTL argued that it is not a question of them asking to be provided with female toilets, it is a problem of their male Commander suddenly dismissing them without notice and explanation (the previous two male Commanders before him were supportive of women). Furthermore, they argued that they want to work in challenging conditions, and had undergone the rigorous physical training for UPF, in the expectation that they would be working under difficult conditions. For one Commander to decide by himself that they (33 PNTL women) are “a vulnerable group” and should be taken-out of UPF was “unacceptable” to them.

More interesting, however, is that what seemed like a “gender issue” primarily, turns out to be a “corruption” problem: when we cross-checked with a high-level official about this “border problem”, he informed us that the border is “ripe” with all kinds of possibilities for making money, smuggling, human trafficking of young Timorese girls to TNI officials, and other illegal activities (with the involvement of high-ranking Police officers, including in Immigration). We asked him: “Is it possible that the women were taken out in order to enable these activities to continue? Were the women also involved in these money-making illegal activities, or were they kept out?” One of the problems we identified is that specific policemen who were already police under the Indonesian occupation, seem to have continued “normalized corruption” to this day. It would indeed be very difficult to “reform” them, unless someone could come up with a reform system that could de-colonize their minds, mentality, attitudes, and behaviors, and provide them with higher salaries so that they would be more sustainable and not be “vulnerable to corruption”.

In the process of conducting research to set up the School of Democratic Economics in rural villages, Hendro Sangkoyo asked the question: “What is the most pressing, crucial, stressful issue that keeps you awake at night, that makes husbands and wives in this village fight? What are the new forms of domination that makes your community want to resist?” We
received a wide range of answers – from the recent increase in rice prices (from US$13 to US$25, with the government providing a subsidy that has brought it down in some districts to US$17); increase in fuel prices; the lack of access to clean water; reports of political violence experienced by villagers during the recent Operasaun Conjunta (conducted by PNTL and FFDTL in search of the “rebels”); to female teachers in rural schools wondering if local/indigenous mother tongues (e.g. Kemak, in Atabae) can represent knowledge/s (as opposed to the pervasive colonial mentality that only Portuguese, Indonesian, English and other foreign languages can express “higher knowledge”). Can indigenous mother tongues/local languages represent knowledge and what are the impacts of this in many different fronts? If local languages (and there are approximately 32) are given the narrative space to express and produce new knowledge, one impact is that ordinary people in the rural districts can grab the governance (economic, political, linguistic, socio-ecological) into their own hands. The idea for creating cross-border collaborative learning spaces is to engender new methods of learning (as the hierarchical, anti-democratic, and colonial methods have not only been ineffective, but damaging). In effect, most of the work that teachers now have to do within East Timor (whether in formal or informal schools, at the primary to tertiary levels) is to first “de-colonize the mind” (as Ngugi wa Thiongo would phrase it.)

Hendro Sangkoyo argues that when he presented the SDE framework to intellectual and political elite audiences in the urban cities of Southeast Asia, they often complained that it was “too complicated”, “too sophisticated” and difficult. However, whenever he presented it to audiences in the rural villages, women in particular often grasped the food-water-energy nexus at the local-national-regional and global levels immediately: because they are often responsible for everyday survival for their families. I am making a parallel argument about “political economy” with that of “security”: ordinary mothers of small children are often preoccupied about safety in the household level and security in the neighborhood and community level, if not the national level. And yet, for some reason, in the recent history of Timor-Leste, “security” has been hijacked by “international security experts/advisers”, a small group of predominantly male elite who often make decisions behind closed doors,
without conducting a broader process of “consulta” (which has a different meaning in the Latin American context, closer to “referendum”, but different from the English “consultation”). One of the serious questions to be asked about nation-building is this: what happens when there is an increasing political (not just geographical) distance (whether real or imagined) between the women, young girls, elderly women in the villages who are in reality, in charge of everyday survival – from human safety to food security, resistance against domination, and resilience – to the small group of men in Dili in charge of key national institutions to whom almost all key decision-making in this country are centralized? What happens when young female students and female PNTL and FFDTL from the rural districts fall silent, give in to domination, marginalization, and discrimination, because they feel they have no agency to resist, their voices are not listened to, and they begin to believe that they have no capacity to effect any change in their local communities, transformation in the national leadership, or push for reform in institutions? For example, one “regime of truth” that continues to be pervasive and almost un-questioned is that the F-FDTL (military) is the “symbol of affirmation of independence, symbol of pride” (“simbolo de afirmasaun da independencia, simbolo de orgulho” – Brig. Gen. Taur Matan Ruak’s words). Any critical questioning of some military personnel, for example, who “act above the law”, especially during the 2006 crisis266 and the recent Operasaun Conjunta to “capture” the rebels, in terms of violations of human rights, is considered almost unacceptable. The rhetoric of “this is a liberation army of the people”, prevails – a rhetoric which enacts its own symbolic violence in its capacity to sustain a “regime of truth” that makes it impossible for its victims to raise questions.

At a meeting in the rural district of Atabae to celebrate the 6th Commemoration of the Restoration of Independence on May 20, 2008, villagers asked questions, posed criticisms to, and gave recommendations to the President of Parliament, Members of Parliament, and Secretaries of State. Out of a total of 15 questions/recommendations from villagers, only 2 were from women, and only after I had whispered

---

266 See for example the UN Commission on Investigation Report on the 2006 crisis.
to the district organizer: “Is this an all-male dialogue?” – at which point he stood up and asked the moderator if there were questions from the women. The final question was from a young woman, a primary school teacher, who gave a poignant and powerful explanation about her dilemma in reference to the current language policy. Her question was: “We are being told that the educational curriculum should be taught in Tetun and Portuguese. But what about our local mother tongue (lingua materna) – Kemak – can’t we express and represent knowledge in Kemak too? The problem is that some of the villagers do not understand Tetun well, let alone Portuguese. So what do we do?” This problem is pervasive in the districts and in Dili, and not only in the village schools, but in the university. In a focused-group-discussion we conducted with Lecturers in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, UNTL, Hendro Sangkoyo and I identified several crucial problems, among them: 1/ a highly extractive research industry that values “external experts” and inferiorizes local intellectual and social capital, treating Timorese primarily as “research assistants”; 2/ a continuing dependence on Bahasa Indonesia as the language for writing thesis and research papers and simultaneously, a politics of citation that is highly dependent on Indonesian-language references (almost to the total exclusion of other languages). Perhaps this comes from a severe lack of confidence, even insecurity, if not a colonial mentality of inferiority that has no confidence in Oral History, Timorese languages and local mother tongues as a “gold mine” for the production of new knowledge. This is not unique to Timor-Leste. It also occurred in Vietnam and the Philippines after independence, with many nationalists framing our previous education under the colonial regimes as a “mis-education” (in the Philippine context, see for example the writings of Renato Constantino, Jose Rizal). When Lecturers in UNTL think of “theory” and “theorizing” they primarily refer to and cite Indonesian writers/thinkers translating the works of other European or American intellectuals to Bahasa Indonesia. When we offered other possibilities on what “theory” means, what “theorizing” is about, i.e. that villager’s common sense ideas about the economy or about security are as relevant, if not more so, than the so-called “scientific expert from New York”, and that “Oral History” and local languages are primary sources for representing knowledge, they were amazed. They are used to anthropologists and linguists objectifying folk culture and valuing local
knowledge in the village, but not in taking control and determining what kind of solid research agenda to pursue for the long term, and which research questions are relevant to the Timorese context.

In effect, we felt that the first thing we had to do was deconstruct, unpack, if not destroy the structure of colonial mentality first, i.e. decolonize the mind, before we could even proceed to other arenas. Teaching young girls and women in Timor-Leste is especially challenging: they hardly attend meetings in the villages (they are often delegated to do the cooking and serving tea and coffee) and/or hardly speak in the meetings. Yet when they are given the opportunity to speak, it is often the case that they give the sharpest analysis of economic and/or security problems in the village level or the national level, as they struggle to balance breast-feeding in public meetings while at the same time articulating the shape of violence in their communities. Listening to their narratives and learning how to read silences gives us a very different idea of the shape of violence and domination in Timor-Leste.

2 - New Methods of learning about Human Safety, Security and Resilience: From “High-Level” to “Common Sense”

On the road while conducting research (through interviews, focused-group discussions, compilation of documents) on SDE, dance and resilience, and women in the PNTL and F-FDTL, I reflected on extreme opposites: what would “national security” and “security sector reform” look like if it was not just formulated by an exclusive group of “alto nivel” (high level) security bureaucrats, advisers, and “experts”, but was more inclusive, consultative, participatory and included, for example, mothers who are concerned for the safety and security of their children? How would women and mothers write a “national security policy” or a “police reform policy” – while simultaneously watching over their children, making sure they do not get into an accident, providing “food security” (which is often prioritized at the bottom,
while “militarized security” is on top) for everyone in the household, working to stop violence in their neighborhoods? Would a mother trust a “rule of experts” and “advisers” at the “alto nivel”, who intentionally exclude her and the rest of the population from any “high level” meetings about security? If a road-map for a “national security policy” were made, without consulting women in the PNTL and F-FDTL, mothers, children, ex-Falintil women, and other groups in civil society, can that “national security policy” be truly called “representative” of people’s assessments of their own sources of security and insecurity? Why is it that ordinary people who have so much to offer are continually being marginalized, and instead we keep going back to the same politicians, bureaucrats, and mainstream thinkers?

Continuing with this sociological imagination on “extreme opposite”, one might reflect on what would happen if the statistics from PNTL and F-FDTL were inverted? What if there were 2613 female PNTL and only 581 male PNTL? What if there were 645 female F-FDTL and only 61 male F-FDTL? No doubt that the policies would be very different. For example, maternity leave would probably be 12 months or more (and with pay), rather than 3 months (as currently exists in PNTL) or 6 months (in F-FDTL). There would most definitely be a childcare center in the institutions to support the work of the “Female Commanders and Generals”. According to the official statistics from the PNTL Human Resources, there are 581 policewomen in the PNTL. 2613 male policemen totalling: 3194. The large majority of women are in the lowest ranks (which means a very small minority are involved in key-decision making, if any.) The highest rank a female has achieved in the PNTL is Inspector. There is only one female Inspector (Inspector Umbelina in the PNTL Headquarters), compared to 22 male Inspectors (only in the PNTL HQ in Dili). There are a few female Sub-Inspectors, but the large majority of women are Agents and Recruit Agents. The minimum qualification for recruitment is completing SMA (High School Degree). The large majority of them have stayed in the same initial position after recruitment (i.e. have not been promoted at all) for as long as 7 years. According to the official statistics from the F-FDTL Human Resources, there are currently (after the 2006 crisis) 61 women F-FDTL, in the midst of 645 men in the F-FDTL. The majority of them are in the
rank of “soldado/soldiers”. The highest rank achieved by females is Second Sargent (there are about 7 women in this rank).

As one critically reflects on the problem that everybody and their uncle involved in formulating the “national security policy”, “security sector reform” and “peacekeeping” are predominantly male (from the government leaders, their security “experts and advisers”, to the PNTL, F-FDTL, UN Police, International “Stabilization” Forces (ISF), church leaders, and gang leaders), one begins to wonder: has it always been this way? A parallel argument can be made for “economic development”. Is there or was there no alternate history of women’s participation in the politics of safety and security, and resilience in the process of nation-building? When people talk about “safety” (keselamatan), do they include in their paradigm, village women who are often responsible for the food security and physical survival of their families in an everyday basis? When they discuss “security”, are women ex-combatants (e.g. Falintil veterans) who played such an important role during the struggle for independence, and made huge life sacrifices including giving up their own possibilities for education, romance, individual growth, included or excluded? Are the “feto balun” (the widows) of the PNTL and F-FDTL who were killed in May 2006 and their children, and their perspectives on “safety and security” included? Are the wife and children of Salsinha, and the widow of Alfredo included? What about the analyses of women F-FDTL and PNTL who joined the Operasaun Konjunta? In times of crisis, are those who are feminised portrayed and/or are constituted as needing to be benevolently protected by militarized masculinities? Are the dominant males and predominantly male peacekeeping forces really providing security or are they just putting on a spectacle of “performing security”?267 The government, UN, INGOs, and NGOs continually hold seminars, briefings, and the British government (through DFID) has provided support for police reform, while the US government has sent advisors to the military. Portugal and Australia are also heavily involved in “security sector reform”. What is interesting about many of the discussions and reports is that they are mostly gender-blind, and almost

267 I say “predominantly males” and “male-dominated” because there are very few women actually involved in the UN Police and ISF operations in East Timor.
always exclude women, except for a few token “media representatives” to represent “gender balance” 268.

Conclusion

The story of “brave warriors, betrayed revolutions” in a “new battlefield” is not a new story. In fact, most revolutions in the modern world have been sadly disappointing in their erosion of egalitarian ideals and practices after the struggles for independence. We have yet to learn thoughtfully across conflicts. We see the same depressing, repetitive, but instructive narratives unfolding in several armed movements in the Third World, especially in South and Southeast Asia, such as in “post-conflict” Aceh (with GAM “claiming” sole representation) 269, the LTTE (Sri Lanka), the Maoist Communist Party (Nepal)...where women within the party and women’s groups outside are questioning the legitimacy of these male-dominated armed groups claiming to be the “sole representative” of the struggles for social justice in their societies. Sondra Hale, an anthropologist and radical feminist who has worked for a long time in Eritrea and Sudan, teaches us 270 about the highly instructive example of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (ETLF) in Eritrea: having been so radical and idealistic, were completely captivated during the revolution by the writings and ideas of Alexandra Kollontay and Rosa Luxemburg 271, but once the war was over and Eritrea became independent, ideals became eroded.


269 See also Jacqueline Siapno, 2006, “The Bitter Taste of Victory”.

270 Correspondence, Professor Sondra Hale, Dept. of Anthropology and Women’s Studies, UCLA, November 2006.

271 For an illuminating analysis of Alexandra Kollontay and Rosa Luxemburg’s critique of Lenin, see James Scott’s “The Revolutionary Party: A Plan and a Diagnosis”.

208
The story is not just that of the ETLF and Eritrea. It is instructive because other independence struggles after war seem to be going down this path such as the case of Aceh (under GAM leadership) and possibly East Timor. I cite the comparative discussions above to historically contextualize the formation of women within police forces and militaries, and at the same time to understand the formation of “masculinities” as production/s and construction/s of particular societies.

What we need in perpetual conflict environments like East Timor is not more Australian or Portuguese, UN and ISF, PNTL or FFDTL armed forces patrolling in the streets and supermarkets, but learning from and listening to increasingly marginalized youth in the rural areas, gang leaders, elderly women and men who hold significant village historical memories on ecological and cosmological systems. Alternative approaches to stronger diplomacy – not being dominated again by the two neighboring countries (Australia and Indonesia), having a quite confidence about sovereignty, rather than displaying machismo in military parades every May 20 and November 28, would be a much healthier reflection on designing a nation-state, rather than repeating the same mistakes in other countries such as Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam whose distorted and narrow understandings of “nationalism” crippled our learning processes.

In this regard, it is absolutely necessary, for our survival, to begin new methods of learning, new methods of governance, new methods of international and local collaboration – to learn from local knowledge, cosmologies, and paradigms on human safety and security. To engender a politics that is about promoting socio-ecological integrity - more of a dance like Sau Batar, an art, a way of harmonizing with nature, rather than a killing spree, or domination, is the challenge we face, if we are to...

---

272 For a fascinating analysis of gangs and so-called “martial arts groups” in East Timor, see for example, Gaku Homma Sensei, 2008, “Bujutsu Fighting Gangs in East Timor”. This is an important analysis that should be read more widely amongst government policy-makers, in terms of how to resolve the conflict amongst martial arts groups in Timor-Leste.

273 See for example, J.S. Furnivall, 1956 Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India. New York University Press.
survive sustainably into the future in East Timor and in Southeast Asia more generally. It is certainly a lot less costly and more sustainable, than spending a huge proportion of the national budget on militarized security and defense (larger than the budget for Education), and marginalizing socio-ecological integrity and ethics. The poverty of our imagination has prevented us from reflecting on the disastrous consequences of our incapacity to heal or even begin to acknowledge that which has been broken and destroyed. It is a lot healthier for the national psyche and emotional healing when we focus on producing new knowledge and new methods of learning and teaching in the villages, with ordinary girls, women, and peasants producing their own assessments about safety, security, and resilience, rather than knowledge and power being hijacked by an exclusive "alto-nivel" elite, and dependency on an external “rule of experts”.
Women of the FFDTL. © Jacqueline Siapno.
Woman from the former clandestine movement. © Jacqueline Siapno.
Thinking about tourism in Timor-Leste in the era of sustainable development. A tourism policy emerging from grass-roots levels

Christine Cabasset-Semedo

It is impossible to speak of tourism in Timor-Leste without first recalling the terrible shape of the country in 1999 –witness the many destroyed buildings still standing today- and the numerous challenges, such as the strengthening of institutions, agriculture, health, education, etc., that the State of Timor-Leste has faced since the withdrawal of the Indonesian army and the advent of the country’s independence on May 20, 2002. As in many “developing” countries, tourism in Timor-Leste appears to be one of the few activities likely to be developed in regions little equipped to that effect, and to provide income opportunities not only to the State but also to individuals and communities bearing little or no qualifications in that regard. Several factors encourage the State on this path. The main external factor is the growth of international tourism, in particular in the Asia-Pacific region which constitutes since 2002 the second largest tourist region –especially leaded by Northeast and Southeast Asia- in the world, behind Europe. Internal factors are connected to the socio-economic realities of the country where jobs and potential economic resources for the population have become priorities. Thus tourism has been considered by all successive governments as a means to develop the country’s economy and to fight poverty. But the country’s lack of visibility, and several undermining events – such as the
crisis of 2006, the tensions connected to the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2007, the double attacks against President José Ramos Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao in February 2008-explain why very few international “tourists” have made it to Timor-Leste up until now. According to the World Tourism Organisation, “tourism” is defined by all the activities carried out by persons during their travels or stays in places located outside of their usual environment for a consecutive period of no longer than one year, for leisure, business, or other goals not connected to the carrying out of an income generating activity in the visited location. In the absence of tourism statistics, we do not know the number of “tourists” arriving in Timor-Leste. Between 2003 and 2005, 3,000 to 4,500 foreign visitors were estimated to arrive annually for tourist purposes. As of late, the strong development of hotel, restaurant, and entertainment businesses, especially in the capital Dili, is primarily due to the presence of foreign workers in Timor-Leste since 1999 (United Nations, embassies, NGOs, etc.). These international residents provide the main support to the budding leisure and tourist activities. As in many other countries/regions which recently started their own brand of local tourism, its on site development in Timor is mostly the works of the private sector, including Timorese nationals especially outside of Dili.

The country had a short history of tourism from the end of the 1960s up until 1975; in 1972, it welcomed almost 5000 international tourists, especially from Australia. The recent re-opening of the country to tourism is taking place in the era of sustainable development. Increased attention is thus given to natural habitats, to local communities, and to the fight against “poverty”. “Demands” must now also address those of global warming, of CO2 emissions, of economic realities, and of natural resources’ improved management (water in particular) in the most vulnerable countries. Tourism is undergoing

important changes with hotels and hotel chains following green policies (such as the decrease in energy consumption) and with the development of other forms of tourism since the 1990’s (adventure tourism, eco-tourism, ethical tourism, etc.) These types of tourism emphasize smaller accommodation units and greater involvement and control from local populations, and a strong link to other existing socio-economic sectors, as local agriculture. Community-based tourism, but also “ecolodges” following, from the most basic to the most luxurious, different levels of social and/or environmental policies, have risen in different parts of the world. Beyond the recurrent pro and con debate around the construction of “big hotel”, tourism faces more than ever the following challenges: how to innovate, how to manage local resources, what related part shall be played by local populations, how to insure a smooth interaction between international tourism, a “modern” state, local powers, and traditional values. In Timor-Leste, the preservation of natural resources and of cultural heritage, the defense of natural environment, and the promotion of sustainable development are written in the Constitution, but with almost no more details than that. Timor’s first national park, the Nino Konis Santana park located in the Eastern part of the country, was set up in 2007 and was placed in the V category of IUCN – long term interaction between man and nature and upkeep of human activities – with eco-tourism as a foreseeable activity. For the time being, tourism in Timor shows two main traits: on the one hand, that it is rather “virginal” outside of Dili (the coastline, a privileged tourist area, offers only a small number of rooms, with few of them meeting international standards’ requirements), and, on the other hand, that it benefits from initiatives and actors -often small entrepreneurs- directly or indirectly connected to tourism. This article will focus on the latter as they make up the traditional backbone of tourism worldwide aside from major tourist attractions, and as they are essential players in the emerging tourist industry of Timor-Leste.

---

276 IUCN, 1994, Guidelines for protected areas Management categories.
1 - Tourism: a political and socio-economic stake

The idea that tourism has a role to play in East Timor's development is quite old. In the short pre and post 1999 referendum periods, several conferences – i.e. Algarve/Portugal, October 1998; Melbourne, 5-9 April 1999; Tibar/East Timor, 30 May-2 June 2000; Brisbane, 20-21 July 2000- were held on the perspectives of economic development. Because the excuse of the non-viability of the country was for a long time used to justify the Indonesian occupation and to halt to the process of self determination, the main concern was then to examine the means at the country’s disposal to insure its economic viability. The main goals of the policies of the economic development planned by the CNRT seemed at the time to be the building of a market economy with the help of the local private sector and of foreign investments, and the urgent development of rural areas through the increase of existing agricultural resources and the diversification, owing mostly to tourism, of rural economies. A consistent theme expressed through these conferences was “the need to develop sustainable tourism, based on natural and cultural resources of the country, and developed by local communities for local community – economically and culturally- growth”. In this spirit, the Tibar conference conclusion was as follows: “If we are not to be an aid-dependent country in the future, we must be proactive. If we do not take the initiative, external investors will determine our tourism future, with profits leaking offshore. Our communities will merely be employees, not owners”.

These few aims reflect an international context influenced by the concept of sustainable development and tourism. They show a concern to favour a kind of tourism which would primarily benefit Timorese nationals. Nevertheless, while fully involved in the country's “Reconstruction” – mainly in its physical and institutional tasks - the

UNTAET government did not implement this tourist policy though in 2002 the National Development Plan had identified tourism as one of the means to reach general development and to fight poverty. The pages relating to this (p. 249-254) show very generalized aims reflecting more “what a tourism strategy ought to be” in the minds of representatives of the international consultants than what realities on a local level are. The first goal given the Direction of tourism, “To build a tourism industry in East Timor that generates employment and maintain culture”, results, because of its extreme vagueness, in a country where international tourism is almost unknown, in the recourse to two other objectives: 1) to attract foreign investment which could increase the number of tourists and consequently generate direct and indirect employment; 2) to give the Direction of tourism the major role of insuring the promotion of the country in order to render it attractive to tourists and investors. True, the Plan suggested that the Direction of tourism help coordinate the improvement of the infrastructures (water and sewerage networks, telephone connections) including those dedicated to tourism (number of rooms, etc.). But the overall results revealed a focus more on the Direction of tourism's mission to promote tourism, than on parallel efforts to initiate the “building” of tourist activity and the implementation of related goals with the country’s different actors and communities. The apparent discrepancy between the National Development Plan and local realities (not only in the tourism sector) resulted in the new 2007 government’s will to work on the drafting of a new document taking into account the “real needs” of the country.280

The first conference of the post independence era called “Turismo em Timor-Leste: Vias para o futuro”, which was organized on 24-25 April 2003 in Dili, saw the entrance of the country in the “family” of international tourism through the welcoming of the first official delegations of the World Tourist Organization (UNWTO) and of the Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA). Changing the image of the country and rendering it visible on the international scene became priorities. The country received some media coverage, especially during

its first participation to the PATA Travel Mart, one of the main annual international tourist fairs in the Asian-Pacific region, in Singapore in October 2003 - an event in which Timor-Leste has taken part every year since. Between 2002 and 2005, tourism was connected to the ministry of the development and the environment in the State secretary of tourism, environment, and investment. As a result Mari Alkatiri, who was then prime minister, emphasized in his introduction speech during this first conference the strong connection between these 3 sectors and the State’s wish that the country set an example of sustainable development in tourism as well. However, the fact that the State Secretary of tourism was, at that time, in charge of the environment, of investments, but also of mining resources and of oil and gas undermined the importance given to this goal. Moreover, the budget allocated to the Direction of tourism was extremely small during the first years of the post independence era, as almost all of it was dedicated to the payment of employees’ salaries: 2003-04: 43,000 US$; 2004-05: 56,000 US$. With 248,000 US$ for the year 2006-07, the Direction of tourism saw a considerable increase in its budget as an extra 100,000 US$ was allocated on top of the initial budget as a “national contribution” for works initiated in 2006 with the UNWTO. This weak budget resulted from the many greater priorities –agriculture, education, health, water, etc. – confronting the State and from the lack of development of concrete policies beyond that of attracting foreign investments.

Deprived of consistent means to dedicate to this sector, the State turned its attention to the training of personnel within the national Direction of tourism, a priority in a country where access to education, training, and more generally to jobs carrying more responsibility was for a long time very marginal for Timor nationals. The State also focused on

---

281 Government changes in July 2005 led to the removal of tourism from the Secretary upon which it depended and its placement under the Ministry of development. Following the parliamentary elections of June 2007 and the change in government in August, tourism was placed under the responsibility of the new Ministry of tourism, commerce, and industry.

communication in order to improve the image of the country and attract tourists and investors. The strategy was then to view the arrival of foreign investment as a means to generate structural improvements needed by the country and to provide employment in significant numbers. The participation of the country to the PATA Travel Mart, the launching in 2004 of the official tourist web site\textsuperscript{283}, the creation in 2005 of TradeInvest (an agency supporting foreign investment), the implementation of external investment law (May 2005)\textsuperscript{284}, etc. bear witness to this endeavour. These efforts contributed to the feeding of quasi-permanent rumors –the main media in Timor- regarding the “imminent” arrival of huge projects, of great resorts, and even, for example, of a casino on the island of Atauro. However, next to these enticement efforts, fundamental questions such as those regarding ownership titles, banking credits, insurance for companies, etc. remained unresolved. Moreover, except for the Northern road, road infrastructure remained rather mediocre, and the population’s access to drinking water or electricity was far from general (45% of the rural population has access to drinking water, 35% to a sewerage network, and 10% to electricity \textsuperscript{285}). A support to national entrepreneurship was for a while contemplated, as shown by the creation of the agency IADE Instituto de Apoio do Desenvolvimento Empresarial (2005) or by the law on internal investment (May 2005), but it bore little connection to tourism.

The political and military crisis of 2006, with its civil war climate, a thousand burnt houses in Dili, 150,000 displaced people, the paralysis of the State apparatus, and an international military intervention, has shed a light not only on important dysfunctions, but also on the weariness of grassroots people, mainly those living in the districts. A gap was increased between Dili and the rest of the country. The heavy centralization of expenditure management, weak capacity in ministries, and inexistence of effective disbursement system to send funds to the

\textsuperscript{283} www.turismotimorleste.com
\textsuperscript{284} RDTL-Government, “Draft law on external investment” approved on May 2, 2005 and implemented on 27 May 2005; and “Law on domestic investment”, approved on May 9, 2005 and implemented on May 27, 2005.
districts explain the slow budget execution on a general level and, specifically in the districts, a lack of funds to support national programs or local service delivery\textsuperscript{286}.

The elections of 2007 – presidential elections in April-May and parliamentary elections in June – resulted in the eviction of Fretilin from all the power centers. During the political campaign, the main parties focused on “poor people” -José Ramos Horta campaign motto was “a president for poor people”; the slogan of his opponent Fretilin, José Guterres “Lu Olo”, was “president of the people for the people”-, and in particular on access of the population to basic services (water, electricity, roads, health, etc.). José Ramos Horta was finally elected as President of the Republic with 69.2% of the second round votes, thanks to the rallying of the main opposition parties\textsuperscript{287}. Former president Xanana Gusmao, who became Prime minister, headed the fourth government led by the Alliance for Parliamentary Majority (CNRT, PD, PSD, ASDT), and Fernando “Lasama” de Araujo, leader of the Democratic Party (PD) embodying the “new generation”, became president of Parliament. To distance itself from its immediate predecessors, the fourth government (August 2007) emphasized, in the presentation of its program and the interim budget, the necessity for the State to carry-out great works to renovate or build infrastructures, to provide support to existing activities and actors, and to attract foreign investors\textsuperscript{288}. Construction of these infrastructures is essential because, as more than half of the population has no access to water, it will be hard to justify the arrival of water pipes for the sole benefit of hotels\textsuperscript{289}.

In a country listed since 2002 as one of the Least Advanced Countries and ranked at number 140 on the Human Development Index of world countries, where each revenue usually feeds close to 10 persons, tourism also becomes a socio-economy challenge. Aside from agriculture


\textsuperscript{287} Cabasset-Semedo Christine and Durand Frédéric, 2007, “Les élections présidentielles de 2007 à Timor-Leste.”

\textsuperscript{288} Agencia de noticias LUSA, 15/09/2007.

-80% of the active population is involved in small farms agriculture- and public services (6% of the active population), job and income opportunities are rather slim while new needs are appearing daily, as with education for example. The creation of jobs is also required by the presence of a very young population (in 2004, 55% of the population is under 20) and by the fact that the 2004 census revealed that the country has the highest birth rate in the world (7.8 children per woman). The related natural growth index, amounting to 3% per year, will see Timor’s population (924,000 persons in 2004) double by 2022\(^{290}\). If poverty, which results mainly from a difficult access to basic services (water, electricity, health care centers, transportation of people and goods), affects mostly rural populations, urban populations of Dili and Baucau are faced with a very high unemployment rate. The district of Dili, which concentrates the bulk of the country’s political, administrative, and economic activities, offers greater employment opportunities outside the agricultural field, mainly because of the presence of the United Nations and other agencies – more than 14% of the district’s active population versus 3.8% for the country at large\(^{291}\). This explains in part the quick demographic growth that the district, and especially the capital, has known between 2001 and 2004 (from 120,000 to 175,000 people). As it concentrates the largest part of the education field with around 20 “universities”, Dili is home to a great number of young people. This fact greatly influenced their involvement in the crisis the country faced in 2006. It is estimated that 14,000 young people arrive annually on the job market while only 400 jobs are created each year.

The country nevertheless has the means to develop itself because of important oil and gas resources. However, this sector is unable to become a major source of employment. The public sector, with great works such as the building of roads, schools, hospitals, etc., and the private sector, which includes tourism, may help achieve an economic growth outside of oil and gas and offer job opportunities.


2 - Initiatives of private entrepreneurs in tourism

The rising of tourist and leisure activities is connected to the peculiar context of the presence of the United Nations: the arrival to Timor-Leste in 1999 of thousands of workers connected to the humanitarian crisis and the temporary administration mandate given to the United Nations (UNTAET) resulted in the rapid growth of the hotel and restaurant business. Dili saw the reinforcement of its role as the political, administrative and economic centre. The city has especially benefited from this huge international presence. The country in 2006 had more than 1,300 hotel rooms, 84% of which located in the capital. The great majority of the clientele is made of employees of the United Nations, embassies, NGOs, cooperation agencies, etc., who most of the time arrive for long term missions (more than a year). As a result, the activity resembles a kind of tourism for locals. The influence of these foreign residents on tourism is important since they have stayed since 1999 with family and friend visiting often. They have become the main support of connected activities such as craftsmanship. A small number of foreign tourists had visited the country between 2003 and 2005. It included 1975-1999 activists and tourists who, for some, had come before 1975, individuals attracted to the novelty of the destination who came for a short stay from Bali or Australia in order to scuba dive (for example) or who arrived within the framework of organized travels (i.e. the tour operator Intrepid Travel / Australia).

Alongside a few hotels that made it through Timor’s contemporary history since the Portuguese colonization, such as The Dili, The Resende (destroyed in 2002), The Turismo, the Timor, many other hotels were built as of 1999, in the city centre but also on the road to the airport, on the water front, towards the East (Bidau-Areia branca), and towards the West (embassies’ neighborhood). The specific profile of the international clientele -high revenues and long terms stays for the most part- resulted in a great hike in prices for rooms which were often quickly built, small, and of mediocre quality. In several district capitals, such as Maliana or

---

Suai, “international” hotels were built for the UN and related clientele. After the 2002 independence, the departure of a great number of these expatriates resulted at the time in an economic crisis following the strong decrease of the demand for goods, services and employment, and in the dramatic fall of the occupancy rate of hotels in Dili. In May-June 2006, the arrival and follow-up stay of a new multinational force and the pursuit of the United Nation’s mission revitalized the hotel and restaurant industry, as well as the business of taxis, commerce, home employees, etc., but only in the capital and in the districts’ capitals as the feelings of insecurity pervasive in Dili and other areas of the country resulted in less week-end or leisure trips.

Since 2000, two scuba diving centers have been created in Dili. In the very short term, Scuba diving is considered as the most promising leisure activity because of the presence of these two professional centers, of sites easily reached from the Northern coastline (connected to the best road of the country), and – last but not least- of very rich and preserved underwater sea worlds located in the coral Triangle. Two or three connected agencies created by Timorese nationals are able to organize tours of the main tourist areas, such as Tata Mai Lau, Matebian, Tutuala, etc., for a few days. The leisure and hotel infrastructures based in Dili are created by Timorese entrepreneurs and moreover by foreign entrepreneurs (Australians, Singaporeans, Malaysians, etc.). A few of these people make up the core of the Association for Tourism in Timor-Leste (ATTL) which was created in March 2003 and plays a role with the government, in particular when it comes to representing the country in international tourist fairs and on tourism information through dedicated web site. Foreign residents, who often drive 4x4 vehicles, also contributed to the creation of hotel rooms and leisure activities outside the capital.

Outside of Dili, structures inherited from the Portuguese period such as the pousadas – colonial houses built for tourism purposes or former administrator’s residences transformed into hotels before 1975- were quickly returned to their tourist activity (between 2000 and 2003). The ones in Baucau and Tutuala in the coastal area, Maubisse and Maliana in the mountains, are prime examples. As properties of the
State, they were endowed to several businesses in the form of concessions. Outside of Dili, the lack of hotels directly located on the coastline -an essential location in the context of contemporary tourism- convinced a private Australian investor to build and open in 2001 a resort at the entrance of the village of Com (on the North-Eastern coast and the Occidental border of the Nino Konis Santana national park). Since then several village inhabitants have built homestays and guesthouses. Other guesthouses were built in several areas of the country at the initiative of private Timor individuals and their families, most often in hinterland and mountain areas: in Hatu Builico near the peak of Tata Mai Lau, in Same which now has five guesthouses (2007), in Ainaro, in Baguia near the peak of Mont Matebian, but also in Ossu, in Los Palos, in Suai, even on the coastline in Baucau, etc. From these guesthouses it is possible to organize walking treks, horseback rides, or boat trips with the “host family” or with the neighbors and, when sharing a common language (i.e. Tetum, Indonesian, Portuguese), one may listened a number of stories coming from personal and local histories.

One of the examples of the dynamic activity of rural areas and of the “cultural renaissance” taking place since 1999 is the obvious drive to return to the former habitat areas, especially in high locations (living in these areas was prohibited during the Indonesian presence for reasons of control and security), through the rebuilding of “traditional” hamlets and of sacred houses following traditional rituals. Another example is that of, highly related to tourism, craftsmanship: many “traditional” objects and their modern adaptation are products such as weavings (tais), jewelries, weaved baskets, statues and other wood sculptures, potteries, leather goods, wood or bamboo furniture, pillowcases, etc. The main buyers since 1999 are foreigners working in Timor; as a result, a certain number of these crafted objects –but also salt and other agricultural products- are sold on the main road axes, on the Northern coast, between Maubara-Liquiça-Dili-Manatuto-Com and Tutuala. Several associations and organizations support this craftsmanship and the men and women involved, such as fishermen or farmers. The purpose is to generate revenues to craftsmen and, through this financial recognition, bring value to these professions, and to encourage the
EAST-TIMOR

transfer of these know-how. As in many other countries, young people have generally little inclination to learn this hand-made craft and prefer to hold administrative jobs.

2003 through 2005 was a stable period which brought much hope to this activity. Entrepreneurs were then really optimistic and they had plans. Following the initiative of Pedro Lebre, a Timor professional involved for a long time in the business of tourism who created the Vila Harmonia guesthouse in Dili in 1989, a housing and tour guide network was set up in the country (Oecussi, Same, Atauro, region of Matebian, etc.), together with a “plan” to develop other welcoming structures in several villages. But the plans quickly stalled following the crisis of 2006 and the turmoils of 2007 connected to the parliamentary elections; parts of Vila Harmonia were burnt in August 2007, and the Timor Village Hotel network was reduced to the two housing centers created in Dili and Loihonu (near Viqueque). Along the same line, José Maria Borges, a Timor national who in 2005 built the Baucau Beach Bungalow - 5 wood and bamboo bungalows perfectly located in the shade of a coconut tree farm on the ocean front - saw 4 of his bungalows go into flames in August 2007 as well.

3 - The emergence of community eco-lodges

Up until today, the few tourist housings offering aesthetics and locations likely to satisfy the demands of international tourism (attractive areas and/or view overlooking pleasant sceneries) indicate either a relationship between the project manager/entrepreneur and foreign networks, or an inspiration taken from Bali or from existing community eco-lodges.

As in many other places in the world, Timor-Leste is experimenting with projects of community-based tourism. In 2008, the two existing community housing centers were created on very attractive sites on the waterfront with nearby mountains. Built by different individuals from communities connected to the projects and with the strong support of
foreign people and NGOs, the concept (bungalows with small balconies facing the sea) and the aesthetics (local materials, “local” architecture) of these two facilities fit the tastes of contemporary tourists. Their realization is also based on the involvement of all or part of a community, from the decision taking to the building and management phases of the project.

The first to open in 2003 was the eco-lodge Tua Koin on the island of Atauro. It provides green housing (solar energy, waste treatment, etc.) and has a capacity of 20 beds. The project was conceived and is managed by a local NGO called Roman Luan, highly inspired and guided by an Australian woman. Before the crisis of 2006, when the eco-lodge was full every week-end, a dozen members from the local community worked there on a full time or part time basis. The income generated by this resort finances actions to promote education, a kindergarten, etc. As it is the most ancient resort, it is also the most famous one. Since its opening, it has welcomed several groups of Timor villagers (from Baucau, Oecussi, Tutuala) or individuals wishing to build a tourist facility. Another community project, “ethical tourism”, was started in the village of Tutuala -included in the perimeter of the Nino Konis Santana national park- with the support of two Portuguese NGOs (CIDAC and IMVF) and by their local counterparts (Haburas Foundation, the main and oldest Timor NGO specializing in the environment). Indeed, since 1999, the fishermen of Tutuala have welcomed “tourists” who come to spend the week-end in a tent on the beach, located 8 kilometers below the village, and have made some money from tourism (boating around the island of Jaco, cooking of grilled fish, etc.). From the beginning (2005), this project was based on the integration of the seven clans making up the village, each one being traditionally in charge of one natural resource: beaches, caves, mountains, etc. A housing facility was built during the first semester of 2007 (four bungalows and one restaurant). 68 persons from the community are directly involved in this project and are in charge of its management in four groups taking turns.

293 The project received its financing especially from AusAid, NZAid, and the Australian Conservation Fund
294 The project mainly received funds from the European Commission.
Beside the Fishermen’s activities, the creation of other tourist activities (trekking guide, production and sale of arts and crafts, etc.) is also planned.

**Conclusion:**
**what kind of tourism for what local project?**

The evolution of tourism in Timor-Leste remains closely tied to safety conditions. While “waiting” for the desired foreign investments, the country may as of now benefit from assets other than its natural environment. Although the presence of a United Nations mission has normally little chance to be seen as a tourism “asset”, the foreign residents constitute nevertheless the main market, as they support since 2000 the tourism and leisure activity and the emerging tourism entrepreneurs network. This market plays a similar role to that of domestic tourism. Indeed, the weight and the role of internal tourism, estimated to ten times greater than that of international tourism, is now well known worldwide. Research done in Indonesia showed that Indonesian tourists’ activity is the reason why many hotels and restaurants did not close during the crisis of 1998 and the severe decrease in international fluxes. Since then, domestic tourism continues to be an essential and coveted market²⁹⁵. In Timor, the involvement of different actors from civil society and a certain sense of entrepreneurship are main assets. Several researchers such as Lucia Palmer and Demetrio de Carvalho in Tutuala, Lucio Sousa in the region of Bobonaro, or Alexander Loch in the region of Laga-Baguia²⁹⁶ underline the structure

---


of local Timor societies, and some of them point their desire to fully take part in the nation building process and in the management of local resources. The same observation of dynamism can be made about tourism and related activities through accommodation, restaurant, hiking, horse or boat tour, handicraft... This finding contradicts images of inertia often spread concerning rural areas.

Should tourism become a real priority for the State of Timor, State intervention will be required not only to insure safety and free travel in the country but also to provide material help to tourism entrepreneurs and to encourage other ways and initiatives. Beyond this, and more generally, State intervention could give to small individual or community entrepreneurs the means to become more competent and, through financial or technical help, to provide more attractive and quality oriented services. The intent of this last remark is not to emphasize the great gap between existing services and international standards, as is often said, but rather to show that a number of these entrepreneurs are partners who are susceptible to offer what is needed to the country. This strategy could insure their participation and, beyond it, that of local communities, an important matter when the gap between Dili and outside Dili economic life, services delivery, etc. has severely increased during the last years. Such policies would also help circumvent the focus on large foreign investment, often seen in developing countries, which tends to distract political leaders from planning tourism at different scales, on diversified territories (and not only on the coastline).

Recent evolutions show that decentralization, local development, and support to the private sector are at the heart of the implemented policies297. In its 2007-2012 program, the government reasserted the role of tourism (: 27-28) and its aim to support policies which, among others, would promote private initiatives and would set up a National Tourism Communication presented to Euroseas Conference 2007; See also McWilliam Andrew, 2001 and 2003.

Centre with delegations in the thirteen districts. The government’s intent is also illustrated by (1) the introduction in late 2007 of the UNCDF Local Governance Program in four pilot districts - Bobonaro, Lautem, Aileu, Manatuto- and its extension, in 2008, to four more districts - Baucau, Covalima, Ainaro, Manufahi-298; (2) the establishment on April 11, 2008 of the National Directorate of Local Development and Territorial Management (DNDLOT); and (3) the launching on 18 April 2008 by the United Nations (UNCDF and UNDP) and by the Government of the five-year, US$ 5 million program called Inclusive Finance for the Under-Served Economy (INFUSE), aiming to provide small business loans to thousands of low-income people 299. While it is too early to gauge the results of these programs, it will be interesting to identify the means actors and communities involved in tourism are given to reach this help, and their impact on the field.

Men that know very well the places, paths, founding myths, and local stories. Here, three generations of them, in front of the Tata Mai Lau, the country’s highest peak. © 2006, Christine Cabasset-Semedo.

299 Actually, the program was aiming to start in Jan-Feb 2006. http://www.uncdf.org/english/countries/timor_leste/index.php ; ProDoc_draft_20060208b.pdf
Fishermen of Tutuala. © 2007, Christine Cabasset-Semedo.
Sculptor from Makili village, Atauro. © 2007, Christine Cabasset-Semedo.
Chronology 1974-2009

1974

**February 22:** In his book, *Portugal and its future*, General Spinola affirms that the problems of the colonies cannot be resolved by war.

**March 14:** President Caetano relieves the generals Francisco da Costa Gomes and António de Spinola of their commands, as they are against colonial wars.

**April 25:** The MFA (movement of armed Forces), initiated by the young officers of the Portuguese army, puts an end to the dictatorial regime of President Caetano during a movement known as the “Carnation Revolution”.

**May 11:** Founding of the Timor Democratic Union (UDT) in Dili.

**May 15:** General Spinola is proclaimed President of the Republic of Portugal.

**May 20:** Founding of the social Democratic association of Timor (ASDT), in Dili.

**May 27:** Founding of the pro-Indonesian party Apodeti (Popular and Democratic Association of Timor), in Dili.

**June 17:** The Indonesian minister for Foreign affairs, Adam Malik, writes to the ASDT to assure it that Indonesia supports the process of East Timorese independence.

**August 16:** The Indonesian General Ali Murtopo’s first visit to Lisbon.

**August 19:** António de Almeida Santos, Portuguese minister for inter-territorial coordination, visits East Timor.

**September 6:** In a meeting with President Suharto, the Australian Prime minister, Gough Whitlam declares that an independent East Timor would not be a viable state.

**September 12:** The ASDT changes its name and becomes the revolutionary Front for the independence of East Timor (Fretilin).

**October 14:** Second visit to Lisbon by General Ali Murtopo, chief of the Indonesian special operations (Opsus).

**November 18:** Arrival of the Portuguese governor, Mário Lemos Pires, in East Timor.
December 4: António de Almeida Santos, Portuguese minister for Inter-territorial coordination, declares in the UN that there can only be two solutions for East Timor: maintaining a link with Portugal or integration with Indonesia.

1975

January: Fretilin sets up its first literacy program classes.
- Beginning of the withdrawal of some Portuguese military troops.
- In a letter, Governor Mário Lemos Pires informs the President of the Portuguese Republic about the non-representation of Apodeti and the troubles caused by Indonesia. He suggests sending a UN interim force of fifty to one hundred persons.
- Formation of the first commissions for decolonization by Governor Limos Pires.

January 21: UDT/Fretilin coalition on a program of total independence.

March: Partial municipal elections by universal suffrage. Fretilin wins 55% of the seats, a little more than the UDT. Apodeti gets only a single seat.

March 9: London conference between Portugal and Indonesia.

May 27: Under pressure from the Indonesian information services (Bakin), the UDT withdraws from its coalition with Fretilin.

June 3: First Indonesian military incursion in East Timor (in the Oecusse enclave).

June 25: A Portuguese delegation meets Indonesian representatives in Hong Kong on the eve of the Macao conference.

June 26–28: Macao conference, in which Fretilin does not participate. Portugal fixes a definite schedule for decolonization that plans for the election of a constituent assembly in October 1976 and the total transfer of sovereignty two years later.

July 5: President Suharto’s visit to the United States. President Ford and secretary of state Kissinger say that they are willing to support the Indonesian stand.

July 8: Breakdown of the coalition government in Lisbon. It marks the beginning of a period of political crisis which would last until November 25, 1975.
July 17: Portuguese law on the decolonization of East Timor makes official the schedule finalized in June in Macao and “guarantee the independence of the territory”.

End of July: Several members of the UDT go to Indonesia. Indonesian officials make it clear to them that they will never accept members of Fretilin in an East Timorese government.

August 8: Demonstration and march in Dili of UDT representatives towards the Fretilin headquarters. The Portuguese police intervenes to avoid confrontation.

August 11: Coup by the UDT, commanded by João Carrascalão. A civil war follows, lasting for three weeks and causing the death of fifteen hundred to three thousand persons.

August 13: Major João soares, special envoy of the Portuguese government, is held up for two days at Bali by Indonesian authorities, who prevent him from going to Timor and force him to return to Lisbon.

August 15: Lino da Silva, the commandant of the military company of Los Palos, joins forces with the UDT.

August 18: The garrisons of Maubisse and Aileu join Fretilin. Formation of the armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (Falintil).

August 24: The Portuguese Presidency asks the UN to constitute a goodwill mission comprising Portugal, Indonesia, Australia, and at least one more country of the region.

August 26: Governor Limos Pires takes refuge on the island of Atauro, off Dili.

August 27: Twenty-three soldiers and three Portuguese civilians, authorized earlier to enter West Timor, are imprisoned by the Indonesian army.

August 28: A Portuguese delegation led by António de Almeida Santos goes to Atauro, then to Jakarta. The Indonesian acting foreign affairs minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, suggests that the delegation sign a memorandum in which Portugal would ask Indonesia to send a military force to “restore peace and order.”

September 1: Fretilin has de facto control over the entire territory, except for the oecussi enclave, the island of Atauro, and some UDT pockets on the frontier.

September 2: Portugal refuses to allow Indonesian troops to enter East Timorese territory and demands the release of the twenty-six Portuguese held in West Timor as a precondition for any future discussions.

October 8: First Indonesian attacks on the border city of Batugade.

October 14: Indonesian army attack on the city of Maliana.
October 16: Attack on the city of Balibo. During the offensive the Indonesian army kills five Western journalists.

November 1–2: In Rome (Italy), a conference between Portugal and Indonesia decides to bring together all the parties in Darwin at the end of November.

November 24: Fretilin appeals to the UN, requesting an intervention force.

November 25: Return of political stability in Portugal.

November 27: The insistence by Indonesia that the proposed conference at Darwin be held instead in Bali leads to its cancellation.
– The Indonesian army seizes the city of Atabae, thereby opening the road to Dili.

November 28: Fretilin unilaterally declares independence. Francisco Xavier do Amaral, the president of the party, becomes the first President of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

November 30: The Indonesian authorities get the UDT and Apodeti leaders who had taken shelter in West Timor to sign the “Balibo declaration”, demanding the integration of East Timor with Indonesia.

December 4: Five members of the government designated by Fretilin—Mari Alkatiri, Abílio Araújo, Rogério Lobato, José Ramos Horta, and Roque Rodrigues—leave Timor to seek foreign support.

December 5–6: President Ford and secretary of state Kissinger visit Jakarta.

December 7: Invasion of East Timor by the Indonesian army.
– Lisbon denounces the Indonesian invasion and breaks off diplomatic ties with Jakarta.

December 8: The last of the Portuguese colonial administrators leave the island of Atauro on board the ship Afonso Cerqueira.

December 12: resolution 3485 of the UN General assembly, asking the Indonesian government “to stop violating the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor and to withdraw its armed forces immediately from the territory.”

December 16: Indonesia annexes the Oecusse enclave.

December 22: The UN Security Council demands the immediate withdrawal of the Indonesian troops, “to enable the East Timorese to freely exercise their right to self-determination.”
1976


January 18-19: Winspeare Guiccardi, the special envoy of the UN Secretary General, visits East Timor. His report, submitted on April 22, indicates that he could not meet the representatives of the resistance due to lack of cooperation from Indonesia and Australia.

March 31: The Portuguese parliament adds an article (no. 389) to the national constitution, stipulating Portugal’s obligation to guarantee East Timor’s right to independence.

April 3: The members of the UDT rise up against the Indonesian occupation army.

April 22: Second resolution of the UN Security Council demanding the withdrawal of Indonesian troops.

May 20: Fretilin holds a two-week national conference in the center of the territory to organize the resistance movement.

May 31: Presentation of an “integration act” by the Indonesian government. The UN refuses to admit it as an internationally acceptable procedure.

July 17: General Suharto proclaims the integration of East Timor with Indonesia, as its twenty-seventh “province”.

July 28: Arrival in Lisbon of twenty-three Portuguese army personnel held as hostages by the Indonesian army since August 1975.

September 29: The Australian government confiscates a radio transmitter which until then had helped Timorese refugees in Darwin communicate with the resistance.

November 19: In an internal report, Indonesian observers declare that the death toll since the invasion could rise to one hundred thousand persons.
- The UN General Assembly, for the first time, asks for the organization of a referendum on self-determination.

1977

January 20: The government of Australia recognizes the de facto Indonesian occupation of East Timor.
**March 13:** Hearing on East Timor in the American Congress. James Dunn (former Australian consul in Dili) presents his first conclusions on the magnitude of human tragedy.

**August 17:** Beginning of the Indonesian military campaign “Encirclement and annihilation” (till March 1979).

**September 7:** Dismissal of Francisco Xavier do Amaral by Fretilin.

**October 16:** Nicolau Lobato is elected as the president of Fretilin.

**November 28:** the UN General Assembly, for the second time, asks for the organization of a referendum on self-determination.

---

**1978**

**January 20:** Andrew Peacock, minister for Foreign affairs in the Australian Liberal government, confirms the stand of the previous government, declaring that “it would be unrealistic to continue refusing to recognize de facto that East Timor is a part of Indonesia.”

**May 12:** First records of forced sterilizations in East Timor.

**July 18:** Brief visit of President Suharto to East Timor.

**August 30:** the Indonesian army captures Francisco Xavier do Amaral, former president of Fretilin.

**September 7–9:** Visits to East Timor organized for the benefit of journalists and foreign ambassadors. They express their shock at the extent of famine and mortality in the holding camps.

**November 20:** The UN General Assembly, for the third time, demands the organization of a referendum on self-determination.

**November 22:** Fall of the last pocket of East Timorese resistance on Mount Matabean.

**December 15:** The Labor government in Australia recognizes de jure the annexation of East Timor.

**December 31:** The Indonesian army kills Nicolau Lobato, president of Fretilin and chief of the resistance.
1979

**January:** Decision of the Indonesian military command to transfer all Portuguese lands to the Indonesian army.

**April 2:** International Red Cross reports indicate that tens of thousands of Timorese are in danger of dying of hunger unless an aid program is quickly organized.

**October 19:** General Suharto authorizes the international red Cross to set up an aid program restricted to sixty thousand beneficiaries. Foreign delegates reveal a health and food supply condition “as bad as that of Biafra and potentially as serious as that of Kampuchea.”

**November 12:** During a visit to London with President Suharto, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, the Indonesian minister for foreign affairs, declares that 120,000 persons have died in East Timor since 1975.

**December 13:** The UN General Assembly, for the fourth time, demands the organization of a referendum on self-determination.

**December 25:** The daily *Times* publishes information about the use of napalm by the Indonesian army in East Timor.

1980

**January 16:** The Indonesian transmigration program designates East Timor as a destination for populations coming from the densely populated islands.

**February 6:** The American Congress reproaches the US ambassador to Jakarta for not communicating information about the magnitude of the famine in East Timor.

**June 10–11:** Attack on Dili by Fretilin damages the new broadcasting station set up by the Indonesian authorities.

**November 11:** The UN General Assembly, for the fifth time, demands the organization of a referendum on self-determination.
1981

March 1–8: The resistance, led from now on by Xanana Gusmão, organizes a conference for the reorganization of the country and the constitution of the revolutionary Council of National resistance (CRRN).

April 15: In spite of a new famine, the Indonesian administration prevents the international Red Cross from continuing its activities in East Timor.

June 3: In a report meant for President Suha rto, the members of the provincial parliament established by the Indonesian authorities complain of extortions committed, as well as the monopolization of sectors of the economy by the army.

July 20: Amnesty International expresses its concern after the revelation of military instruction manuals stolen from East Timor suggesting torture as a means for obtaining information.

July 31: The Timorese clergy publishes Reflection on Faith, which discusses the humiliation and the suffering of the population.

August 19: Beginning of the operation Pagar Betis, or “Fence-of-legs.”

September: Four hundred to five hundred East Timorese are killed by the Indonesian army at St. Antony, near Lacluta.

October: After the Indonesian administration bans the use of Portuguese, the Vatican approves the decision of the East Timorese clergy to use tetum (the vernacular of the eastern part of the island) rather than Indonesian during services.

October 24: The UN General Assembly, for the sixth time, demands the organization of a referendum on self-determination.

October 26: The Australian Parliament decides to conduct an enquiry on the situation in East Timor.

1982

January 11: The Australian press publishes an appeal by the East Timorese clergy revealing that half the population is threatened with famine.

April 14: After an interruption of one year, the International Red Cross obtains authorization to work once again in East Timor.
May 4: During the first elections organized by Indonesia in East Timor as a part of the national parliamentary elections, General Suharto’s Golkar party obtains 99.43% of the votes, which hardly convinces the international community.

May 16: Pope John Paul II refuses to include the diocese of Dili in the conference of Indonesian bishops.

May 18–28: Visit of a group of Western journalists highlights the magnitude of the problems of undernourishment in East Timor.

June 10: the Portuguese president, Antonio dos Santos Ranalho Eanes, makes the East Timorese cause one of his priorities.

October 13: Mgr da Costa Lopes, the apostolic administrator of Dili, denounces the massacre of Lacluta (September 1981) in a sermon, incurring the wrath of the Indonesian army.

November 3: The UN General Assembly, for the seventh time, demands the organization of a referendum on self-determination in East Timor.

1983

February 7–12: Portuguese journalist Rui Araujo visits East Timor with the permission of the Indonesian government. In spite of the fact that the tour was prepared by the army, his photographs show the pathetic situation in which the Timorese live.

February 16: The UN Human rights Commission condemns the violence in Timor and demands the implementation of the process of self-determination.


May 16: Indonesia obtains from the Vatican the resignation of the apostolic administrator Martinho da Costa Lopes. His successor, Mgr Carlos Felipe Belo, a Timorese who had agreed to adopt Indonesian nationality, is poorly received at first. He would reveal himself to be a fervent defender of the rights of the Timorese.

May 23: A report by the Center for Defence information in the USA estimates 250,000 deaths in East Timor since the Indonesian invasion in 1975.

July 29: One hundred and seventy European parliamentarians launch an appeal for the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination.
August 17: the Indonesian army calls off the cease-fire. General Benny murdani, commander in chief of the Indonesian armed forces, declares that the Timorese resistance would be crushed “mercilessly.”

August 21: Execution of nearly a thousand civilians in the village of Kraras near Viqueque.

September 9: The Indonesian government decrees a state of emergency in East Timor.

September 14: President Suharto demands the launching of a new military operation (operasi Persatuan: “operation Unity”).

September 23: Even though Indonesia has been occupying East Timor for eight years, the UN General assembly defers its vote for the year 1983 and asks the Secretary General to ensure the dossier is followed up.

October 13: Mgr Belo preaches against the arrests and violence, and declares that Indonesia ought to bring books and food to East Timor rather than arms.

November 13: The Indonesian Episcopal Conference (MAWI), previously very reserved, declares its support for the Timorese people, “victims of cruel sufferings.”

1984

January: serious food shortages caused by the military campaigns launched since 1983.

February 21: The UN Human rights Commission grants an audience to Martinho da Costa Lopes, former apostolic administrator of Dili, and denounces the actions of Indonesia.

March 16: The International Red Cross is authorized to visit prisoners in Dili but not to bring them humanitarian aid.

March 20: The “governor,” Mário Carrascalão, admits that there are still at least two thousand political prisoners on the island of Atauro, off the coast of Dili, but that they would not be released as long as “the situation is not calm.”

March 25: Fretilin proposes a peace plan.

July 21: The Portuguese President, António dos Santos Ramalho Eanes, and the Prime minister, Mário Soares, make a common declaration reminding the
Portuguese government of its duty to guarantee the inalienable right of the East Timorese people to self-determination.

**December 17:** The commander in chief of the Indonesian armed forces, General Benny Murdani, acknowledges that the East Timorese conflict “will take time to be resolved.”

---

**1985**

**January 5:** The Indonesian government announces the introduction of a major family planning program, funded by the World Bank, concerning ninety-five thousand East Timorese women, or more than 60 percent of the women of procreative age.

**March 15:** Under pressure from Indonesia, the UN Human rights Commission withdraws the question of Timor from its agenda.

**May 8:** One hundred and thirty-one members of the American Congress address a letter to President Ronald Reagan before his visit to Portugal, expressing their concern over the situation in East Timor.

**August 18:** During a trip to Jakarta, the Australian Labor Prime minister Robert Hawke reaffirms that his country recognizes the sovereignty of Indonesia over East Timor. Mr. Hawke had supported Timor’s right to self-determination when in opposition.

**September 14:** Reports indicate that heavy bombing by the Indonesian air force had taken place in the eastern part of the territory.

**September 24:** Indonesia and Portugal resume diplomatic ties.

**October 27:** Negotiations begin between Australia and Indonesia over the sharing of petroleum resources in the Timor sea.

---

**1986**

**March 31:** Formation of a new UDT/Fretillin coalition in Lisbon.

**April 17:** Seventy Japanese parliamentarians send a letter to the UN secretary-general demanding the establishment of a process for self-determination in East Timor.
July 10: The European Parliament passes a motion affirming the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination.

October 20: Four East Timorese students attempt to take refuge in the Netherlands embassy in Jakarta.

November: Fretilin reveals a new offensive involving more than fifty battalions (nearly twenty-five thousand men) in the eastern part of the territory.

1987

April 13: The American Episcopal Conference denounces the Indonesian occupation and particularly the forced birth control campaigns.

June 5: Forty members of the American Senate criticize the Indonesian occupation of East Timor in an open letter to the press.

November 14: The Indonesian daily *Jakarta Post* reveals a new famine in the south of the country and indicates that thirty-eight thousand children are suffering from malnutrition.

December: In a letter, Mgr Belo, the apostolic administrator of Dili, accuses the Indonesian army of regularly practicing torture.

1988

February 18: The Indonesian government invites the Portuguese Parliament to send a delegation.

May 3: The governments of the twelve countries of the European Community adopt a common resolution calling upon the UN secretary-general to work towards safeguarding the rights of the East Timorese people.

June 20: Mário Carrascalão, the governor appointed by Indonesia, asks President Suharto to open the territory closed by the army for more than twelve years.

September 15: The European Parliament asks for the withdrawal of the Indonesian troops and the enforcing of the right of the East Timorese to self-determination.
October 30: Two hundred and twenty-nine American congressmen and senators express their concern over the use of torture and arbitrary imprisonment in East Timor.

November 2–3: President Suharto’s visit to East Timor and the announcement of a “partial opening-up” of the territory.

December 31: Attack by Fretilin in the suburbs of Dili, causing the death of eighty-four Indonesian soldiers.

---

1989

January 1: Eight of the thirteen districts of East Timor are declared “open” to foreigners by President Suharto. More than half of the territory remains under the exclusive control of the Indonesian army.

February 6: Mgr Belo, bishop of Dili, writes to the UN secretary-general asking for the organization of a referendum on self-determination.

April 26: During a meeting with General Suharto, the American Vice-President, Dan Quayle, broaches the question of “repressive practices” in East Timor.

June 9: One hundred and eighteen members of the American Congress write to President George Bush, asking him to take up the East Timor problem during President Suharto’s visit to the USA.

August 5: Mário Carrascalão presents a report before the Indonesian assembly. He declares in particular that the illiteracy rate has touched 92% and that more than a third of the subdistricts do not have even a single doctor.


October 5: Xanana Gusmão presents a peace plan foreseeing independence after a period of administrative supervision under the control of Indonesia and then of the UN.

October 12: Pope John Paul II’s visit to Dili. The demonstrations result in the arrest of forty people.

December 11: Indonesia and Australia sign a “provisional agreement of cooperation” for jointly exploiting the hydrocarbon resources in the Timor Sea.
**December 17:** One hundred members of the American Congress ask the state Department to carry out an inquiry into the torture of the people arrested after the visit of Pope John Paul II.

---

**1990**

**January 17:** Demonstrations are severely repressed on the occasion of the visit to Dili of John Monjo, the American ambassador to Indonesia.

**March:** New Indonesian military offensive with forty thousand soldiers.

**April 19:** Cancellation of a colloquium in Yogyakarta (Java) during which a team of researchers from the University of Gadjah Mada was to present the East Timorese situation.

**August 17:** School children brandish the Fretilin flag at Dili during the Indonesian national festival.

**September 4:** Protest demonstration on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the diocese of Dili.

**September 27:** The Australian journalist Robert Domm manages to interview Xanana Gusmão. This first contact with the foreign press after fifteen years of military occupation reopens the debate on the Timorese problem and incites pro-independence demonstrations in Dili.

**October:** Appearance of “ninjas” in Dili, these masked paramilitary groups, which carry out nocturnal attacks against separatists.

**October 15:** The police fire on the students of the San Paulus Grammar school in Dili. Three deaths, three wounded, and around forty arrested.

---

**1991**

**February 9:** Indonesia and Australia sign a joint treaty of exploitation of oil resources in the Timor Sea, confirming the provisional agreement of December 1989.

**February 22:** Portugal lodges a complaint against Australia at the international Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague for having signed a treaty with Indonesia on
East Timor (Portugal could not summon Indonesia, which does not recognize the ICJ).

**March 11–12:** During a visit to Jakarta, the Japanese deputy Minister for Foreign affairs takes up the question of human rights in East Timor.

**March 13:** Amnesty international denounces the arrest of six East Timorese students in Bali.

**June 1:** Indonesia promulgates a decree prohibiting “foreigners” from owning land in East Timor. Its aim is to force the natives to give up their Portuguese nationality. They are given until May 31, 1992, to become Indonesian or be expropriated.

**June 28:** The Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council asks the Indonesian government to withdraw its troops from East Timor as a precondition to the process of self-determination. It asks the member states to stop the sale of military equipment to Indonesia.

**September 13:** An agreement signed between Portugal and Indonesia paves the way for the visit of a delegation of Portuguese parliamentarians to East Timor.

**October 25:** the Portuguese Parliament suspends the proposed visit to Timor (from November 4–16) due to numerous conditions imposed by Indonesia.

**November 12:** The Indonesian army opens fire on a crowd of about 3,500 persons in the neighborhood of the cemetery of Santa Cruz at Dili. Video pictures taken by journalist Max Stahl and telecast over Western channels result in the suspension of financial aid from several countries (Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands). American military aid is also stopped. The first official Indonesian assessment is nineteen deaths and ninety-one injured, whereas the Timorese claim more than two hundred deaths and the disappearance of many people.

**November 19:** As protest against the shooting at Santa Cruz, seventy East Timorese students demonstrate in Jakarta and are arrested.

**November 23:** A council of students from 10 Indonesian universities asks the government to withdraw the troops from East Timor and to allow the East Timorese people to exercise their right to self-determination.

**November 28:** In response to pressure from the international community, President Suharto appoints a national commission of enquiry, which goes to Dili at the end of November. The new official estimate figuring in its report submitted on December 26, 1991, indicates “about fifty deaths,” but, except for eighteen tombs, the bodies remain untraceable. Amnesty International, for its part, furnishes a list of names of 271 dead, 382 wounded, and 250 disappeared.
December 19: Arrest of East Timorese students who came to present to several diplomatic chancelleries in Jakarta (the UN, Australia, and Japan) their petitions against the action of the Indonesian army in the territory.

1992

January 22: The ferry Lusitania Expresso, baptized the “ship of peace,” leaves Lisbon for East Timor to lay floral tributes on the tombs of those killed in Santa Cruz.

January 28: Pieter Kooijmans, special reporter of the UN on torture, points out that the practice of torture by the Indonesian police might be routine in certain regions, including East Timor.

March 11: The ferry Lusitania Expresso approaches East Timorese territorial waters carrying on board 120 persons of twenty-one nationalities, with the former Portuguese President, General Ramalho Eanes, amongst them. The Indonesian navy forces it to turn back.

March 12: In Dili, beginning of the trial of the East Timorese students who demonstrated against the Santa Cruz massacres. They are convicted, with sentences ranging from six years to life imprisonment. On May 29, a court-martial tries two Indonesian soldiers and eight non-commissioned officers for “indiscipline” during the Santa Cruz shooting. The sentences handed down would not exceed eighteen months’ imprisonment.

May 2: Two Indonesian lawyers appointed to defend the East Timorese political prisoners challenge the legality of the procedure, arguing that the Indonesian criminal code is not applicable as East Timor was not legally integrated with Indonesia.

June 25: The American Congress withdraws from the federal budget two million dollars of military aid meant for Indonesia.

July 16: In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords demands the enforcement of an embargo on the sale of arms to Indonesia, the suspension of economic aid, and of training programs for Indonesian officers.

July 20: Portugal blocks the signing of an agreement between the European Community and ASEAN, citing the violations of human rights in East Timor.

August 27: The UN sub-Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of minorities “deplores the tragic events of November 12, 1991,” “expresses its concern over continuing violation of Human rights in East Timor,”
and asks Indonesia to provide immediately information about the missing persons.

**November 20:** Capture of Xanana Gusmão by the Indonesian army.

**December 17:** Meeting in New York of the Portuguese and Indonesian ministers for Foreign affairs, under the aegis of the UN. The exact contents of the discussions are not divulged.

---

1993

**February–May:** Trial of Xanana Gusmão organized by the Indonesian judiciary in Dili. The judges refuse to listen to his plea and sentence him to solitary confinement for life (May 21). The international commission of jurists present during part of the sessions declares in its report that this trial “did not take place according to international rules and had even violated the provisions of the Indonesian Penal Code.”

**March 10:** The UN Human rights Commission expresses its concern about the activities of Indonesia in East Timor and asks Jakarta to invite special reporters to examine the situation in the territory.

**April 21:** Talks between Portugal and Indonesia under the aegis of the UN in Rome.

**June 22:** The International Red Cross Committee deplores the “continuing difficulties” caused by the Indonesian administration resulting in obstructing visits to East Timorese prisoners.

**July:** General Suharto commutes the prison sentence of Xanana Gusmão to twenty years of solitary confinement.

**September 17:** Negotiations in New York between the Portuguese and Indonesian ministers for foreign affairs, Durao Barroso and Ali Alatas.

**November 4:** The Norwegian Thorolf Rafto Human rights Prize is awarded to the East Timorese people.
February: The American state Department places Indonesia on its “black list” of countries that do not respect human rights, along with Burma, China, North Korea, Zaire, etc.

April 15: Abílio Osório Soares, appointed governor of East Timor in 1992 admits before foreign journalists to the figure of two hundred thousand East Timorese victims since 1975.

May 31–June 4: Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor in manila.

July 31: Mgr Belo denounces in an open letter “the excessive controls, executions, torture, arrests and arbitrary detentions, particularly by extrajudiciary institutions.”

September 15: the Indonesian foreign affairs minister, Ali Alatas, who had declared that East Timor was a “pebble in Indonesia’s shoes,” mentions before the parliament the possibility of granting a “special status” to the territory.

October 8: First meeting between Ali Alatas, the Indonesian Foreign affairs minister, and José Ramos Horta, the CNRT representative.

October 27: The Federal Court of Boston orders the Indonesian general Sintong Panjaitan to pay fourteen million dollars to the mother of the young New Zealander Kamal Bamadhaj, killed during the shooting at Santa Cruz in November 1991.

November 12: East Timorese demonstration on the occasion of an APEC meeting in Indonesia. Twenty-nine East Timorese students take refuge in the US Embassy in Jakarta. Eighty others are “reported missing.”

November 12–14: Nearly a thousand young Timorese challenge the police in Dili.

January 1: During a demonstration in Baucau, the army kills three Timorese.

January 13: The special UN reporter on extrajudiciary executions submits his report on the 1991 events of Santa Cruz. He concludes that the shooting of November 12 was “the consequence of a planned military operation against unarmed civilians demonstrating their political disagreement.”
June 2–5: First round of negotiations among the different members of the East Timorese diaspora at Burg Schlaining (Austria).

June 30: The international Court of Justice declares itself incompetent to take up the case brought up by Portugal against Australia in February 1991 regarding the agreement with Indonesia on oil resources in the Timor sea.

July 9: Negotiations between the Portuguese and Indonesian foreign Affairs ministers in Geneva under the aegis of the UN.

September 1: The Indonesian army opens fire on the people of a hamlet near Baucau, resulting in three deaths.

September–October: Confrontations between East Timorese and migrants, leading to the destruction of seven mosques and two Protestant churches.

December 18: Australia and Indonesia sign a defense agreement.

1996

Early January: In a report on the East Timor situation, Amnesty International indicates that at least thirteen summary executions of civilians took place in 1995 and reports numerous cases of inhuman treatment, torture, and rape.

January 16: Negotiations between the Portuguese and the Indonesian foreign affairs ministers in London under the aegis of the UN.

January 24: The Indonesian Commission of Human rights opens a representative office in Dili.

February 29: The Portuguese Prime minister, António Gutteres, meets President Suharto and asks for the release of Xanana Gusmão.


October 11: The Nobel Peace Prize is jointly awarded to mgr Carlos Filipe Ximimes Belo, bishop of Dili, and José Ramos Horta, the overseas representative of the East Timorese resistance.
March 19: The East Timorese priest Basílio do Nascineto is appointed bishop of Baucau by the Vatican.

April 2: Opening of a new Catholic radio station, the first means of independent communication authorized by the Indonesian administration in twenty-one years of occupation.

April 16: A resolution of the Human rights Commission of the UN condemns the repeated Indonesian excesses and asks Jakarta to allow its special rapporteur on torture to visit East Timor once again.

June 27: Capture and execution of David Alex, the vice commandant of Falintil.

July 15: During his visit to Indonesia, Nelson Mandela, the South African president, openly demands a meeting with Xanana Gusmão. He declares that the release of the latter is indispensable for solving the Timorese problem.

August: The Asian crisis hits Indonesia hard. The crash of the rupiah and the bankruptcy of some fifteen banks push two-thirds of the population below the poverty line.

October: Manuel Carrascalão launches the movement for the reconciliation and the Unity of the People of Timor (GRPRTT).

November 7: A report on the violence committed on the Timorese is submitted to the special UN rapporteur on violence against women.

March: General Suharto, in power since 1965, is re-elected for a seventh presidential term.

April 23–27: National Timorese convention in Lisbon. The CNRM becomes CNRT (National Council of Timorese Resistance), whose president and vice president are respectively Xanana Gusmão (in prison in Indonesia) and José Ramos Horta.

May 21: General Suharto is forced to resign. His Vice-President, Jusuf Habibie, replaces him.

May 26: Two Indonesian human rights militants, Muchtar Pakpahan and Sri Bintang Pamungkas, express their support to Xanana Gusmão.
June 9: Three weeks after coming to power, President Habibie declares his intention of proposing a special status for East Timor.

June 15: Demonstration by fifteen thousand students in Dili demanding a referendum on self-determination and the release of Xanana Gusmão. Between June 15 and mid-July, sixty-five thousand Indonesians leave the territory.

August 5: Fresh rounds of talks between Portugal and Indonesia.

August 12: Two Indonesian officers, major General Damiri and Colonel Tono Suratman, ask the Timorese militia leaders whom they had trained to organize themselves “for protecting integration.”

August 21: Xanana Gusmão rejects the proposal for autonomy by the Indonesian government.

October 11: Thirty thousand persons attend a march in Dili, demanding the resignation of the pro-Indonesian governor, Abílio Osório Soares.

November 2: Mgr Belo, bishop of Dili and Nobel Peace Prize winner, asks that Xanana Gusmão be included in the talks on the future of East Timor.

November 20: The UN secretary-general expresses his concern about the mounting violence. The talks between Lisbon and Jakarta are suspended.

December 31: The Indonesian government frees sixty-two political prisoners, of whom twenty-six are Timorese, but continues to hold Xanana Gusmão prisoner.

1999

Early January: Several cases of missing persons, torture, and assassination are reported by organizations defending human rights.

January 14: The European Parliament condemns the repression of East Timorese civilians. It asks the Indonesian government to withdraw its troops and free the political prisoners.

January 27: The Indonesian president, B. J. Habibie, declares that he will ask the parliament (MPR) to grant independence to East Timor if it rejects the proposal of autonomy which he intends offering it.

February 14: General Sudjarat, spokesman of the Indonesian armed forces, admits that the army supplies arms to the militia “for protecting the civilians from the Fretilin guerrillas.”
February 18: The international Red Cross Committee asks the Indonesian government to disarm the militia.

February 22: General Wiranto, commander in chief of the Indonesian armed forces, declares that he would continue deploying the militia “to help the police maintain security.”

April 5–6: Sixty-two dead and fourteen missing after an attack on the Liquiça church by the militia supported by the Indonesian army.

April 17: The UN secretary-general deplores the “apparent incapability of the Indonesian army to control violence and protect the population.”

April 24: During a meeting with an Australian delegation, President Habibie admits his inability to disarm the militia.

May 5: Portugal, the UN, and Indonesia sign an agreement that defines the main modalities of the “popular consultation” slated for August 8, 1999.

May 28: The Justice and Peace Commission reports that the militia are in the process of drawing up a list of separatist leaders with the help of the Indonesian intelligence services.

June 1: Arrival in Dili of Ian martin, the new representative of the UN secretary-general on the East Timor issue.

June 11: The UN Security Council establishes UNAMET to supervise the referendum.

July 8: Mary Robinson, the UN human rights high commissioner, declares that she is worried about the attacks against the UN personnel by armed militia.

July 14: General Wiranto, commander in chief of the Indonesian armed forces, refuses an interim force of the UN.

July 16: After several delays due to violence, enrolment on the electoral rolls for the referendum finally begins (up to August 4). The total number of voters rises to 451,792, of whom 438,000 are in East Timor.

August 19: Ian Martin, the representative of the UN Secretary General for East Timor, demands the withdrawal of the Indonesian officers actively involved with the militia.

August 26: The UN Security Council extends the term of UNAMET to November 30, 1999.

August 28: Ali Alatas, Indonesian foreign affairs minister, rejects the proposal of sending a peacekeeping force.

August 30: The day of the referendum. More than 97% of the East Timorese vote.
August 31: The militia attack several cities. Three Timorese members of the UNAMET team are killed.
— Ali Alatas, the Indonesian foreign affairs minister, lauds the manner in which the referendum was conducted.

September 3: General Wiranto announces that in order to be prepared for “any possible circumstances,” two thousand soldiers had been sent to East Timor.

September 4: Official announcement of the results: 344,580 East Timorese (that is, 78.5% of the population) had voted in favor of independence. Violence provoked by the militia and the Indonesian army obliges all the UN personnel to take shelter in Dili.

September 6: President Habibie declares martial law in East Timor. Numerous massacres are reported in the days that follow. The Indonesian army organizes the displacement, often under pressure, of three hundred thousand East Timorese to West Timor and the neighboring islands.

September 8: The Indonesian Human rights Commission condemns the incidents of violence and admits the involvement of the peacekeeping force of Indonesia.

September 9: The UN Secretary General decides to repatriate his officers to Australia. Some of them refuse to leave the territory.

September 10: American president Bill Clinton declares that the involvement of the Indonesian army with the militia is “not acceptable” and demands the suspension of military relations with Indonesia.

September 12: The UN Security Council firmly condemns Indonesian action in East Timor. The Indonesian government accepts the sending of a peacekeeping force.

September 14: the European Union bans the sale of arms to Indonesia.

September 15: The UN Security Council approves the deployment of INTERFET, an international intervention force placed under Australian command.

September 17: The Indonesian army begins its withdrawal from East Timor.

September 21: the Indonesian Battalion 745 causes severe destruction and the death of a Dutch journalist during its withdrawal.

September 27: Faced with great destruction and numerous victims, the UN High Commission for Refugees (HCR) demands the setting up of an international commission of inquiry.

October 3: INTERFET strengthens the western frontier.

October 8: Beginning of the return of displaced people to East Timor.
October 18: The Indonesian Assembly (MPR) officially recognizes the results of the referendum of August 30, 1999, and cancels the text of July 15, 1976, concerning the integration of East Timor.

October 19: The governor of the Indonesian province of Nusa Tenggara Timur (including West Timor) declares that 284,414 “refugees” are at present in his territory.

October 20: The Indonesian parliament elects Abdurahman Wahid as president of the republic.

October 25: The Security Council sets up a provisional administration, UNTAET, placed under the direction of the Brazilian Sergio Vieira de Mello, who consults an East Timorese advisory national council (CN).

December 17: The sponsors meet in Tokyo. Five hundred million dollars are released for reconstructing East Timor.

2000

January 12: Signing of a memorandum between UNTAET and the Indonesian army on the administration of the frontier between the two countries.

January 22: The American dollar is chosen as the temporary currency of the country, without excluding the possibility of creating a national currency in the future.

January 31: The Indonesian Commission on the Violation of Human rights in East Timor, formed in 1999, submits its report. It lists in detail extortions, lays emphasis on the responsibility of the Indonesian army. The commission declares that the facts reveal crimes against humanity and demands the constitution of an international tribunal.

February 12: Visit of the Portuguese president, Jorge Sampaio, to East Timor.

February 29: Visit of the Indonesian president, Abdurahman Wahid, to East Timor. He apologizes to the East Timorese people for all that happened in the past.

September 6: In West Timor, an attack on the office of the high commissioner for refugees by pro-Indonesian militia leads to the death of three UN personnel.

December 11: First indictments for crimes against humanity by the Dili Court of Justice, under the aegis of the UN, for acts committed in 1999 by the militia and the Indonesian army.
February 1: Dissolution of Falintil and the founding of the FDTL (Force for the Defence of East Timor).

March 16: Decree of UNTAET for the election of a constituent assembly, and beginning of registration of voters (up to June 23).

March 19: Xanana Gusmão dissolves the common platform of the CNRT in order to allow free competition among the parties.

March 29: Following a difference of opinion over the modalities of consulting the population for drawing up the constitution, Xanana Gusmão resigns from the national advisory council established by UNTAET.

April 9: Manuel Carrascalão is elected as the head of the National Council.

April 23: The Indonesian government establishes an ad hoc court in Jakarta (keppress 53/2001) for the trial of crimes committed after the referendum of August 30, 1999.

May 1: Eurico Guterres, one of the principal pro-Indonesian militia leaders, is sentenced to six months imprisonment by the ad hoc Indonesian tribunal for crimes committed in East Timor. He is freed after three weeks in detention.

July 6: Renegotiations with Australia over the agreement on petroleum resources in the Timor Sea. East Timor obtains 90% of the royalties of the central zone, which is the most promising.

July 8: National unity pact among all political factions in East Timor for the election of the constituent assembly.

July 13: UNTAET establishes (decision 2001/10) a Commission for reception, truth and reconciliation (CRTR/CAVR), whose purpose is to throw light on the events that happened from April 1974 to October 1999.

July 23: Abdurahman Wahid is forced to step down from the post of president of the republic in favor of his vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of the first president of the republic.

- East Timor is granted permission to be an observer at the ASEAN inter-ministerial conference held in Hanoi.

August 30: Elections for the constituent assembly in East Timor, with a participation rate of 94 percent of the enrolled voters. Fretilin wins 57.4% of the vote.
October 22: Announcement by the Japanese government that it has sent a battalion of six hundred engineers from the Japanese self-Defense Force arouses intense agitation in East Timor.

2002

January 15: Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Indonesian president, appoints an ad hoc court of justice for the crimes committed in East Timor. Its jurisdiction is limited to the extortions occurring between April and September 1999 in three of the thirteen districts of the territory.

January 16: Mgr Belo, bishop of Dili, warns the population of the risk of yielding to the mentality of living on aid due to the easy money available from UN subsidies.

February 26: First trilateral meeting of the representatives of the governments of East Timor, Indonesia, and Australia.

February 28: The authorities of East Timor and Indonesia sign an agreement on the demarcation of their common frontier.

March 22: Adoption of the national constitution.

May 20: Independence of East Timor.

July 23–24: East Timor joins the international monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asia Development Bank (ADB).

July 12: East Timor seeks the United Nations least developed country status.

July 19: Talks on the Greater sunrise gas field begin between East Timor and Australia.

August 5: The Indonesian ad hoc Human rights Court on East Timor acquits six Indonesian military and police officers of charges of crimes against humanity committed in 1999, contrary to a wealth of well-documented evidence.

September 27: The Democratic republic of East Timor gains membership in the UN.

November 25: East Timorese security forces face antigovernment confrontation.
2003

February 24: East Timor joins the Non-aligned movement as its one hundred and fifteenth member.

March 4: The Indonesian government dismisses the prosecution of top Indonesian officials accused of committing crimes against humanity in East Timor.

April 25: The UN Economic and social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) admits East Timor as its sixty-second member.

May 20: The international Federation for East Timor (IFET) urges the UN Security Council to establish an international tribunal for the crimes against humanity committed in the territory from 1975 to 1999.

June 6: East Timor becomes the one hundred and ninety-first country to sign up to the Geneva Conventions.

September 15: Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri constitutes an eighteen-member national AIDS commission.

September 20: The Asian athletics association (AAA) officially welcomes East Timor as its forty-fifth member.

October 22: East Timor unionists end the nation’s first-ever strike after getting a 12.5% pay rise.

November 10: East Timor introduces its own coins, which are expected to replace the US coins in use.

December 18: During the truth and reconciliation Commission hearings, the last Portuguese governor, Mário Lemos Pires, publicly admits that Portugal failed to prepare the former territory for democracy.

2004

January 20: The Indonesian military (TNI) says it will deploy troops to the disputed island of Batek, which is close to East Nusa Tenggara province and to the Oecusse enclave.

March 7: Pope John Paul II appoints Alberto Ricardo da Silva to succeed Nobel Peace laureate, Bishop Belo, who stepped down for health reasons.

March 24: Flooding hits East Timor, damaging hundreds of houses.
May 16: East Timorese president Xanana Gusmão meets Indonesian president Megawati Sukarnoputri in Bali to discuss bilateral relations and to try to settle past problems.

May 28: UN peacekeepers start their withdrawal from East Timor after a mission lasting nearly five years. From about three thousand troops, the remaining contingent is down to about eighteen hundred soldiers.

July 1: East Timor and Indonesia sign an accord over 90% of their land boundary.

August 19: East Timor concedes sovereignty over disputed Batek island to Indonesia.

September 14: announcement of the first results of the new national census. The population of East Timor is up to 924,642.

September 29: During the UN General assembly’s annual meeting, East Timor’s foreign minister, José Ramos Horta, says that Indonesia deserves a seat on the Security Council.

October 6: East Timor becomes the newest member of the ASEAN regional Forum, which brings together ministers from the ASEAN countries and their counterparts from the Asia and Western Pacific region.

December 5–9: During a five-day visit to Washington, DC, President Xanana Gusmão meets US President George W. Bush at the White House.

2005

January 17: East Timor and Portugal announce the signing of a future program on military and technical cooperation.

January 20: Indonesia and East Timor form a “truth and Friendship” Commission.

January 31: President Xanana Gusmão dismisses domestic criticism of Dili’s efforts to normalize relations with Indonesia.

March 19: The first East Timorese commercial airline, Kakoak, launches its inaugural flight serving a route connecting Dili to Kupang.

April 28: The UN Security Council unanimously adopts resolution 1599, establishing a one-year follow-on special political mission in East Timor, the United Nations office in East Timor (UNOTIL), which replaces UNMISET and will remain in East Timor until May 20, 2006.
May 7: Three weeks of antigovernment demonstrations came to an end after Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and East Timor’s two Catholic bishops, Alberto Ricardo da Silva and Basílio do Nascimento, sign a negotiated joint declaration.

May 19: the end of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in East Timor. a scaled-down UN presence remains, the staff reduced from 900 to about 275 military, police, and government advisers.


August 16: East Timor launches bidding round for petroleum exploration.

October 31: Xanana Gusmão receives the final report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR). The report, released in December, estimates the minimum total number of conflict-related deaths during the period 1975-1999 is 102,800 and could be up to 183,000.

2006

January 12: Australia and East Timor signed in Sydney a “Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea” (CMATS), establishing a 50-50 split of royalties from the Greater Sunrise gas field in the Timor Sea.

February 8: A group of about 350 troops (of a total 1,800 FDTL troops) protest against discrimination and other grievances over working conditions in front of the presidential palace in Dili.

February 10: An inquiry commission began hearings on the East Timorese soldiers who went AWOL to protest alleged discrimination and ill-treatment by commanders.

February 22: East Timor military chief Matan Ruak indicates during a meeting with members of the bilateral Commission of Truth and Friendship in Dili that he wants to normalize military relations with Indonesia, despite unresolved human rights cases.

March 17: Gastao Salsinha, the leader of the group of 593 East Timorese soldiers dismissed from the armed forces for going on strike appeals to President Xanana Gusmão to mediate in their row with the military leadership.

April 8: World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz visits East Timor and says about the management of its oil revenues that the system in place is sound and can stand as something for a model for other countries, but that it remains an area for continued vigilance going forward.
EAST-TIMOR

April 19: the Foreign Ministry José Ramos Horta declares that East Timor has received ASEAN’s blessing to sign a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Southeast Asian bloc.

April 26: About 2,000 protesters held a demonstration in support of dismissed soldiers

April 28: Hundreds of dismissed soldiers burns cars and shops in Dili, after the deadline of their threat to wage a guerrilla war if the government failed to resolve their dispute with the military leadership.

May 4: Former military-police Major Alfredo Reinado joins the rebels

May: Civil unrest, causing more than 20 dead, drives 100,000 people (65,000 around Dili) from their homes to emergency camps.

May 13: UN Security Council unanimously approves a one-month extension of the UN mission in East Timor until June 20 and urged East-Timorese authorities to address the causes of the recent wave of violence in the territory.

May 18: Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri is re-elected as head of East Timor's governing FRETILIN party, despite criticism about the April crisis.

May 24: In response to ongoing clashes between the East Timor Defence Force (FDTL) and rebel soldiers and police, Xanana Gusmão and Mari Alkatiri ask the Australian government to send troops as part of an international force to restore security.

May 26: 350 first Australian troops arrive in Dili, out of the 1,300 soldiers committed by Canberra for a peace keeping forces in East Timor. 500 are to come from Malaysia, 200 from Portugal and 100 from New Zealand.

June 26: Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri steps down, as demanded by Xanana Gusmão, after the President threatened to resign.

July 8: José Ramos Horta is appointed Prime Minister. He offers a weapons amnesty to prevent a repeat of communal clashes which left 21 dead and displaced 150,000 in April-May.

August 25: The UN Security Council votes to authorize 1,600 international police and 34 military liaison officers for a follow-on mission in East Timor. The UN mission will support the government in the presidential and parliamentary elections, scheduled for 2007.

August 30: Major Alfredo Reinado who had been arrested in Dili July 26 for detention illegal of weapon runs away of jail with fifty other prisoners
September 26: Prime Minister José Ramos Horta meets several hundreds of petitioner soldiers and guarantees the maintenance of their salary so much that the investigation continues

September 30: Timor-Leste establishes diplomatic relations with Myanmar

October 12: Cambodia offers to send peace keeping forces to Timor-Leste

October 27: Prime Minister José Ramos Horta meets pope Benedict XVI in Vatican and hands him an invitation of President Xanana Gusmão to visit Timor-Leste

December 6: UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appoints the Indian Atul Khare as Special UN Representative in Timor-Leste and chief of the UNMIT (620 staff of which 460 police forces)

2007

January 12: During Cebu summit (The Philippines), ASEAN worries about unrest in Timor-Leste, but still consider that the country could join the association in three to five years.

January 17: Prime Minister José Ramos Horta makes a public declaration supporting Burmese dissident Aung San Suu Kyi

January 26: Australia signs a tripartite agreement with Timor-Leste and UN for the coordination of the aid to the country

February 22: The UN Security Council of the UNO extend for one year the international keeping force mandate

March 4: Offensive by the Australian army in the region of Same against Major Reinado, chatty the death of four of his partisans but failing in capturing him

May 20: José Ramos Horta becomes the new President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

June 30: Legislative elections. Fretilin gets the best result, but with only 29% of the votes. Xanana Gusmão leader of the CNRT (24%) forms a coalition with the other parties. Beginning of a new period of instability

July 26: UN Secretary General refuses to recognize the bilateral commission of investigating on the crimes of 1999, established by Indonesia and Timor-Leste CTF (Commission for Truth and Friendship)
July 31: Timor-Leste founds its first national park: Konis Santana (123,600 hectares of which 45% maritime) in the eastern part of the country

August 1: ASEAN acknowledge the project of integrating Timor-Leste

August 3: Former Minister of the Interior Rogerio Lobato is sentenced seven years and half of jail for having provided weapons to against the rebels

August 8: After one month of negotiations, Xanana Gusmão is designated Prime Minister

September 3: Portugal signs a four years agreement of cooperation for an amount of 60 millions of euros

September 20: A delegation of Chinese businessmen announce more than 100 millions US$ investments for the next ten years

November 24: the European Union announces the concession of 100 millions of dollars for the support in the farming zones in 2008

December 14: Visit of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to Timor-Leste – During a visit to Dili, Australian Prime minister announces that he will maintain the 780 soldiers force at least until the end of the year 2008

---

**2008**

January 1: Extension of the TSDA mandate (*Timor Sea Designated Authority*) until June 30, 2008

January 13: Meeting in Maubisse between President José Ramos Horta and the rebel Alfredo Reinado

January 15: Signature of a principle agreement for a project of 100 millions of dollars with the company Indonesian GTLeste Biotech, for the plantation of 100,000 hectares of sugar cane to produce biofuel

January 21: President José Ramos Horta meets Pope Benedict XVI in Vatican and discusses on the role of the Catholic Church in education, health and poverty alleviation

January 29: China signs an agreement of cooperation with Timor-Leste for an amount of 1.4 billion US$ and announce the exemption of taxes for the East-Timorese products

February 11: The rebels coordinated by Alfredo Reinado attack president José Ramos Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão. The wounded President is
taken to Australia. Alfredo Reinado is killed in the assault of the presidential residence

**February 28:** Six rebels led by the veteran Bernardo da Costa surrender to the East-Timorese polices

**March 28-29:** Meeting of the international donors to Timor-Leste in Dili.

**April 11:** Discovery of new oil resources in Sea of Timor by the company Australian ENI in the zone of Kitan-1, to the East of Laminaria

**April 16:** Timor-Leste signs an agreement with China to buy two patrol boats for an amount of 28 millions US$

**April 25:** The leader rebels Gastão Salsinha surrenders to the authorities

**June 27:** José Ramos Horta renounces to become UN High Commissioner for Human's Rights

**July 1:** Establishment of the National authority of Oil (Autoridade Nacional do Petróleo-ANP), in replacement of the TSDA (Timor Sea Designated Authority)

**July 7:** Demonstrations by students from ASUTIL (Timor-Leste University Students Solidarity Action) worrying about the rise of the price of basic products, the risks of budgetary drift and the threat constitute by biofuel projects on national food security

**July 11:** Visit of the Brazilian President Lula da Silva who support the idea of cooperation notably in the domain of the biofuel

**July 13:** East Timor’s President Jose Ramos Horta declares that he wants to grant amnesty to perpetrators of the violence that wracked the country in 2006.

**July 15:** Indonesian and Timor-Leste Presidents receive CTF report acknowledging the “institutional responsibility” of Jakarta in the “crimes against the humanity” committed in 1999 in East-Timor that caused officially 1,400 victims. Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, made no formal apologies but expressed his “very deep regrets concerning facts that caused deaths and material damages”.

**July 22:** The Singaporean airline company Austasia launches a weekly link to Dili.

**July 31:** In a controversial context, the East-Timorese Parliament approves an exceptional increase of the budget for the year 2008, from 347.8 millions US$ initially foreseen to 773.3 millions.

**August 7:** After a meeting between Chinese President Hu Jintao and José Ramos Horta, Chinese government scraps import duties on products imported from East Timor.
August 8: United Nations and Timor-Leste’s Government launch a five-year programme to reduce poverty, consolidate democracy and provide basic social services for the people.

September 8: Don Bosco Catholic School camp, the largest displacement camp in Dili (2,000 IDPs) starts to be dismantled.

October 13: East Timor President, Jose Ramos-Horta, declares that he wants the United Nations to drop its investigation into bloodshed surrounding a 1999 independence vote from Indonesia.

October 14: East Timor government signs a deal allowing South Korea to import gas from Greater Sunrise gasfield by 2013.

October 23: India agrees to train East Timor Navy personnel.

November 13: In response to a case brought by 16 Members of Parliament, three judges of the Timor-Leste Appeals Court issue a unanimous ruling regarding the $788 million mid-year budget, and invalidate State budget which had been passed by Parliament and promulgated on 5 August 2008.

November 20: New Zealand defence minister Wayne Mapp declares that peacekeeping troops will stay in Timor-Leste for as long as necessary.

December 6: During a two day visit to Portugal, East Timor PM Xanana Gusmão call for Portuguese businesses to invest in his country, saying that his Government was modifying investment and tax legislation in order to attract foreign capital.

December 9: Former Prime Minister and Secretary General of FRETILIN, Mari Alkatiri, withdraw from the Timor Sea negotiations, following criticisms by the CNRT in the National Parliament.

2009

January 9: The East Timorese foreign minister acknowledge that the Pope could visit East Timor in 2010

January 12: Thailand Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva declares that he will support Timor-Leste’s application for membership of ASEAN by 2012.

January 16: Visit of Timor-Leste President to the Philippines. Jose Ramos-Horta agrees with President Arroyo to bolster bilateral cooperation on education and professional training as well as marine and fisheries resources.
Glossary and list of acronyms

ABRI  
*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*. Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (renamed as TNI).

ACFOA  
*Australian Council for Overseas Aid*.

ADB  
*Asian Development Bank*.

AIETD  
*All Inclusive East Timorese Dialogue*. Dialogue sessions among all Timorese (under the aegis of the UNO, from June 1995).

Aitarak  
Pro-Indonesian militia led by Eurico Guterres in 1999

Aldeia  
Hamlet or small village, basic unit of territorial division. Regrouped as sucos.

Apartismo  
Portuguese doctrine of non intervention of the army in political affairs.

APEC  
*Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation* – a forum for economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

APODETI  
*Associação Popular Democrática Timorense*, Popular Democratic Timorese Association (party founded in May 1974, founded again in 2001 in the form of Apodeti- pro Referendum).

ASDT  
*Associação Social Democrática Timorense Social Democratic* Timorese Association (founded in May 1974, becomes FRETILIN in September 1974, founded again by Francisco Xavier do Amaral in 2001).

ASIO  
*Australian Security Intelligence Organisation*. Australian Intelligence Services.

ASUTIL  
*Timor-Leste University Students Solidarity Action*.

ASEAN  
*Association of South-East Asian Nations* founded in 1967.

BAKIN  
*Badan Koordinasi Intelijens Nasional*, Agency for the Co-ordination of National Information Services (Indonesia).

BPS  

BRTT  
*Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur*. East Timor People’s Front, founded by the pro-Indonesian leader Lopes da Cruz before the Referendum of 1999.
**CAVR** (see CRTR)

**CIA** *Central Intelligence Agency* (United States).

**CIVPOL** *Civil Police* of the UNO, different from the military PKF (from 1999 in East Timor).

**Concelho** Districts, numbering 13 at the end of Portuguese colonization, which became *kabupaten* during the Indonesian occupation (1975-1999).

**CN** *Conselho Nacional*, National Council. Advisory council formed in November 1999 by UNTAET for representing different East Timorese political tendencies. It was presided over by Xanana Gusmão and later by Manuel Carrascalão; dissolved in July 2001.


**CPD – RDTL** *Popular Defense Committee of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste*. Movement formed by young Timorese in 1999, suspected of having been utilised by the Indonesian army (close to PNT of Abílio Araújo).


**CRTR** *Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation* established by UNTAET in July 2001 (CAVR in portugues), to promote the East Timorese reconciliation process (until October 2005).

**CTF** *Commission for Truth and Friendship*, Commission established jointly by Indonesia and East-Timor in 2005. The report of the commission was accepted by both countries on July 15, 2008

**DPR** *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, Representative Council of the People (Parliamentary Assembly - Indonesia).

**ETTA** *East Timor Transitional Administration*, Transitional Administration of the UNO in East Timor (working under the aegis of UNTAET).
EAST-TIMOR


FDTL  Forças de Defesa de Timor Lorosa’e, Defence Forces of Timor Lorosa’e (formed on February 1, 2001 as a substitute for Falintil).

Firaku  Populations of the eastern part of East Timor (Refer Kaladi).

FRETLIN  Frente Revolucionario do Timor-Leste Independente, Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (party founded in September 1974, as a substitute for ASDT).

Funu  Ritual wars amongst Timorese chieftaincies or?? against foreign populations (malai).

GOLKAR  Golongan karya. Functional group (political wing founded by General Suharto- Indonesia).

GPK  Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan. Generic name given by the Indonesian army to “groups threatening security”.

Halilintar  Pro-Indonesian militia led by Joao de Tavares in 1999.

IEC  Independent Electoral Commission set up by UNTAET for supervising the August 2001 elections.

ICJ  International Court of Justice at The Hague.

ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross.

IGGI  Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, the international group of sponsors for Indonesia (dissolved in 1992, after the Santa Cruz events in November 1991, replaced by GCI).

IOM  International Organization for Migration.

Interfet  International Force in East Timor (formed by the Security Council of the UNO in September 1999, as a replacement for UNAMET, after the crisis which followed the declaration of the results of the referendum of August 30, 1999. Was replaced by UNTAET in October 1999).

JPDA  Joint Petroleum Development Area. Zone of joint development for exploitation of petroleum resources, negotiated in 2001 between the provisional East Timorese Administration (ETTA) and Australia (replaces the ZOCA of 1989).

Kaladi  Populations of the western part of East Timor (Ref. Firaku).
**KomNas-HAM** *Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia*, Indonesian Human Rights Commission

**KOSTRAD** *Komando Strategi Angkatan Darat*, Strategic Command of the Army (Indonesia).


**Liurai** Traditional Timorese chieftain.

**Lulic** Ancient generic term for “sacred” in East Timor.

**Malai** Ancient generic term for “foreigners” in East Timor.

**Mambai** One of the main ethno-linguistic groups of East Timor in the mountains to the south of Dili.

**Maubere** Term of the ethno-linguistic group *Mambai* used during the colonial period to make fun of the less educated peasants. The expression was taken up again by the first East Timorese separatists symbolizing their movement and was particularly used in the acronym CNRM.

**MAWI** *Majelis Wali Gereja Indonesia*, Indonesian Episcopal Catholic Conference.

**MFA** *Movimento das Forças Armada*, Movement of the armed forces (Portugal).

**MIPLIN** *Milícia Popular de Libertação Nacional*, Popular National Liberation Militia established by the resistance in East Timor in the early 1980s.

**MPR** *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, Deliberation Assembly for the People (Indonesia).

**NTT** *Nusa Tenggara Timur*, Indonesian province of the eastern part of the Lesser Sunda islands to which West Timor belongs.

**OPMT** *Organização Popular da Mulher Timor*, Popular Organization of the Timorese Women (1975).

**Pancasila** Ideology of the Indonesian regime.

Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Line—provisional agreement between Australia and Indonesia on fishing (October 1981), including the part of the Timor Sea which comes under East Timor (it establishes the sharing of resources based on the coastal median line).

Peace Keeping Forces (of the UNO), in East Timor from 1999.

Polisi Republik Indonesia, Police of the Republic of Indonesia (in charge of security during the referendum of August 1999).

Partido Nacionalista Timorense, National Timorese Party formed by Abílio Araújo in 1999 (favouring autonomy within Indonesia).

Partido Social democrática, Social Democratic Party founded in East Timor in 2001 by Mário Carrascalão.

Reino Traditional Timorese kingdom or chieftaincy.


Village (desa during the Indonesian period). Comprising several aldeias or “hamlets”.

One of the main ethno-linguistic groups of East Timor. Its language, spoken particularly in Dili, has become the local language of the territory. It was used to celebrate religious ceremonies after Portuguese was banned. It is one of the two national languages along with Portuguese.

Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Army (ex-ABRI).


Transmigrasi Transmigration, Indonesian programme of population displacement from the densely populated islands of Java and Bali towards the “outer islands”.

União Democrática Timorense, Timorese Democratic Union (party founded in 1974; founded again in 2001 by João Carrascalão for the Constituent Assembly elections).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNETIM</td>
<td>União dos Estudantes Timorense, Organisation of Timorese Students (East Timor).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
<td>(May 20, 2002-May 20, 2005), replaced by UNOTIL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOTIL</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Timor-Leste</td>
<td>(as a replacement for UNMISET (May 20, 2005- May 20, 2006), replaced by UNMIT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
<td>(set up by the Security Council of the UNO in October 1999 as a substitute for Interfet).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAS</td>
<td>Uni Timor Aswain. Union of the Heroes of Timor. Organisation created in February 2000, following the referendum for self-determination, to unite the former pro-Indonesian militia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization (UNO).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOCA</td>
<td>Zone of Co-operation Area, demarcated in the Timor Sea between Australia and East Timor from the time of Indonesian occupation (from 1989). Replaced by the JPDA (Joint Petroleum Development Area) in 2001.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Barnett (Jon), Dessai (Suraje), Jones (Roger N.) 2005, *Vulnerability to climate variability and change in East Timor*, Working paper n°05/05, Melbourne University, School of International Development, Melbourne, 13 p.


Bartu (Peter) 2000, “The Militia, the Military and the People of Bobonaro District”, in Kingsbury (D.) ed., pp.81-98.


Boxer (Charles Ralph) 1947, The Topasses of Timor, Koninklijke Vereeniging Indisch Instituut (Mededeling n°LXXIII Afdeling Volkenkunde N°24), Amsterdam, 22 p.


Camões (revista de Letras e Culturas Lusófonas), Timor Lorosa’e, n°14, Julho-Setembro 2001, 176 p.


Carrascalão (Maria Ângela) 2002, Timor. Os Anos da Resistência, Mensagem-Serviços de Recursos Editoriais, Queluz, 362 p.

Cayrac-Blanchard (Françoise), Dovert (Stéphane) & Durand (Frédéric) (eds) 2000, Indonésie, un demi-siècle de construction nationale, L’Harmattan, Paris, 352 p.


Cribb (Robert) 2000, Historical Atlas of Indonesia, University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, x-256 p.


Dovert (Stéphane), see also Defert (Gabriel).


Dunn (James) 1995, “The Timor Affair in International Perspective”, in Carey (Peter) & Bentley (G. Carter), East Timor at the crossroads: The Forging of a Nation, Social Science Council, New York, pp.59-72.


Durand (Frédéric) 2003a, « Catholicisme et identité (s) timoraise (s), Cinq siècles de symbiose complexe », in Histoire & Anthropologie, n°2, pp.77-100.

Durand (Frédéric) 2003b, “Petitesse et pauvreté des peuples: caution ou alibi des puissants et de ceux qui les servent: le cas de Timor Oriental”, in Outre-Terre, pp.245-255.


Durand (Frédéric), see also Rouxel (L.)

East Timor Studies, 2006, Commentary on the Background to the Crisis in East Timor, Australian National University.


Feijó (Rui Graça) forthcoming “Counting the Votes that Count – a systemic analysis of the Timorese electoral cycle of 2007” (forthcoming, ICAS5KL).


Friedberg (Claudine) 1978, *Comment fut Tranchée la Liane Céleste et autres textes de littérature orale bunaq*, Paris, SELAF.


Hall (S), Critcher (C), Jefferson (T), Clarke (J), Robert (B) 1978, *Policing the crisis: “Mugging” the State and Law and Order*, Macmillan, London.


Hicks (David) 1976, Tetum Ghost and Kin, Mayfield Publishing Company, x-143 p.


Hohe (Tanja) 2000, “The younger brother who comes to solve the violence. Local vs. International perception of conflict resolution and political legitimacy in East Timor”, Paper presented to the Conference on ‘Conflicts and Violence in Indonesia’, Humboldt University Berlin. 3-5 July 2000.


IMF 2006, Staff Report for the 2006 Article IV Consultation, International Monetary Fund, December 27, 54 p.


IUCN 1994, Guidelines for protected areas Management categories, IUCN Commission on National Park and protected areas with the assistance of the World Conservation Monitoring Center, 94 p.


Kingsbury (Damien) & Leach (Michael) eds. 2007, East Timor beyond Independence, Monash University Press, Victoria, Australia, 320 p.

Kingsbury (Damien) eds. 2000, Guns and Ballot boxes, East Timor’s Vote for Independence, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton-Australia, xii-201 p.


La’o Hamutuk Bulletin 2005, *Timor-Leste will be one of the most oil-dependant countries in the world*, vol. 6, n°4, November, 16 p.


Marcus (George E.) 1986, “Contemporary Problems of Ethnography in the Modern World System”, in Clifford (James) & Marcus (George E.) Eds.,


Mead (Margaret) 1952, Film: “Dance and Trance in Bali”.


Metzner (Joachim K.) 1977, Man and Environment in Eastern Timor: A Geoecological Analysis of the Baucau-Viqueque Area as a Possible Basis for Regional Planning, Australian National University, Canberra, 389 p.

Migdal (J.), Schlichte (Klaus) 2005, Rethinking the State, in Schlichte (Klaus), The Dynamics of States. Processes of state formation outside the OECD, Ashgate, Aldershot.


Ostergaard (Lene), with Savio (Domingo) and Conceição (Antonio) 2005, *Timor-Leste, Youth Social Analysis*, June, 59 p.


Prideaux (Bruce), Carter (Bill) 2003, East Timor-steps to building a tourism industry, in *Tourism in Asia: Development, Marketing and Sustainability. The fifth biennal Conference, May 23-25, 2002*, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, School of hotel and tourism management, HK SAR., pp. 455-464.


RDTL - Government, "Draft law on external investment" approved on May 2, 2005 and implemented on 27 May 2005 ; and "Law on domestic investment", approved on May 9, 2005 and implemented on May 27, 2005.


Rees (Edward) 2006, "Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: Improvisation and Confusion from the Field", UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.


Identidade(s), Diversidade(s) e Práticas Interculturais. Porto, Areal Ed., pp. 385-391.


Silva (Kelly Cristiane da), Simião (Daniel Schroeter) eds 2007a, *Timor-Leste por trás do palco*, Humanitas, Belo Horizonte (Brasil), xxiv-431 p.


Tambiah (Stanley) 1985, *Culture, thought and social action*, Havard University Press, Boston.


Vaquinhas (José dos Santos) 1885, “Timor”, in Boletim da Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, 5ª Série N°1, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, pp 61-64.


Contributors

FRÉDÉRIC DURAND is Associate-Professor in Geography at University Toulouse II-Le Mirail, member of the CNRS Center for Southeast Asian Studies in Paris (UMR 8170), and currently Director of the Malaysia-France University Center in Kuala Lumpur. Author of more than ten books on Southeast Asia, the Malay World and Indonesia, he published four books on Timor: a geo-historical atlas of East-Timor in 2002 (translated into English in 2006), an history of Christianism in East and West Timor (in 2004), an history of cartography and travel to Timor Island (in 2006), and a study on contemporary situation in the country (Timor-Leste in search of reference marks. Economic and political perspectives, and regional integration 1999-2050), in 2008. Contact: durand@univ-tlse2.fr

CHRISTINE CABASSET-SEMEDO holds a PhD in Geography and Planning (Paris-Sorbonne), she's part-time university lecturer in several French universities, and works also as an expert and adviser on tourism. For the last 15 years, her academic research focused on different aspects of tourism and notably: socio-economic integration, spatial concentration / extension, contribution to national unity... Her main field surveys were undertaken in Southeast Asia, and particularly in Indonesia and Timor-Leste, topics and countries on which she published many articles. For the past ten years, she visits almost annually Timor-Leste. Her 2007 and 2008 missions to enhance teaching of tourism at the National University of Timor Lorosa'e were supported by the France Embassy in Indonesia and East-Timor. Contact: christine.cabasset@free.fr

RUI GRAÇA FEIJÓ (D. Phil Oxon 1984) is currently teaching at Universidade Aberta and also an Associate Researcher at the Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa, where he pursues his research interests in the construction of a democratic state in Timor-Leste. He lived in Timor for an extended period (2004-2006). He was a teacher at UNTL in Díli, and later an UN sponsored Advisor to
Presidency of the Timorese Republic. In 2007, he was a member of the CPLP team of electoral observers in the Timorese Presidential elections. In 2006 he published *Timor-Leste: Paisagem Tropical com gente dentro* (Lisbon, Campo da Comunicação). Contact: rfeijo@univ-ab.pt

**SARA GONZALEZ DEVANT** is a freelance writer and Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional y Desarrollo (AECID) scholar. She worked in Timor-Leste between 2005-2006. She has also published 'Displacement in the 2006 Dili Conflict: Dynamics of an Ongoing Crisis' (2008), Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper 45, University of Oxford. Contact: sara.gonzalez.devant@gmail.com

**DAVID HICKS** is Professor of Anthropology at Stony Brook University and Life Member of Clare College, University of Cambridge. His books include *Tetum Ghosts and Kin* (2004), *Structural Analysis in Anthropology, A Maternal Religion, Kinship and Religion in Eastern Indonesia*, and *Ritual and Belief*. His papers have appeared in the *American Anthropologist, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Society*, and the *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, land- en Volkenkunde*. Contact: dhicks@notes.cc.sunysb.edu

Dr. **ALEXANDER LOCH** is a German psychologist and cultural anthropologist working for 10 years in various capacities for international developmental organisations. He managed the research-and development unit of the *Instituto Catolico para Formação de Professores* (2002-2005) in Baucau, edited a Tetum dictionary (2005) and a monograph about Psychosocial Reconstruction in East Timor (2007). He is academically affiliated with the *Centre Asie du Sud Est* in Paris (2008) as a Post-Doc researcher (DAAD), and advises ongoing training programs in East Timor (World Bank) and West Papua (UNIPA). Contact: alexander@loch.asia

**NUNO CANAS MENDES** holds a Ph.D. in International Relations and is an Assistant Professor at The Advanced Institute for Social and Political Sciences at The Technical University of Lisbon. He is also a Research Fellow at the Orient Institute where he co-ordinates a research project on "State-building/State-failure debate in International Relations: The Case of East Timor" financed with a grant from The Portuguese
Science and Technology Foundation. His main research interests are International Relations, foreign policy and international relations history, East Timor and Southeast Asia. He has published and co-edited five books on these subjects. Contact: ncanasm@gmail.com

HENRIETTE SACHSE is a PhD candidate at Humboldt-University of Berlin in Germany. She has been doing research on Indonesia and Timor-Leste for the last 10 years and especially on the Timorese Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation as well as the bilateral Commission for Truth and Friendship. She has published several articles on both countries. Besides her research, Henriette Sachse is working for the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Contact: henriettesachse@gmx.de

CHRISTINE SCHENK has been working as advisor and project manager for a range of aid agencies and NGOs, including GTZ, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), World Bank, Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Timor-Leste (CAVR). She has field experience in Haiti, Ecuador, Peru, Honduras, Sri Lanka, East Timor and Indonesia/Aceh. In August 2007, she joined swisspeace, a Swiss NGO working on peace research, policy and practice. She works as Programme Officer for Sri Lanka in Berne. Contact: chschenk@gmx.net

PAULO CASTRO SEIXAS has a master in Sociology and a PhD in Anthropology. Associate Professor at Fernando Pessoa University since 2004, he is coordinator of the Cultural Studies Programs and of Humanitarian Action, Cooperation and Development Master. Researcher in projects funded by World Bank, EU and Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation, he is author/co-author of 6 books and organizer of other 5. He is also author and Director of six anthropological documentaries. His main interests are Transnational Urban studies and Timor-Leste Anthropology. Books on Timor-Leste: Timor-Leste. Viagens, Transições, Mediações, Porto, Univ. Fernando Pessoa Ed., 2006; Seixas, Paulo Castro & Engelenhoven, Aone (orgs) Diversidade Cultural na Construção do Estado e da Nação em Timor-Leste, Porto, Univ. Fernando Pessoa Ed., 2006. Contact: pseixas@ufp.edu.pt
JACQUELINE AQUINO SIAPNO (Joy) teaches Philosophy and Political Economy in the Universidade Nacional Timor-Leste (UNTL) and also co-founded the School of Democratic Economics, Faculty of Economics (UNTL), with Hendro Sangkoyo. She has also previously taught at the Universidade Dili and Universidade da Paz in Timor-Leste. Once a year, she teaches in Universitat Jaume I in Castellon, Spain, in the Graduate Program in International Conflict, Peace and Development. She has held a tenured position in the University of Melbourne and research fellowships at ANU, University of California Irvine and Riverside. She lives in Dili where she is raising her family, and conducts extensive research in rural districts in Timor-Leste, and comparative research with the Philippines, Indonesia, and other Asian countries. She has written several articles and books on Timor-Leste, Aceh, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Southeast Asian history, culture and politics. Contact: jsiapno@unimelb.edu.au

KELLY SILVA holds a Ph.D. in Anthropology (University of Brasilia, 2004) and is an Assistant. Professor at the University of Brasilia. Her research focuses on anthropology of complexe societies, with an emphase on problematics related to State anthropology, international cooperation, politic and elites. She coordonates or participates to several investigation works on elites and the State-Nation building in Timor-Leste. She published, with Daniel Simiao, Timor-Leste por trás do palco, Humanitas, Belo Horizonte (Brasil) (2007). Contact: kellysa@uol.com.br

LÚCIO SOUSA is a portuguese anthropologist. He taught Portuguese in East Timor between 2000 and 2002. He is currently teaching Anthropology at Universidade Aberta in Lisbon and doing a PhD in Social Anthropology with a thesis on the social organization and ritual practices of the Bunak of East Timor. The field research was made during university holidays in August 2003 and 2004 and from September 2005 to August 2006. The research was supported by grants from Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian and Fundação Oriente. Contact: lucio@univ-ab.pt
Publications de l’Irasec

Études régionales Asie du Sud-Est

L’Islamisme combattant en Asie du Sud-Est par Philippe Migaux

Présence économique européenne en Asie du Sud-Est, sous la direction de Guy Faure et David Hoyrup

Le destin des fils du dragon, l’influence de la communauté chinoise au Viêt Nam et en Thaïlande, par Arnaud Leveau

Des montagnards aux minorités ethniques, quelle intégration nationale pour les habitants des hautes terres du Viêt Nam et du Cambodge, par Stan Tan Boon Hwee, Nguyen Van Chinh, Andrew Hardy, Mathieu Guérin

Pavillon Noir sur l’Asie du Sud-Est, histoire d’une résurgence de la piraterie maritime en Asie du Sud-Est, par Eric Frécon

The Resurgence of Sea Piracy in Southeast Asia, Occasional Paper by Eric Frecon (in English)

Yaa Baa, production, trafic et consommation de méthamphétamine en Asie du Sud-Est continentale par Joël Meissonnier et Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy

Yaa Baa, Production, Traffic and Consumption of methamphetamine in Mainland Southeast Asia by Joël Meissonnier and Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy (in English)

Armée du peuple, armée du roi, les militaires face à la société en Indonésie et en Thaïlande par Nicolas Révisse et Arnaud Dubus

Les messagers divins, aspects esthétiques et symboliques des oiseaux en Asie du Sud-Est, sous la direction de Pierre Le Roux et Bernard Sellato

Réfléchir l’Asie du Sud-Est, essai d’épistémologie sous la direction de Stéphane Dovert

Outre-Terre, Asies, tiers du monde (revue)

Les musulmans d’Asie du Sud-Est face au vertige de la radicalisation sous la direction de Stéphane Dovert et de Rémy Madinier
Asie du Sud-Est 2007, par la revue Focus Asie du Sud-Est
Asie du Sud-Est 2008, par la revue Focus Asie du Sud-Est
Asie du Sud-Est 2009, par Arnaud Leveau (Ed.)
Mekong–Ganga Initiative, Occasional Paper by Swaran Singh
Investigating the Grey Areas of the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, Occasional Paper sous la direction d’Arnaud Leveau
L’impact des catastrophes naturelles sur la résolution des conflits en Asie. Les cas du Sri Lanka, de l’Indonésie et du Cachemire, note de recherche de Clarisse Hervet
Anti-Trafficking Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Global Linkages from Geopolitical Perspectives, note de recherché d’Anne-Lise Sauterey

Brunei

Brunei, les métamorphoses d’un Etat-réseau, par Marie Sybille de Vienne (à paraître en 2009)

Birmanie

Birmanie contemporaine, monographie nationale, sous la direction de Gabriel Defert
Back to Old Habits, Isolationism ot the Self-Preservation of Burma’s Military Regime, Occasional Paper by Renaud Egretreau and Larry Jagan

Cambodge

Cambodge contemporain, monographie nationale, sous la direction d’Alain Forest
Le dictionnaire des Khmers rouges, par Solomon Kane
Cambodge soir, chroniques sociales d’un pays au quotidien, sous la direction de Grégoire Rochigneux
Indonésie

La fin de l’innocence, l’islam indonésien face à la tentation radicale de 1967 à nos jours, par Rémy Madinier et Andrée Feillard

Les relations centre périphérie en Indonésie, note de recherche de Lucas Patriat

Aceh : l’histoire inachavée. La fière histoire d’une terre dévastée par les tsunami par Voka Miladinovic et Jean-Claude Pomonti (bilingue / Bilingual : Français / English)

Laos

Le Laos au XXI siècle, les défis de l’intégration régionale, par Vatthana Pholsena et Ruth Banomyong (en français)

Laos, From Buffer State to Crossroads by Vatthana Pholsena and Ruth Banomyong (in English)

Malaisie

Economie de la Malaisie par Elsa Lafaye de Michaux (à paraître en 2009)

Philippines

Elites et développement aux Philippines : un pari perdu ? par Cristina Jimenze-Hallare, Roberto Galang et Stéphane Auvray

La Croix et le Kriss, violences et rancœurs entre chrétiens et musulmans dans le sud des Philippines par Solomon Kane et Felice Noelle Rodriguez

Singapour

A roof Overt Every Head by Wong Tai-Chee and Xavier Guillot
Thaïlande

Thaïlande contemporaine, monographie nationale sous la direction de Stéphane Dovert

Les musulmans de Thaïlande par Michel Gilquin
The Muslims of Thailand by Michel Gilquin (in English)

Thaïlande : ressources documentaires françaises par Laurent Hennequin

Bangkok, formes du commerce et évolutions urbaines par Davisi Boontharm

State and Media in Thailand During Political Crisis, Occasional Paper sous la direction d’Arnaud Leveau et Chavarong Limpattamapaneer

Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation into Southern Thailand, Occasional Paper par Patacharawalai Wongboonsin (Eds)

Femmes prostituées dans la region du sud de la Thaïlande, Occasional Paper par Jean Baffie

Timor-Leste

Timor Lorosa’e, Pays Carrefour de l’Asie et du Pacifique. Un atlas géohistorique, par Frédéric Durand

Timor Lorosa’e, A Country at the Crossroads of Asia and the Pacific, a Geo-Historical Atlas by Frédéric Durand (in English)

Catholicisme et protestantisme dans l’île de Timor : 1556-2003. Construction d’une identité chrétienne et engagement politique contemporain, par Frédéric Durand

Timor : 1250-2005, 750 de cartographie et de voyages, par Frédéric Durand

Timor-Leste en quête de repères, perspectives économico-politiques et intégration régionale par Frédéric Durand

Timor-Leste, The Dragon’s Newest Friend, by Loro Horta
Viêt Nam

Viêt Nam contemporain, monographie nationale, sous la direction de Stéphane Dovert et Benoît de Tréglodé

Japon-Viêt Nam, histoire d’une relation sous influences, par Guy Faure et Laurent Schwab

Japan-Viêt Nam, history of a relationship under influences by Guy Faure and Laurent Schwab (in English)

Agriculture, environnement et sociétés sur les hautes terres du Viêt Nam, par Frédéric Fortunel, Frédéric Durand, Rodolphe de Konnick